Wysłany 29 maja 2018 przez Susan Mangiero Jeśli chodzi o gry strategiczne, policz mnie. Bridge and Scrabble to dwa z moich ulubionych, z wyjątkiem sytuacji, gdy wydaje mi się, że mam małą szansę na zwycięstwo. Jedną rzeczą jest stracić rękę lub dwie, ale czuć się pewnie w możliwym zwycięstwie. Jest całkowicie przygnębiające, aby wiedzieć, że odzyskanie jest mało prawdopodobne. Zdarzyło się to kilka dni temu, gdy mój mąż dodał literę E, U, A i L, aby utworzyć grupę słów, które dały mu sześćdziesiąt siedem punktów. Oooo. Nawet z wieloma wysokimi literami wiedziałem, że pokonanie jego ruchu na bonanza było nieprawdopodobne. Za każdym razem, gdy gramy, zaczynam z optymistyczną nutą i mam nadzieję na pozytywny wynik do momentu, gdy poznam jego czas na przekształcenie moich obliczeń. Dobrze jest chcieć na gwiazdę, ale równie ważne, aby odróżnić fantazję od fikcji. To dlatego byłem zaskoczony, gdy dowiedziałem się o wynikach niedawnego badania 400 inwestorów instytucjonalnych na temat ich prognoz wydajności. Prowadzone przez State Street Global Advisors (quotSSGAquot) w połączeniu z ramieniem badawczym Financial Times. Główne przykłady odejść z badania quotBuilding Bridges są następujące: Tradycyjne modele alokacji aktywów mogą nie być w stanie wygenerować długoterminowej średniej stopy zwrotu wynoszącej jedenaście procent, na pewno nie zmuszając kupujących do podejmowania większego ryzyka. Czterdzieści jeden procent ankietowanych wyraziło preferencję dla kilkudokładnych klasyfikacji ekspozycji aktywów w odniesieniu do identyfikatorów czynnikowych lub obiektywnych. Jedenaście procent osób, które szukają końcowych luk w rankingu, uznają strategie smart beta za najważniejsze, a 38 procent inwestorów instytucjonalnych zastosuje to podejście wraz z innymi działaniami. "Co ciekawe, trzy czwarte respondentów, którzy wprowadzili metody inteligentnej bety, zauważyło umiarkowaną do znaczącej poprawę wydajności portfela." Oświeceni decydenci mają trudności z uzyskaniem zgody zarządu na lepsze sposoby osiągania długoterminowych wyników, a grupy rówieśnicze są wolno iść za przykładem. Osiemdziesiąt cztery procent funduszy emerytalnych, państwowych funduszy majątkowych i innych właścicieli aktywów uważa, że słabsze wyniki prawdopodobnie utrzymają się przez rok. Jak zauważył dziennikarz "Market Watch" Chuck Jaffe nieco nieumiejętnie podkreślając ryzyko inwestycyjne: myślenie życzeniowe (18 maja 2018 r.), Inwestorzy długoterminowi mają marzenia, jeśli wierzą, że mogą regularnie generować jedenaście procent rocznie. Cytuje Lori Heinel, głównego stratega ds. Portfolio w SSGA, jako przyznając, że trudno jest osiągnąć tę liczbę, biorąc pod uwagę fakt, że kwota ta stanowi wyzwanie dla perspektyw wzrostu, otoczenia inflacyjnego i bardzo trudnego środowiska zwrotu inwestycji. Co więcej, dopiero kilka tygodni temu Specjalny mediator Departamentu Skarbu USA wysłał list do powierników funduszu emerytalnego państw centralnych, odrzucając plan ratunkowy po części dlatego, że jego 7,5 procent rocznych założeń dotyczących zwrotu z inwestycji nie było postrzegane jako rozsądne. Tak jak to opisałem we wcześniejszym poście na blogu "Pension Rock" a Hard Place, czyli publiczne fundusze emerytalne, przywódcy związkowi, grupy podatników i decydenci kształtują niepewne wody zarządzania aktywami i pasywami. Nie są sami. Plany korporacyjne, fundacje, fundacje i inne rodzaje inwestorów instytucjonalnych są również zagrożone dotarciem do miejsca przeznaczenia i nie upaść na skałach. Moje nierealistyczne oczekiwania mogą mi zagrać w grę. W przypadku inwestorów długoterminowych dochodzi do poważnych pieniędzy, a dane wejściowe do modeli są odpowiednio analizowane. Wysłany 10 sierpnia 2018 r. Przez Susan Mangiero W celu poinformowania burmistrza miasta, Borisa Johnsona, o zmianach klimatycznych, Zgromadzenie Londyńskie wezwało ostatnio Urząd Funduszy Emerytalnych w Londynie (quotLPFAquot) do uwolnienia się od inwestycji w węgiel (w szczególności w paliwa kopalne) i alokować wpływy do odpowiedzialnych funduszy, które dostarczają odpowiednich zwrotów podatnikowi. Podobno do Narodowego Stowarzyszenia Funduszy Emerytalnych (quotNAPFquot) i uznania, że instytucje mają do odegrania rolę w zakresie Odpowiedzialnych Inwestycji (quotquot) lub tego, co NAPF opisuje jako przytoczenie czynników środowiskowych, społecznych i ładu korporacyjnego (ESG) w procesie podejmowania decyzji inwestycyjnych i działań zarządczych. Zdaniem Chief Investment Officer. LPFA, z aktywami przekraczającymi 4 miliardy funtów szterlingów, odpowiedział w liście do 80 000 członków, że ESG poważnie inwestuje jako długoterminowy pojazd, dodając, że jego celem musi być zapewnienie, że możemy nadal płacić twoje emerytury, ponieważ są one należne. Chociaż ten duży program emerytalny ma obecnie mniej niż 1 inwestycję w paliwa kopalne, przytocz je na stronie internetowej LPFA, aby poruszyć ten temat w następujący sposób: quotRozwiązalne czynniki inwestycyjne, takie jak niski poziom węgla, mogą być istotne jako dodatkowa uwaga. Jednak badanie zasobów pod kątem inwestycji wyłącznie z przyczyn etycznych pozostaje w konflikcie z obowiązkiem powierniczym Rady, jeżeli decyzja może spowodować znaczące straty finansowe dla funduszu. Pojęcia odpowiedzialnego inwestowania i dezinwestycji nie są nowe. Plany emerytalne i państwowe fundusze majątkowe to tylko niektóre z wielu organizacji, które zostały poproszone o wyrzucenie niektórych inwestycji. Odpychanie, gdy się pojawia, opiera się na założeniu, że (a) głęboko zakorzenione akcjonariusze mogą wiele zrobić, aby dokonać zmiany (b) koszty zbycia są wysokie i (c) wyprzedanie pozycji może naruszyć obowiązki powiernicze wobec beneficjentów. W artykule "Pośród paliw kopalnych nie ma rozwiązania dla kwestii zmian klimatycznych" (Financial Times, 22 marca 2018 r.), Anne Stausboll wyszczególnia stanowisko w zakresie zarządzania przyjęte przez California Public Employees Retirement System, aby objąć quasiadwatność, zaangażowanie w przedsiębiorstwa i inwestowanie w rozwiązania dotyczące zmiany klimatu. quot Jako dyrektor generalny sugeruje, że wycofanie się po prostu poprzez wyprzedawanie aktywów poprzez zbycie nie pomoże. W 2007 roku napisałem o mojej rozmowie z Marią Bartiromo, późniejszą starszą kotwicą CNBC, na temat tego, czy, jak i kiedy i kiedy pozbyć się. Zob. "Tam, gdzie odpowiedzialność powiernicza przypisana do zbycia", cytowany powyżej, zaproponowałem cztery kwestie, które powtarzają się poniżej: Sprzedaż inwestycji z powodu presji politycznej mogłaby skończyć się kosztem kwototaksujących i zaplanować uczestników w postaci nieoczekiwanych kosztów transakcji, co z kolei mogłoby pogorszyć sub-poziomy finansowania. z jakiejkolwiek zleconej sprzedaży może dojść do niższych zysków niż pierwotnie zakładano Powiernicy mogą zostać oskarżeni o naruszenie swoich obowiązków, chyba że mogą odpowiednio wykazać ekonomiczne uzasadnienie zbycia, a plany, zwłaszcza te z niewielkimi sztabami, mogą być przytłoczone koniecznością spędzenia znacznego czasu i pieniądz, aby uzyskać szybki rozwój przed dokonaniem bezpośrednich inwestycji typu ESG. Jak w przypadku każdej akcji inwestycyjnej, nigdy nie ma darmowego lunchu. Każda decyzja musi być dokładnie przejrzana. Zainteresowani czytelnicy mogą sprawdzić następujące elementy: Wysłany 27 lutego 2017 r. Przez Susan Mangiero Ludzie w mojej rodzinie kupują rzeczy do końca. Nie zawsze działa tak, jak chcemy. Na przykład, nie możemy oglądać filmów w Internecie za pośrednictwem naszego telewizora, ponieważ musimy jeszcze uaktualnić do nowszego pudełka, które ma technologię, aby to umożliwić. Czasami jednak lepiej jest dokonać aktualizacji, nawet jeśli istnieje krótkoterminowy dodatkowy koszt, aby to zrobić. Dowiedziałem się tej lekcji na własnej skórze w ostatnich tygodniach. Chorego starego laptopa, który ciągle zamarzał na stronach ze zbyt dużą ilością grafiki i drukarką, która działała tylko wtedy, gdy czyściłem głowicę drukującą (i co stało się częstym zjawiskiem), zrobiłem frazę do Staplesa. Podczas mojej dyskusji ze sprzedawcą technologii zgodził się ze mną, że natychmiastowy zakup nowych narzędzi zwiększających produktywność będzie o wiele tańszy niż modernizacja przy zakupie kilku części. Szybkość, przechowywanie i możliwość korzystania z nowszych wersji oprogramowania to tylko niektóre z zalet, o których mówiliśmy. Zmiana może być dobra, czy nie. Koncepcja oceny, kiedy należy ulepszyć projekt planu lub mix alokacji aktywów (lub wiele innych decyzji), w porównaniu do przeprowadzenia pełnego przeglądu, ma zastosowanie do planów emerytalnych. Oczywiście zakłada to, że można nawet modyfikować. W przypadku programu o określonych świadczeniach, który jest rażąco niedofinansowany lub planu określonych składek utworzonego w celu zapewnienia zadowolenia pracowników poprzez oferowanie określonej grupy inwestycji, kurs odwracania może być problematyczny. Z drugiej strony, sponsor, który może wprowadzić zmiany, które zostałyby uznane za korzystne przez uczestników, ale nie podejmuje działań, może zostać oskarżony o złe praktyki lub gorzej. Należy pamiętać, że wiele pozwów w sprawie ERISA dotyczy działań, które mogła podjąć komisja powiernicza. Ważne jest, aby być czujnym na temat tego, co należy robić na bieżąco i odpowiednio na nie reagować. Przynajmniej niektórzy sponsorzy planu uwzględniają potrzebę dokonania przeglądu sytuacji. Według niedawnego sondażu Aon Hewitt, 62 procent badanych 220 amerykańskich firm z tradycyjnymi ofertami świadczeń emerytalnych poprzysiągło, że dostosuje swoje plany, aby lepiej pasowały do zobowiązań w nadchodzącym roku. Niektórzy respondenci potwierdzili zamiar rozważenia zwiększenia alokacji na papiery wartościowe o stałym dochodzie i strategii hedgingowych, gdy ich status finansowania ulegnie poprawie. Jedna na osiem ankietowanych firm ocenia status finansowania planu tak często, jak raz dziennie. Kliknij, aby pobrać quot2017 Gorące tematy na emeryturze: budowanie strategicznego fokusu. quot mam koszulkę, która czyta quotChange jest dobra. Idź pierwszy. To zawsze mnie rozśmiesza. Nawet jeśli zmiana nie jest uzasadniona, ważne jest, aby wykazać, że przynajmniej ktoś pomyślał o czynnikach ryzyka i alternatywnych sposobach złagodzenia tych zidentyfikowanych niepewności. Może t-shirt powinien zamiast tego przeczytać quotAssesing, czy zmiana ma sens jest ważną częścią fiduciary responsibility. quot Opublikowany 12 stycznia 2017 r. przez Susan Mangiero Moje komentarze na temat alokacji aktywów instytucjonalnych, wraz z tymi dokonanymi przez pana Rona Ryana (CEO, Ryan ALM) i Lynn Connolly (Principal, Harbor Peak, LLC), zostały dobrze przyjęte 8 stycznia 2017 r. Część wspólnego programu sponsorowanego przez Quantitative Work Alliance for Applied Finance, Education and Wisdom (quotQWAFAFEW quot) i International International Managers Association (quotPRMIA quot), nasza publiczność profesjonalistów inwestycyjnych dodana debata na tematy takie jak strategiczne i taktyczne alokacje aktywów, opłaty, rola doradcy emerytalnego i prawdopodobny wpływ na rynek kapitałowy z powodu wdrożenia strategie takie jak inwestowanie oparte na zobowiązaniach (quotLDIquot) i transfery ryzyka emerytalnego (quotPRTquot). Biorąc pod uwagę wielkość rynku emerytalnego w USA wynoszącego 20 bilionów dolarów, liczy się duże pieniądze. Złe decyzje dotyczące alokacji zasobów mogą prowadzić do kaskady problemów gospodarczych. Nie jest zaskoczeniem, że zarzuty dotyczące naruszenia powództwa w formie pozwów dotyczących systemu ERISA są coraz bardziej skoncentrowane na kwestiach dotyczących stosowności danej kombinacji aktywów i czy doradca inwestycyjny lub doradca finansowy pomógł lub utrudnił sposób alokowania środków emerytalnych. Na uwagę zasługuje fakt, że analiza skuteczności procesu alokacji aktywów i związanego z nim miksu pieniądza może i była stosowana zarówno do programów określonych świadczeń, jak i programów określonych składek. Należy pamiętać, że decyzje o alokacji aktywów są również kluczowe dla oceny popularnych produktów finansowych, takich jak fundusze daty docelowej. Problemy z rachunkowością i to, jak zmieniające się zasady wpływają na decyzje o alokacji aktywów, to kolejny temat, którym zajmiemy się w nadchodzących miesiącach. Kliknij, aby wyświetlić slajdy dotyczące alokacji aktywów Susan Mangieros, które zostały rozdane członkom grupy 8 stycznia, i mają na celu zainicjować dyskusję na temat tego zawsze istotnego tematu. Zainteresowani czytelnicy mogą zapoznać się z często zadawanymi pytaniami dotyczącymi daty docelowej lub funduszy cyklu życia (Instytut Instytucji Inwestycyjnych) oraz "Roczny przegląd dużych funduszy emerytalnych i publicznych funduszy rezerw emerytalnych. Sprawozdanie z długoterminowych inwestycji funduszy emerytalnych (OECD, październik 2017 r.). Jeśli masz konkretne pytanie dotyczące alokacji aktywów i procesu proceduralnego związanego z zarządzaniem aktywami i pasywami, wyślij mi e-mail. Wysłany 26 września 2017 r. Przez Susan Mangiero Hot off prasy, OECD września 2017 r. Wydanie quotPension Markets In Focus quot zawiera niektóre ważne statystyki dotyczące systemów emerytalnych na całym świecie. Podczas gdy łączne aktywa wzrosły do ponad 20 bilionów (według stanu na grudzień 2017 r.), Realne stopy zwrotu po wprowadzeniu były w najlepszym wypadku niewielkie. Przy średniej rocznej stopie zwrotu na poziomie -1,7 niewielu zwycięzców pokonało cały rynek. Nagroda dla systemu emerytalnego o najwyższej wydajności trafiła do Danii z rocznym zwrotem w wysokości 12,1 w 2017 r., Następnie w Niderlandach (8,2), Australii (4,1) oraz w Islandii i Nowej Zelandii, z których każdy uzyskał skromny wynik 2,3. Turcja, Włochy, Hiszpania, Japonia, Wielka Brytania i Stany Zjednoczone osiągnęły ujemne zyski. Wieści nie są wcale ponure. Według Andreacute'a Laboul, dyrektora departamentu finansowego ds. Finansowych i korporacyjnych OECD ds. Finansowych, oceny wydajności, które wyglądają na wiele lat, pokazują, że tradycyjny 60-procentowy i 40 długoterminowy zestaw obligacji państwowych wygenerował dodatnie zwroty w wysokości od 2,8 w Japonii. do 5,8 w Wielkiej Brytanii. Oczywiście w grę wchodzi wiele czynników, z których nie mniej ważne jest to, ile komitetu inwestycyjnego lub organu zajmującego się tworzeniem polityki musi lokować pieniądze lokalnie, a nie zagraniczne, tempo, w jakim aktywa rosną (i mogą zostać wykorzystane) oraz opłaty, które są wypłacane różnym dostawcom usług. Jeśli chodzi o ekspozycję klasy aktywów, naukowcy z OECD zauważają, że alokacja funduszy emerytalnych do akcji publicznych znacząco spadła w porównaniu z latami ubiegłymi. Tendencja ta została również odnotowana w "Globalnym funduszu emerytalnym 2017". Opublikowanym przez Towers Watson w styczniu, ta kompilacja interesujących punktów danych pokazuje, że Holandia i Japonia mają czterokrotność alokacji na obligacje niż średnia. Dla kontrastu, 2017, Australia, Wielka Brytania i Stany Zjednoczone utrzymały ponadprzeciętne alokacje kapitału własnego. Przyznanie większej ilości środków na rozwiązania alternatywne jest niezaprzeczalną rzeczywistością w przypadku planów emerytalnych w wielu krajach. Ponieważ więcej niż kilka osób zakłada, że decyzje o alokacji aktywów dominują w zakresie zwrotów portfela, kluczowe jest śledzenie, kto inwestuje w co. Działalność związana z eliminacją ryzyka emerytalnego najprawdopodobniej będzie miała wpływ na wycenę portfela określonych świadczeń, jeśli, jak sugerują eksperci, więcej spółek decyduje się na wyjście z inwestycji lub zmodyfikowanie jej ekspozycji na wycenę biznesową poprzez zamrożenie planu, za pomocą instrumentów pochodnych, oferując wypłaty ryczałtowe, wchodzenie w renty grupowe i tak dalej. Restrukturyzacja emerytur i dodanie większej liczby alternatyw to czynniki, które zmieniają krajobraz zarządzania na wiele sposobów. Po pierwsze, potrzeba dochowania należytej staranności i niezależnych usług wyceny prawdopodobnie staje się bardziej paląca. Po drugie, regulacyjne skupienie się na ujawnianiu udziałów i wynagrodzeniach wypłacanych usługodawcom mogłoby zahamować wykorzystanie funduszy prywatnych w tym samym czasie, w którym poszukujący zysku piszą kontrole. Dynamika quotpush-pullquot przyciąga na siebie uwagę, ponieważ gra toczy się o tak wiele pieniędzy. Wysłany 22 września 2017 r. Przez Susan Mangiero Reporter Michael Corkery maluje ponury obraz tego, co czeka pracowników rządowych. W kryzysowym kryzysie, pomimo cięć niemal każdego Staterdquo (Wall Street Journal, 22-23 września 2017 r.), Kroki podjęte w celu obniżenia kosztów nie były w stanie pokryć prawie 1 tryliona luki w finansowaniu. rdquo Oprócz zmniejszonych korzyści dla nowych pracowników, zwiększono składki wymagane od nowych i obecnych pracowników, zawieszone korekty kosztów utrzymania i niższe świadczenia dla obecnych pracowników, rządy zaczynają wdrażać plany określonych składek, takie jak uzgodnienia 401 (k). Bez wątpienia debata na temat konstytucyjności będzie szalała, ale faktem jest, że status quo jest prawie niemożliwy do utrzymania. W przypadku niektórych planów rozwiązaniem jest zmiana aktywów i inwestowanie w alternatywne rozwiązania, takie jak fundusze private equity i fundusze hedgingowe. Według doradcy Capital Equity Capital Equity. fundusze private equity i niektóre fundusze emerytalne dobrze sobie radziły. Mapa stanu według stanu pokazuje pozytywne zyski dla publicznych funduszy emerytalnych, takich jak California State Teachersrsquo Retirement System. To, czy związek między obiema grupami będzie kontynuowany, jest niepewne. Jak zauważyła Kate D. Mitchell, dyrektor zarządzający Scale Venture Partners i mówca podczas konferencji Dow Jones Private Equity Analyst 2017, przejście od programów określonych świadczeń do programów określonych składek dla niezliczonych państwowych i lokalnych pracodawców prawdopodobnie będzie oznaczać mniej dolarów dla prywatnych przemysł kapitałowy. To, co się wówczas stanie, będzie zależeć od tego, czy nowe środki będą dostępne z innych źródeł, czy zamiast tego spowodują zmniejszenie długoterminowego wykorzystania aktywów przez partnerów generalnych (quotGPquot). Ponadto naciski polityczne są rzeczywistością, szczególnie w odniesieniu do sposobu, w jaki zyski kapitałowe są obecnie opodatkowane. Jeżeli stopy wzrosną w tym samym czasie, gdy mniej pieniędzy będzie dostępnych w publicznych kasach emerytalnych, branża private equity może znaleźć się pod presją pod względem potencjału wzrostu i rentowności. Inni prelegenci na konferencji Dow Jones Private Equity Analyst Conference byli niezwykle optymistyczni jeśli chodzi o prognozy wzrostu uber w niektórych sektorach geograficznych i branżach. Jeśli mają rację, inwestorzy private equity będą chcieli uważnie przyjrzeć się portfelowi GP. Wysłany 27 czerwca 2017 r. Przez Susan Mangiero Podpisany 25 czerwca 2017 r. Przez prezydenta Obamę, zachowanie dostępu do opieki nad beneficjentami Medicare i ustawą o uwolnieniu emerytalnym (HR 3692) pozwala sponsorom planu amortyzować luki w finansowaniu przez dłuższy okres czasu niż jest obecnie dozwolone. Ponadto przepisy te umożliwiają ulgi w finansowaniu na okres do dwóch lat. Podczas gdy rynki finansowe nie były dobre dla więcej niż kilku programów określonych świadczeń, nowe przepisy sprawią, że użytkownikom sprawozdań finansowych jeszcze trudniej będzie ocenić rzeczywisty stan ekonomiczny każdej umowy emerytalnej. To nie jest dobra rzecz. Beneficjenci i akcjonariusze również zasługują na informacje przyjazne dla użytkownika, zwłaszcza jeśli plan ma kłopoty. Nowe prawo sprawi, że sprawy będą jeszcze trudniejsze, jeśli chodzi o odcyfrowanie zgłoszonych numerów, a to coś mówi. Jak napisałem w "Planie, że nie było Barką" (czasopismo CFA, marzec-kwiecień 2008 r.), Analitycy finansowi i inne zainteresowane strony muszą nauczyć się myśleć jak detektywi. Obecny stan rozliczeń emerytalnych jest daleki od doskonałości. Biorąc pod uwagę prawdopodobny wpływ H. R. 3692, opublikowane informacje o finansowaniu będą jasne jak błoto. Kliknij tutaj, aby uzyskać dostęp do pełnego prawodawstwa. Wyczyść, by przeczytać cytat z planu, który nie zrobił, cytowany przez dr Susan Mangiero. (Redakcja Uwaga: Pension Governance, LLC jest obecnie częścią Investment Governance, Inc.) Wysłany 13 czerwca 2017 przez Susan Mangiero Ciesz się tym wywiadem na temat zarządzania długowiecznością i ryzykiem emerytalnym z Dr. Davidem Blake, dyrektorem Instytutu Emerytalnego. Profesor Blake wyjaśnia, dlaczego tak ważne jest zrozumienie trendów długości życia w zależności od wieku, płci i grup społeczno-ekonomicznych. Komentuje nowe zasady wyceny, które odnoszą się do przejrzystości sprawozdania finansowego i cen akcji sponsorów. Dokonuje rozróżnienia między wykupem emerytur a zakupami emerytalnymi i podaje powody, dla których zamiany długów mogą być korzystne. Kliknij tutaj, aby zapoznać się z cytowaniem Wydziału Zarządzania Ryzykiem i Emeryturami, cytując wywiad z profesorem Davidem Blake, maj 2017 r. Aby zapoznać się z innymi artykułami na temat zarządzania długowiecznością i ryzykiem emerytalnym, odwiedź portal. fiduciaryxregister, aby uzyskać bezpłatny abonament na stronę najlepszych praktyk FiduciaryX. Opublikowano 1 września 2009 r. Przez Susan Mangiero Alokacja zasobów wydaje się być obecna w wielu dzisiejszych czasach. Nie jest to zaskakujące, ponieważ badania empiryczne wielokrotnie sugerują, że sposób podziału środków między sektory i instrumenty jest główną przyczyną zwrotów. Niektóre stany, takie jak Karolina Północna, stanowią większy wybór dla państwowych funduszy emerytalnych. Według cytowanego przez fundację "Pension", aby uzyskać nowe opcje, cytowany przez reportera News amp Observer, Davida Ranii, Skarbnik Tar Heel niebawem będzie miał możliwość alokowania do śmieciowych i skarbowych papierów wartościowych zabezpieczonych przed inflacją (quot. TIPSquot). W ankiecie na temat alokacji aktywów z 2009 r. Mercer LLC zapytał europejskie fundusze emerytalne i odkrył, że nadal koncentruje się na zarządzaniu ryzykiem i uznaniu, że dobre zarządzanie może poprawić wyniki inwestycyjne inwestorów instytucjonalnych. Ważne jest to, że dojrzałe programy określonych świadczeń mają tendencję do zmniejszania ich ekspozycji na rynkach akcji na rzecz stałego dochodu. Natomiast dr David Gulley, dyrektor zarządzający w Navigant Consulting, sugeruje, że wyjście z kapitału mogłoby być nierozsądne dla inwestorów szukających zysków przez wiele lat. Zaskakująca lekcja rynku niedźwiedzi na temat zwyżkujących prognoz (Law360, lipiec 2009), dr Gulley pisze, że kwoty znaczące i obiektywne dowody wskazują, że zwroty z akcji są wiarygodne w długim okresie i że dodatnia premia z tytułu ryzyka kapitałowego jest wymogiem wymuszona przez rynki zdolność do odmowy pieniędzy. Jeśli to prawda, wpływ potencjalnie jest zamiatanie. Po pierwsze, migracja do inwestycji opartych na odpowiedzialności (quotLDIquot), która sprzyja faworyzowaniu stałego dochodu, może okazać się później kosztowna. Plan emerytalny Decydenci, którzy chcą zrezygnować ze strategii tylko długich, mogą teraz ponosić koszty transakcyjne, a jedynie dodać koszty alternatywne do miksu, jeśli i po ponownym wschodzącym słońcu na ziemiach magazynowych. Wynik netto może być podwojeniem liczby złych wieści (lub co gorsza). Bez powszechnej akceptacji roli zapasów w porównaniu ze wszystkim innym, debata na temat optymalnego strategicznego i taktycznego mieszania aktywów będzie niewątpliwie kontynuowana przez wiele lat. Wysłany 19 listopada 2008 r. Przez Susan Mangiero W quotpension Plans Under Closer Watchquot (18 listopada 2008 r.) Reporter MarketsmediaLive Karla Yeh cytuje mnie jako proces podkreślający. Zamiast rozwodzić się nad pojedynczymi liczbami, które mogą się zmieniać w czasie i zgodnie z wybranym terminem i zasadami sprawozdawczości, nakłaniam zainteresowane strony do skupienia się na tym, co dzieje się dalej. W przypadku, gdy program określonych świadczeń ponosi stratę, w jaki sposób rzeczy będą musiały ulec zmianie, ponieważ fundusze emerytalne borykające się z malejącymi wartościami aktywów mogą być bardziej dotknięte konsekwencjami strat niż same straty, powiedziała Susan Mangiero, prezesa Pension Governance Inc. we wtorek. Tak. Prawdziwym pytaniem jest, jakie działania są wymuszane na sponsorach planu w wyniku zgłoszonych strat, dodała Rdquo. Dla niektórych sponsorów programu, łańcuch wydarzeń związanych z emeryturami jest znaczny. W ubiegłym tygodniu Organizacja Współpracy Gospodarczej i Rozwoju odnotowała spadek średnich zwrotów z funduszy emerytalnych o ponad 20 procent w okresie od stycznia do października, co spowodowało 4 biliony strat w aktywach emerytalnych . Ponadto, firma konsultingowa i aktuarialna Milliman w poniedziałek oświadczyła, że korporacyjne fundusze emerytalne mogą mieć 93 miliardy długów do końca roku, gdy wartości aktywów spadną o 120 miliardów. Trudno zignorować stratę w wysokości 120 miliardów dolarów, zwłaszcza, że wielu ekonomistów uważa, że zmienność rynku jest tu na razie wystarczająca - powiedział Mangiero. Aby walczyć z rekordowymi stratami, Mangiero powiedział, że firmy mogą zostać zmuszone do wniesienia miliardów dolarów w gotówce lub zamrozić swoje programy określonych świadczeń, jeśli wskaźniki finansowania spadną poniżej 60 procent, zgodnie z Ustawą o ochronie emerytur z 2006 roku. Mogą one również zmniejszyć świadczenia wypłacane emerytom i rencistom. obniżki ratingów na twarzach lub wyższe koszty kapitałowe w celu uzupełnienia funduszy, dodała. W miarę zbliżania się Nowego Roku akcjonariusze i uczestnicy programu najprawdopodobniej będą obserwować swoich sponsorów planu emerytalnego pod ścisłą kontrolą, aby zrozumieć charakter zgłaszanych strat, powiedział Mangiero. W międzyczasie, sponsorzy planu będą chcieli dowiedzieć się, jak mają zamiar zrekompensować straty z tytułu akcji, a także, aby skłonić je do przeznaczenia większej ilości pieniędzy na bardziej ryzykowne inwestycje, powiedział Mangiero. Dodała, że alokacja aktywów będzie priorytetem w planach emerytalnych, które wymagają poprawy zarządzania pieniędzmi i zarządzania ryzykiem. gtgt Opublikowany 17 listopada 2008 r. przez Susan Mangiero Jak pisał ten blogger od wielu miesięcy, zarządzanie ryzykiem emerytalnym jest bardziej zwrotne. Niewiele zależy na ryzyku związanym z pozytywną stroną. Jest to skrajny ogon rozkładu cen, który przyciąga uwagę ludzi. Gdy występują niskie wartości (czytaj DIRE), uważaj. Domina rozbijają się o inne, struktura się kruszy i ktoś zbiera kawałki. Czy tak się teraz dzieje? Założę się, że wszelkie problemy związane z inwestycjami, dotychczas umieszczane w czystych zasobach aktywów, przeniosą się na inne części portfela, wymuszając poważne decyzje dotyczące alokacji aktywów, płynności i potrzeb gotówkowych. Artykuł z New York Times z 16 listopada 2008 r. Przytacza moją rację. (Patrz cytat z doliny jest ostrzeżeniem.) Pisarze Jeff Segal, Lauren Silva Laughlin i Rob Cox wyjaśniają, że California Public Employees Retirement System (Calpers) musi teraz zdecydować, czy i jak ponownie przemyśleć strategiczną alokację aktywów do alternatywnych inwestycji. Pierwotnie miał to być około 10% całego portfela, straty w sektorze kapitałowym najwyraźniej zmusiły gigantyczne plany publiczne do względnej ekspozycji na fundusze hedgingowe, kapitał podwyższonego ryzyka, kapitał prywatny przekraczający jego limit, do około 14 procent jego aktywów. Co gorsza (ze strategicznego podejścia do alokacji aktywów) jest to, że załamanie rynku może teraz przyspieszyć apele o kapitał ze środków private equity i venture capital, w które inwestuje Calpers, zmuszając do jeszcze wyższej alokacji. (Chodzi o to, że niektóre firmy portfelowe potrzebują teraz więcej pieniędzy, ponieważ ich prognozy dotyczące dochodów nie mogą zostać zrealizowane jako umowy dotyczące wydatków firmowych Menedżerowie funduszy private equity i venture capital - i ich inwestorzy - mogą albo stracić wszystko, co zainwestowali w spółki portfelowe, albo spróbować aby pomóc im utrzymać się na powierzchni, dając im ratę gotówkową wcześniej niż oczekiwano, stąd potrzeba przyspieszenia połączeń kapitałowych.) Calpers nie jest sam. Dowiedzieliśmy się od wielu sponsorów planu, że zapytanie o kurs lub zapytanie ofertowe o rozwiązania alternatywne (niektóre lub wszystkie) znajdują się na szczycie listy decyzji. Problem polega na tym, że wyjście z konkretnego funduszu prywatnego może być kosztowne, tak że sponsor planu zostaje pogorszony w krótkim i średnim okresie. Ponadto, sponsorzy planu rzadko mają prawo do odrzucenia wniosku o dodatkowy kapitał z funduszu private equity X lub funduszu venture capital Y. Według Johna Brunjesa, prokurenta prywatnego funduszu inwestycyjnego. partner z Bracewell amp Giuliani, notowany w funduszu private equity lub venture capital, jest umownym związkiem. Z wyjątkiem oszustw i przymusów, emerytury są na wyciągnięcie ręki, aby napisać czek, gdy przychodzi inny menedżer funduszu. Jeśli to prawda, niektórzy sponsorzy planu są kupcami w przewidywalnej przyszłości (tj. Muszą wywiązać się ze swoich zobowiązań kapitałowych wobec zarządzających alternatywnymi funduszami) ORAZ ich straty są kontynuowane w tradycyjnych gruntach kapitałowych, uczestnicy mogą wziąć to na podbródek w formie zmniejszonych świadczeń. Podatnicy i akcjonariusze mogą zostać poproszeni o wyrównanie różnicy. Począwszy od poczty i połączeń, które otrzymujemy w Pension Governance, Inc .. jest wiele osób, które są niezadowolone z tego, co uważają za swoją słabnącą przyszłość z powodu anulowania świadczeń, znikających planów, sponsorowania niewypłacalności i tak dalej. (Podczas gdy nasza firma koncentruje się na sponsorach planu i ich dostawcach usług, nasza obecność w sieci zachęca do komunikacji od uczestników planu.) W odniesieniu do obowiązku inwestycyjnego powiernika, członkowie komitetu inwestycyjnego będą odpowiedzialni za niepoprawne oszacowanie wzorców korelacji w stosunku do ekstremalnych danych. zakresy Kiedy sprawy idą na południe, a inwestor ucieka do jakości, nie ma nic wspólnego z ofertą handlową. Oznacza to, że złe wiadomości wpływają na wydajność wielu sektorów aktywów, nawet tych, którzy myślą, że działają odwrotnie lub są od siebie niezależni. The quotone world - jedno zjawisko rynkowe przekłada się na niższe korzyści dywersyfikacyjne. Czy powierniki inwestycyjne zostaną pociągnięte do odpowiedzialności za brak lepszej płynności pomiaru lub ocenę ograniczeń zbywalności lub skutków prawnych wezwań kapitałowych Jaka jest rola konsultantów i zarządzających funduszami funduszy w ocenie czynników ryzyka wykraczających poza same liczby Czy istnieją prywatne fundusze uznane za dokonane? wystarczającą do sprawdzenia przydatności alternatyw dla ich klientów instytucjonalnych. Piszę o wiele więcej na temat zmieniających się relacji między inwestorami instytucjonalnymi a funduszami prywatnymi. Czego chcesz się dowiedzieć więcej na tych tematach. Opowiedz mi o tym. 4 stycznia 2007 r. Napisałem: sama transakcja jest niebezpieczna, ale jeśli wziąć pod uwagę to, co niektórzy określają jako nieuniknioną konwergencję do jednego globalnego rynku, przy transakcjach, które mają miejsce 247, potencjał poważnej krzywdy jest prawdziwy. Ciągłe postępy technologiczne, międzynarodowa deregulacja i gotowość inwestorów do korzystania z usług offshore promują błyskawiczny przepływ informacji. Kiedy trafiają się złe wieści, słychać to w całym świecie. Pracując na trzech stołach podczas niestabilnych czasów, wiem z pierwszej ręki, jak szybko rzeczy mogą się zmienić. (Zobacz cytat z napisem: "Powinniśmy się martwić"). Strona internetowa Calpersa informuje, że na dzień 30 września 2008 r. Obecny przydział środków alternatywnych wynosi 12,2 kontra cel 10 procent. Aby uzyskać więcej informacji, kliknij tutaj. Oto link do pokazu slajdów, w którym Silicon Alley drży w butach. Zasadniczo słynna firma typu venture capital, Sequoia Capital, powiedziała przedsiębiorcom, aby obserwowali ich gotówkę i potwierdzili, że strona finansująca może się skończyć, przynajmniej na jakiś czas. Sam zobacz. Przeczytaj sekcję The Sequoia: RIP: Good Times: tutaj cytuje ją Eric Eldon, Venture Beat. 10 października 2008 r. Opublikowany 28 kwietnia 2008 r. Przez Susan Mangiero Według reportera Financial Times Deborah Brewster (inwestorzy wycofują się z funduszy inwestycyjnych, 27 kwietnia 2008 r.), Prawie wszyscy menedżerowie amerykańskich funduszy inwestycyjnych zauważyli spadek aktywów w Q1- 2008. Spadające zyski są głównym motorem sprzedaży detalicznej. Cytując Strategic Insight, Brewster pisze, że osoby i instytucje pozyskały 100 miliardów z amerykańskich, europejskich i japońskich funduszy akcyjnych. Fundusze rynku pieniężnego, pobierające niższe opłaty, wydają się podnosić luki. Sugeruje to nieuchronny spadek rentowności w działalności związanej z zarządzaniem aktywami. W cytowanym raporcie Financial Industrys Heyday Come and Gonequot (28 kwietnia 2008 r.) Reporter z Wall Street Journal, Justin Lahart, pisze, że przedsiębiorstwa pożyczające, pożyczające, inwestujące i wszystkie pośredniczące między sobą firmy zwalniają, a tym samym powodują powstawanie fal w całej gospodarce USA. With documented job cuts in the financial sector, new regulations and questions about quotexcessquot risk, a discernible shift is underway. A shrinking financial sector and reduced availability of credit hits consumers and corporations hard. In addition, defined benefit plans are moving assets away from equity to alternatives and fixed income. In quotCalPERS to shift 44 billion quot (December 24, 2007), Pensions amp Investments reporter Raquel Pichardo describes the giant retirement plans move into international equity, real estate, private equity and a quotnew inflation-linked asset class. quot On April 17, 2008, New York Times reporter Mary Williams Walsh offers insight into what some of Americans biggest plan sponsors are doing to manage market volatility. Referring to a new study by Evaluation Associates in quotMarket Turmoil Has Taken a Toll on Big Pension Funds, quot Walsh writes that General Motors, Ford, Boeing and Deere are a few of the large plans to turn from equities. The issue is important for many reasons, not the least of which is the impact on statutory funding requirements, cash flow and related share price. In March 2008, money manager Charles Gilbert spoke to a Society of Actuaries audience about the double whammy of falling interest rates (increases the defined benefit liabilty) and unhealthy stock returns (reduces portfolio value). Posted on February 19, 2008 by Susan Mangiero According to its February 18, 2008 press release, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is changing its asset allocation mix to 45 percent invested in fixed income, 45 percent invested in equity and 10 percent left for alternative investments. A spokesman explains that ratcheting up on private equity funds and real estate is expected to generate higher returns but reduce risk because of greater diversification, giving quotthe Corporation a 57 percent likelihood of full funding within ten years compared to 19 percent under the previous policy. quot In the past, the PBGC mix favored bonds with 75 to 85 percent being invested in fixed income securities, including some monies earmarked for liability-driven investing (quotLDIquot) strategies. Some PBGC critics recently cited high opportunity costs by concentrating on notes and bonds. With an accumulated deficit of 14 billion at the end of fiscal year 2007 and the recognition of the long-term nature of its obligations, the decision was arrived at, after quotan extensive review process that began in mid-2007.quot Interestingly, an quotInvestment Program Fact Sheet quot seems to contradict the newfound logic, stating that quotBecause of the statutory restrictions on investment of the Revolving Funds and a change in PBGCs investment policy adopted in 2004, fixed-income securities dominate PBGCs asset mix. quot Additional text emphasizes a relatively low tolerance for uncertainty. quotThe current investment policy continues PBGCs investment focus of limiting financial risk exposure by investing the majority of PBGCs assets in long duration fixed-income securities in order to reduce balance sheet volatility. quot It would be interesting to know more about exactly why the PBGC decided to move into real estate and private capital pools now. How did they net the expected lower risk (due to diversification) against incremental risks association with interests that seldom trade Access to meeting minutes would make for good reading. Though it is not an official U. S. government agency (quotfinanced by premiums paid by employers, assets from failed pension plans, recoveries from bankruptcies and returns on invested assetsquot), many people believe that American taxpayers are ultimately on the hook in the event of a PBGC bailout. With a recession on the way and relatively low interest rates that push liabilities upward, bad news for this insurance agency is not out of the realm of possibility. Additionally, though premiums have increased, few economists believe that risky plans are paying their quotfair sharequot and that quotgoodquot plans are subsidizing poor financial management elsewhere. If true, PBGCs exposure to default is that much higher. The PBGC says it reviews its investment policy every two years. How often does it assess its outside managers Will due diligence for alternative fund managers differ from the check-up imposed on traditional managers How will the PBGC address valuation issues related to private equity, venture capital and real estate What performance metrics can we expect PBGC to share with interested parties if quothard to valuequot assets are held at cost versus quotfair market valuequot Is there or will there be a Chief Risk Officer for PBGC who addresses asset-liability management on an enterprise risk basis How will banks be impacted if private plans decide to follow PBGCs example and shy away from LDI Will corporate plans follow suit Posted on December 16, 2007 by Susan Mangiero At this rate, one could spend hours blogging about sub-prime woes, risk and whether adequate controls were in place. In a December 4, 2007 Washington Post article entitled quotLosses Stack Up: Local Officials in Florida Try to Assess Damage To Investments Linked to Soured Subprime Loans quot by Tomoeh Murakami Tse, I was interviewed about pension risk management implications. (Click here to access the article. You may be asked to register.) The State Board of Administration of Florida itself acknowledges the importance of risk controls, both in a November 2007 account of their sub-prime losses and in later interviews about fund withdrawals, subsequent freezes prohibiting further withdrawals and the hiring of Blackrock to develop a financial game plan. In a recent study by the Towers Group. risk management was found to be lacking at some organizations, arguably one cause for large losses. Describing the adverse consequences of siloed risk management functions in financial institutions, authors of quotMultifunctional Integration: The Positive Side of Risk, quot cite the need to work across divisions. They add that quotBeyond defending against threats to the organization, a more integrated approach to risk management can drive other business and client-centric benefits, including: improved quality and transparency of information relationship pricing process simplicity and efficiency more effective decision making and overall resilience. quot No surprise to this risk manager and blogger who has spent over 20 years in the areas of risk management consulting, forensic analysis, board and trustee training and process assessment. In trying to convey the importance of acting before the fact, our Pension Governance team oft-repeats the importance of a holistic investment risk orientation, commencing with comprehensive training for everyone - front, middle and back office staff included. Importantly, buy-in from the top drives the acceptance of an organizational-wide risk culture and allows for resources to purchase analytical systems, hire professionals and make sure everyone has a good understanding of checks and balances. (In a recent workshop I led on risk management, I encouraged pension fund professionals to spend time with the chief risk officers employed by their banks, mutual fund and hedge fund managers.) Whether separate risk management activity reflects a quotpenny wise, pound foolishquot behavior depends on a host of factors and will vary across organizations. However, delay in implementing an effective process can be costly as pointed out in a December 2007 assessment of sub-prime litigation risk by Guy Carpenter amp Company, LLC. In quotWhatrsquos the State of Your State EampO Risk Uneven across the Country, quot authors list six factors that give rise to litigation risk for real estate professionals (though noteworthy for other related parties, given the flurry of lawsuits now being filed). See below for excerpted text: Percentage of mortgages in foreclosure Percentage of subprime mortgages that are delinquent Number of litigation attorneys per mortgage industry professional Frequency of Truth in Lending lawsuits (per million households) through Q32006 Frequency of banking-related lawsuits (per million households) through Q32006 Extent to which a state is plaintiff-friendly, i. e. is deemed a ldquoJudicial Hellholerdquo by the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA). Mortgage bankers and real estate brokers may be getting pink slips but litigators are busier than ever. For retirement plan fiduciaries, it bears repeating. Ask external money managers if they have sub-prime problems, query about how they are addressing risk gaps and demand to know what lessons they have learned from the credit crisis. Posted on December 12, 2007 by Susan Mangiero Disappointing many, the Federal Reserve cut rates by a smaller amount than expected. Equity investors responded with a resounding hiss, sending the Dow Jones Industrial Average down nearly 300 points. Defined benefit plan managers cant be too happy either. After all, many of them have more money allocated to stocks than bonds. Then there is the matter of reported net unfunded liabilities rising as rates fall. Whats an asset allocator to do This blogs author recently read survey results that suggest a significant migration to more complex securities. Not surprisingly, researchers describe a struggle on the part of investors and financial advisors who need higher returns but are not always comfortable that they understand the risks. (See quotFinancial Advisors to Embrace More Sophisticated Investment Products Over the Next Two Years, According to New Data from Cogent Research, quot Insurance Newscast, December 7, 2007.) I hate to say it folks but here goes. Why invest in something you dont understand Isnt that part of the reason why the sub-prime debacle is starting to make the SampL crisis look like a walk in the park Several incidents come to mind. Following the 1987 market crash, equity put option writers sued their brokers, saying they did not understand the nearly unbounded downside, forcing some into bankruptcy. In the early 1980s, a handful of prominent institutional investors sued their bankers for putting them into complex, new fangled derivatives. One treasurer acknowledged the need to know more, exclaiming quotDue to my inexperience, I placed a great deal of reliance on the advice of market professionalshellip. I wish I had more training in complex government securities. quot Mark my words. The courts will be hearing a lot of cases that address who ultimately has responsibility for investment strategies gone awry. Pre-exemptively, pension funds must seek legal counsel to review their fiduciary duties. Nevertheless, as strategies become more complex, there will be sufficient numbers of investors who simply do not understand the risk and, absent good process, will lose money. This gets back to a point made many times herein. Shouldnt pension decision makers (regardless of plan design) be required andor encouraged to have a particular familiarity (experience, education) with investment and risk management The fact that no such certification requirement exists amazes and disturbs. Posted on June 13, 2007 by Susan Mangiero In quotA Conversation with a Fiduciaryquot (published by Morningstar), independent pension fiduciary Matthew D. Hutcheson provides a thought-provoking assessment of ERISA Section 404 and passive versus active investment choices for 401(k) plan participants. Click here to read the article and here to read Hutchesons March 6,2007 testimony about 401(k) fees before the U. S. House of Representatives. On the other side of the fence, Financial Times writer John Authers extolls the virtues of Dave Swensons quotuninstitutional portfolioquot approach in his June 9, 2007 article about the Capital Asset Pricing Model and market efficiency. With more than two-thirds of the endowment fund for Yale University in alternative assets quotwhich are not readily marketable, quot the contrast is telling. While the evidence seems to strongly support Swensons approach for Yale, issues abound with respect to alternatives investments and command attention. quotSee quotYale puts academic theory of investment into practice. quot) I co-led a workshop on the valuation of quothard to valuequot assets on June 12, 2007 and came away with a renewed appreciation of the fact that more than a few institutions may truly be in the dark with respect to risk factors. Worth mentioning again is that risk itself is not bad. However, risk that is ignored cannot be measured and, by extension, can certainly not be managed. For most investors, limited resources make it difficult to replicate the Connecticut Ivys success. Addressing a recent gathering of alumni, Swenson said that quotYale is set up to make high-quality active management decisionsquot with a staff of twenty and a long time horizon. The debate continues with respect to style because it is a crucial (nay impossible to ignore) element of investment management. Strategic asset allocation and tactical implementation are likewise integral determinants of fiduciary liability for a given organization. To the extent that Hutcheson reminds us to focus on the quotFquot word and move the conversation to process that supports duty, plan beneficiaries applaud. Tell us what you think. Should fiduciaries do a better job of justifying when active strategies make sense We will talk more about these issues because there is a lot to say. Click here to email your comments. Please indicate if you would like the comments kept private. Posted on April 22, 2007 by Susan Mangiero I am the author of a book entitled Risk Management for Pensions, Endowments and Foundations (John Wiley amp Sons, 2005). A primer about risk management (no math by design), the feedback has been gratifying. Im particularly proud of the comments citing ease of use. (The book is replete with examples, checklists and references). However, its no Da Vinci Code in terms of sales. While Id like to write a sequel at some point, few are competing for the honor and no one is knocking down my door to buy the movie rights. (You can visit our online bookstore at pensiongovernance - Products, Books for what we think constitutes a good readling list.) True, its non-fiction and written for a limited audience. Yet one wonders why, in todays benefits climate, more people arent fast and furiously laying pen to paper to describe how to tackle what is arguably one of the most important topics in pension land - risk management. If there is a single message I can impart to those who will listen, it is this. ANYONE involved in pension investing is a de facto risk manager. Believe it. You are. Whether focused on the asset or liability side (or both), risk is an integral part of financial management. Those who deny this truism expose themselves to possible trouble down the road. Personal and professional liability aside, plan sponsors who passively manage risk (whether defined benefit or defined contribution) through ignorance or benign neglect invite unwelcome scrutiny. Unless they are lucky, litigation, economic loss andor damaging headlines are high probability events. Besides, plan sponsors who give risk management short shrift lose a precious opportunity to improve things. An effective process forces a plan sponsor to identify, measure and control risk on an ongoing basis. Taking inventory (in terms of uncovering sources of risk) enables plan sponsors to make meaningful changes. Lower costs or enhanced diversification are two of many possible benefits associated with the activity of collecting and analyzing data as part of the identification of risk drivers. So a natural question arises. Why dont more plan sponsors pay attention to risk management, whether for themselves or as part of hiring, reviewing and perhaps firing money managers and consultants Asked another way, what is the tipping point beyond which risk management becomes front and center at meetings of board members, trustees, investment committees and so on Here are a few thoughts. 1. Based on the preliminary results of the pension risk management survey now underway, and co-sponsored by Pension Governance, LLC and the Society of Actuaries. there seems to be a HUGE gap between belief and reality. Many respondents say they actively pay attention to risk management. At the same time, they cite limited or no use of risk metrics other than standard deviation andor correlation. (Well talk about limitations of basic risk metrics elsewhere.) How can you improve on something you think you are already doing well 2. Many plan sponsors are tasked with benefits-related work as an add-on to their regular job. Often, there is little organizational incentive for them to excel. In a way, its a lose-lose proposition. They assume significant fiduciary liability with little or no recognition in the form of additional money, better title or other types of perquisites. At the same time, if they do a bad job, there is no escape. Its all downside. Sadly, there is so much perceived ambiguity about what constitutes a quotgoodquot job that its often difficult to hold someone accountable. (Note the term quotperceivedquot versus quotreal. quot) 3. Not all attorneys (litigators and transactional) feel comfortable with finance concepts, let alone financial risk management. That knowledge void arguably makes it easier to let risk control gaps slide unless, or until, an egregious act occurs. 4. Establishing a financial risk management process is seldom fun (or at least sort of enjoyable) for most people. It is often a complex activity that requires copious amounts of money, time, concentration and energy, especially if a plans investment mix (DB or DC) extends to multiple asset classes. Moreover, benchmarking the process, and making appropriate changes thereafter, likewise consumes large chunks of time and money. Is it any wonder then that its ranking on ones quotto doquot list plummets in the absence of a strong risk culture 5. When market conditions are quotgoodquot and benefit costs decline as a result, people tend to get lulled into false security. Instead of focusing on structural issues, its easier to breath a sigh of relief and say quotproblem solved. quot Alas, markets change all the time and putting off the inevitable is hardly a smart move. So whats the tipping point that has everyone wearing quotIm a risk managerquot button Certainly lower interest rates andor an anemic equity sector are factors, as is regulation. A few recent surveys cite mandates as a central force in encouraging, sometimes forcing, plan sponsors to radically revise their asset allocation strategies and focus on plan risk. Most folks think were moving closer to the pension risk management tipping point. I agree but counter that movement is relative. Until (and hopefully not quotunlessquot) plan sponsors recognize the URGENT need for financial risk management, investment stewards remain vulnerable on many counts and that is not a good thing for anyone Posted on July 24, 2006 by Susan Mangiero The Star Ledger reports that New Jersey state officials adopted a plan to shift billions of dollars in state pension money to private investment managers and set a course to reduce the funds heavy reliance on the stock market. Journalist Dunstan McNichol describes a 16 billion reallocation from stock in favor of larger holdings in toll roads, hedge funds and international stocks. A harbinger of things to come Many experts agree that pending regulations and increased focus on pension obligations will move asset allocation to center stage, resulting in a variety of questions that demand good answers. (Asset allocation is oft-cited as the most important determinant of performance.) 1. How will an increased emphasis on alternative investments change the expected return-risk tradeoff of the pension portfolio (particularly as relates to estimating pairwise correlations of returns that vary over time) 2. What are the liquidity implications of investing in public works projects, hedge funds, international stocks, commodities, private equities and so on 3. How should pension plan decision-makers proceed in selecting alternative investment consultants (especially with respect to their ability to thoroughly analyze the impact of performance fees on net returns) 4. How do alternative fund managers value their holdings, if at all 5. How will overseers evaluate performance in the event of diminished transparency of returns and risk drivers that influence returns 6. Will fiduciary liability change for funds that invest outside the traditional mix of equities and debt 7. Do fiduciaries need addi tional training to feel comfortable asking the right questions about alternatives (and interpreting the answers with confidence) 8. How should the Investment Policy Statement change to accommodate the use of alternatives Get ready pension fiduciaries There is a lot of work to be done in moving the money around. Posted on May 30, 2006 by Susan Mangiero Taking time for some weekend reading, I was struck by several headlines that focus on a topic I predict well hear more about (much more) in coming months, namely how to best allocate assets to meet liability objectives. Here are a few examples. While a discussion of optimal asset allocation and portfolio re-balancing is left for another time and venue, a few questions and comments come to mind. 1. As new accounting rules encourage a focus on liability-driven investing, how will plan fiduciaries decide on a portfolio split between matching liabilities and generating excess return 2. How can and should derivatives be used to transform assets and liabilities 3. What role should alternatives play 4. What will cause a shift away from the traditional equity-fixed income mix for defined benefit plans 5. How should the equity risk premium be evaluated with respect to managing goals, knowing that greater reliance on fixed income is likely to widen a plans pension deficit if equities outperform 6. How should fiduciaries be evaluated and compensated if they focus on risk control in lieu of exceeding return targets 7. Are decision-makers sufficiently trained to deal with surplus volatility, fat tailed distributions, side pockets and other financial delights 8. What is the likely impact on capital markets as long-term pension investors begin to favor a radically different asset allocation mix As accounting rules, regulatory mandates, changing demographics and economic reality join hands, its clear that a paradigm shift in asset allocation strategies and tactics is on its way. Are we ready Posted on April 16, 2006 by Susan Mangiero Diversify, diversify, diversify No smart investor should do otherwise, right Well suppose individuals are not even saving enough, let alone investing wisely. What then Sad to say, financial illiteracy is reaching crisis proportion. In a recent release, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (part of the U. S. Department of Commerce), reported a continued negative savings rate. This means that individuals are spending more than they earn. Not surprisingly, personal bankruptcies are climbing higher. According to the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts. bankruptcies filed in the twelve-month period ending December 31, 2005, totaled 2,078,415, up from the 1,597,462 petitions filed in the 12-month period ending December 31, 2004, reflecting a whopping 30 percent increase. Similarly significant, they report that this was the largest number of bankruptcy petitions ever filed in any 12-month period in the history of the federal courts. A faint glimmer of hope comes in the form of a new study from the Jumptart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy. High school students showed a tiny improvement in their understanding of topics such as budgeting and credit cards. Survey designer Dr. Lew Mandell acknowledges the gain but stresses the need for much more work in the area of pecuniary preparedness. Couple these alarm bells with pension safety nets that are in serious disrepair around the world and the fact that many employers are rescinding or reducing benefits, if offered at all, and we are about ready to enter a maelstrom of unprecedented proportion. What do you think Crisis or not Take this five-question survey and see what others think. Click to visit Dr. Mangieros compliance blogOn Speed Bumps, Exotic Order Types and Left Handed Apple Peelers ITG Canada has noticed that the ability of the average agency broker to gain top-of-book priority in Canada has diminished over the past 24 months. In our latest Canadian market structure update, we take a deep dive into how the introduction of speed bumps and exotic orders types has likely harmed the ability of investors to capture spread, and we offer some potential solutions for traders and regulators. MiFID II Preparedness Update To BIVA or to BMV: That Is the Question In the Media Buy Side to Brokers: Show Me Some Love February 16, 2017 Markets Media Euronext Targets Blocks Ahead of MiFID II February 15, 2017 Markets Media ITGs Rob Boardman speaks with FTTradingRoom about the dark pool trading caps under MIFID II: tinyurlmte8jjb RECENT AWARDS 2018 8211 Best TCA Provider 2017 8211 1 Outstanding TCA Provider The Trade Hall of Fame Awards, Europe Product finder Select product attributes from the lists below: ITG employees report a renewed sense of gratitude, along with stronger bonds with their colleagues, as a result of our Give Back program. THIRD-PARTY RESEARCH To access the articles below, first make sure you are logged in as a member, and then click the links below. Membership is free, click here to register . Gambling or De-risking: Hedge Fund Risk Taking vs. Managers Compensation Hedge fund managers risk-taking choices are determined by their compensation. Managers de-risk when the management fee becomes more important in total compensation, potentially to protect their existing assets and fee incomes. When funds are below their high-water marks, managers increase risk taking to recover past losses. Managers also take more risk when funds are above their high-water marks, possibly to further increase their compensation. During the recent financial crisis, managers herded more with their styles and decreased fund-specific risk. Finally, when fund managers take more risk, they do not generate better future performance and thus do not benefit investors. Click here for full article Chengdong Yin, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University Xiaoyan Zhang, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, and PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University Funding Liquidity Risk and the Dynamics of Hedge Fund Lockups We exploit the expiring nature of hedge fund lockups to create a dynamic, fund-level proxy of funding liquidity risk. In contrast to the prior literature, our measure allows us to identify how within-fund changes in funding liquidity risk are associated with performance and risk taking. Lockup funds with lower funding liquidity risk take more tail risk and have better risk-adjusted performance, suggesting reduced funding liquidity risk enables funds to better capitalize on risky mispricing. Surprisingly, lockup funds outperform non-lockup funds even when controlling for restricted capital, suggesting that a portion of the lockup premium is attributable to a lockup-fixed effect. Click here for full article Adam L. Aiken, PhD, Assistant Professor of Finance - Elon University Christopher P. Clifford, PhD, Phillip Morris Associate Professor of Finance - Gatton College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky Jesse A. Ellis, PhD, Associate Professor of Finance Poole College of Management, North Carolina State University Qiping Huang, PhD Gatton College of Business, University of Kentucky Political Cognitive Biases Effects on Fund Managers8217 Performance Under rational agent hypothesis, financial industry practitioners should not be affected by political discourse, and investors cannot realize abnormal returns on publicly available information. Rare events, however, may silence rationality and potentiate cognitive dissonance on a spectrum of agents. We assembled a comprehensive dataset of hedge fund performance and matched equity hedge fund managers political affiliation by their partisan contributions. We document higher returns of equity hedge funds managed by Democrats for 10 subsequent months--from December 2008 to September 2009. This result is unique and robust to placebo time windows and random partisan affiliation shuffling. We conjecture that the conjunction of the financial crisis, Obamas election, and politically polarized interpretation of the US central bank policy during that period had an asymmetric impact on hedge fund managers perception. In other periods, when the political discourse did not involve central bank policy, there was no statistically significant difference between the performance of equity hedge fund managers depending on their political beliefs. Click here for full article Marian Moszoro, University of California, Berkeley and Harvard University Michael Bykhovsky, Center for Open Economics and Columbia Engineering BOV Timing is Money: The Factor Timing Ability of Hedge Fund Managers This paper studies the level, determinants, and persistence of the factor timing ability of hedge fund managers. We find strong evidence in favor of factor timing ability at the aggregate level, although we find ample variation in timing skills across investment styles and factors at the fund level. Our cross-sectional analysis shows that better factor timing skills are related to funds that are younger, smaller, have higher incentive fees, have a smaller restriction period, and make use of leverage. An out-of-sample test shows that factor timing is persistent. Specifically, the top factor timing funds outperform the bottom factor timing funds with a significant 1 per annum. This constitutes 13 of the overall performance persistence in hedge funds. The findings are robust to the use of an alternative model, alternative factors, and controlling for the use of derivatives, public information, and fund size. Click here for full article Albert Jakob Osinga, KAS Bank Marc B. J. Schauten, VU Amsterdam Remco C. J. Zwinkels, VU Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute Wolves at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge Fund Activism Some commentators attribute the success of hedge fund activism to the support offered by other investors, many of whom are thought to accumulate stakes in the target firms before the activists campaigns are publicly disclosed. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as wolf pack activism. This paper explores three research questions: Is there any evidence of wolf pack formation Is the wolf pack formed intentionally (by the lead activist) or is it the result of independent activity by other investors Does the presence of a wolf pack improve the outcome of the activists campaign First, consistent with wolf pack formation, I find investors other than the lead activist accumulate significant share-holdings before public disclosure. Second, these share accumulations are more likely to be mustered by the lead activist rather than occurring spontaneously. Notably, for example, the other investors are more likely to be those who had a prior trading relationship with the lead activist. Third, the presence of a wolf pack is associated with a greater likelihood that the activist will achieve its stated objectives (e. g. will obtain board seats) and higher future stock returns over the duration of the campaign. Click here for full article Yu Ting Forester Wong, Columbia Business School Obstructing Shareholder Coordination in Hedge Fund Activism Recent theoretical work argues that shareholder coordination can contribute to success in hedge fund activism. We examine the actions that target firms take to limit coordination among shareholders, thus obstructing the ability to coordinate. Targets most often obstruct coordination when the potential for incumbent shareholder coordination is highest and when the target firm stock experiences abnormal turnover just before the activism announcement. Firms that obstruct coordination suffer worse long-term stock and operating performance and a lower probability of mergers, payouts, asset sales, and management changes following activism. Our results are robust to propensity score matching and an instrumental variables analysis. Click here for full article Nicole M. Boyson and Pegaret Pichler DAmore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University Boston Sentiment Risk, Sentiment Timing, and Hedge Fund Returns We examine whether exposure to sentiment risk helps explain the cross-sectional variation in hedge fund returns. We find that funds with sentiment beta in the top decile subsequently outperform those in the bottom decile by 0.67 per month on a risk-adjusted basis. Further, we show that some hedge funds have the ability to time sentiment by having high exposure to a sentiment factor when the factor premium is high, and sentiment timing also contributes to fund performance. Our results are robust to controlling for fund characteristics and other risk factors known to affect hedge fund returns and hold for alternative sentiment risk measures. Overall, these findings highlight sentiment risk as a source of limits to arbitrage faced by hedge funds. Click here for full article Yong Chen, Mays Business School, Texas AM University Bing Han, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto Jing Pan, University of Utah, Eccles School of Business Benchmarking Benchmarks: Much Ado about Nothing We compare the performance of a wide variety of benchmarks: traditional, fundamentals-based and optimization-based. We find that for a set of all stocks of the SP500 index during the period from February 1989 to December 2017 traditional and new benchmark portfolios perform similarly according to a variety of return, risk, turnover, and diversification performance metrics. Moreover, the difference between traditional value - or equal-weighted benchmark and new benchmark portfolios is not statistically significant. We identify a set of basis benchmarks, which span both the set of new and the set of traditional benchmarks. The first basis benchmark explains three quarters of the variation of all benchmark portfolios correlation between this basis benchmark and systematic market factor is 96 for the last 10 years period. We conclude that the strongest driving force of all considered benchmark portfolios is the market factor. Irrespective of the benchmark portfolio, managers mainly track the market and do it in statistically sufficient way during the last 23 years. The difference in the performance of various benchmarks can be attributed to the skill to outperform the market. In the long run these skills are washed out. Our work has implications for big mutual, pension and hedge funds with fairly big number of stocks in their portfolios and long investment time horizon. For these funds the choice of the benchmark is not important. Click here for full article Yuliya Plyakha, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg School of Finance Rethinking Performance Evaluation The current approach to performance evaluation is to run equation-by-equation regressions to calculate alphas. There are at least three issues that arise: 1) the estimation does not take into account any cross-sectional information (i. e. how well other funds are doing) 2) there is no allowance for parameter uncertainty and 3) the estimated alphas do a poor job of predicting future alphas. Harvey and Liu (2018) propose a new method that uses cross-sectional information. They perform extensive simulations in the paper and show that their method is superior to the usual OLS approach. They also argue that their technique has advantages over a Bayesian approach because no priors need to be specified. The latest research papers conclude that not a single MF significantly outperforms (there are some that significantly underperform). Applying their technique, dramatically changes the inference. Harnessing the cross-sectional information, they find that 26 outperform. While they have only applied their method to mutual funds, the paper indicates that next up are hedge funds. Click here for full article Campbell R. Harvey, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Duke Innovation Entrepreneurship Initiative Yan Liu, Texas AM University, Department of Finance Slow Trading and Stock Return Predictability Market returns predict the future abnormal returns on small and illiquid stocks, implying attractive dynamic investment strategies for investors investing in the size premium or in small and illiquid stocks either directly or through exchange traded funds. We provide evidence that this return predictability is due to institutional investors trading patterns: When rebalancing their portfolios the institutional investors initially buy (sell) relatively more the large and liquid stocks. In the case of illiquid stocks they split their orders over several days to avoid excessive price impact, thus inducing predictability in stocks returns. We provide evidence that some hedge funds exploit this return predictability. Click here for full article Matthijs Lof, Aalto University School of Business Matti Suominen, Aalto University School of Business Acquiring and Trading on Complex Information: How Hedge Funds Use the Freedom of Information Act Using the Freedom of Information Act, hedge funds receive records from the Food and Drug Administration about new product approvals, factory inspections, and complaints. We use the funds receipt of this information to empirically test implications of theories about investors with bounded rationality acquiring complex information for trading purposes. Consistent with theory, we find evidence that the magnitude of hedge fund trades is positively related to the funds prior knowledge about the target firm and the FOIA process, and to the short-term abnormal stock returns derived from trading. Click here for full article April Klein, Professor of Accounting, Stern School of Business - New York University Tao Li, University of Warwick - Warwick Business School Corporate Governance and Hedge Fund Activism Over the past 25 years, hedge fund activism has emerged as new form of corporate governance mechanism that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the entire American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement to reduce agency cost. Click here for full article Shane C. Goodwin, Adjunct Professor (Finance and Managerial Economics), University of Texas Dallas Financial Intermediation in Private Equity: How Well Do Funds of Funds Perform This paper focuses on funds of funds (FOFs) as a form of financial intermediation in private equity (both buyout and venture capital). Compared to investments in hedge funds or publicly traded stocks, private equity investments in direct funds are less liquid, less easily scaled and have higher search and monitoring costs. As a consequence, FOFs in private equity may provide valuable intermediation for investors who want exposure to the asset class. We benchmark FOF performance (net of their fees) against both public equity markets and strategies of direct investment into private equity funds. We also examine the types of portfolios private equity FOFs create when they pool investor capital. After accounting for fees, primary FOFs provide returns equal to or above public market indices for both buyout and venture capital. While FOFs focusing on buyouts outperform public markets, they underperform direct fund investment strategies in buyout. In contrast, the average performance of FOFs in venture capital is on a par with results from direct venture fund investing. This suggests that FOFs in venture capital (but not in buyouts) are able to identify and access superior performing funds. Click here for full article Robert S. Harris, University of Virginia Darden School of Business Tim Jenkinson, Said Business School, University of Oxford and CEPR Steven N. Kaplan, University of Chicago Booth School of Business and NBER Ruediger Stucke, Warburg Pincus The Case For and Against Activist Hedge Funds A subset of so-called hedge funds, henceforth known as activists, has latched on the idea that many corporations are not managed or governed in a manner likely to maximize value for shareholders. With the capital they have obtained from pension funds and other institutional investors, they take a small position in the equity of publicly traded companies and push, with a varying degree of aggressiveness, for measures they deem likely to boost targeted companies stock price. This is a fast growing business. The number of activist interventions, some 27 in 2000, has reached 345 in 2017 according to the WSJ-FactSet Activism Scorecard. Activist hedge funds have now amassed an estimated 200 billion in managed assets. To achieve more leverage on companies, smaller hedge funds may band in what has been aptly called wolf packs. In a by-now familiar scenario, the activist hedge fund calls on the targeted company to name to its board some people of its choosing (threatening a proxy fight if the company is not forthcoming). That is merely a first step, sometimes entirely skipped. Unless the company swiftly gives in to its demands, the hedge fund will produce a paper, or a long letter, critical of the companys management and board and outlining the remedial actions that, in its view, would benefit shareholders. That document will be broadcast widely so as to gather the support of the companys institutional shareholders, even if a tacit one. In due course, if matters come to a proxy fight, the hedge fund will try to persuade the proxy advisors (ISS and Glass Lewis) to come out in favour of the hedge funds nominees for the board. Click here for full article Yvan Allaire, PhD (MIT), FRSC Executive Chair, IGOPP Emeritus Professor Effect of Regulatory Constraints on Fund Performance: New Evidence from UCITS Hedge Funds We economically motivate and then test a range of hypotheses regarding performance and risk differences between UCITS-compliant and other hedge funds. The latter exhibit more suspicious return patterns than do absolute return UCITS (ARUs), but ARUs exhibit higher levels of operational risk. We find evidence of a strong liquidity premium: hedge funds offer investors less liquidity than do ARUs yet exhibit better risk-adjusted performance. Our findings are substantially unchanged under various robustness tests and adjustments for possible selection bias. The liquidity premium for ARUs and their lack of performance persistence have implications for both investors and policy makers. Click here for full article Juha Joenvr, University of Oulu, Risk Management Lab, Imperial College Business School Robert Kosowski, Imperial College Business School, CEPR, Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance and EDHEC The Economic Consequences of Investor Relations: A Global Perspective We offer new evidence on the economic value of investor relations (IR) activity using the results of a 2017 global survey of IR officers and their activities at over 800 firms from 59 countries. More active IR programs, as measured by a firms involvement in broker-sponsored conferences, in facilitating one-on-one meetings with institutional investors, through global outreach, and with formal disclosure, media and governance policies, are associated with a statistically significant and economically large 8-12 higher Tobins q valuation. The findings are resilient to concerns about potential reverse-causality as we instrument the level of IR activity with firm-level constraints, or of their peers, on IR personnel, salaries, and budget. The channels through which IR activity increases market value is through greater analyst following, improved analyst forecast accuracy, and a reduced cost of capital. More IR activity is also associated with higher institutional and hedge fund ownership, and more equity issuance. Click here for full article G. Andrew Karolyi, Professor of Finance and Economics and Alumni Professor in Asset Management at the Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University Rose C. Liao, Assistant Professor, Rutgers Business School, Rutgers University Asset Bubbles: Re-thinking Policy for the Age of Asset Management In distilling a vast literature spanning the rational irrational divide, this paper offers reflections on why asset bubbles continue to threaten economic stability despite financial markets becoming more informationally-efficient, more complete, and more heavily influenced by sophisticated (i. e. presumably rational) institutional investors. Candidate explanations for bubble persistencesuch as limits to learning, frictional limits to arbitrage, and behavioral errorsseem unsatisfactory as they are inconsistent with the aforementioned trends impacting global capital markets. In lieu of the short-term nature of the asset ownermanager relationship, and the momentum bias inherent in financial benchmarks, I argue that the business risk of asset managers acts as strong motivation for institutional herding and rational bubble-riding. Two key policy implications follow. First, procyclicality could intensify as institutional assets under management continue to grow. Second, remedial policies should extend beyond the standard suite of macroprudential and monetary measures to include time-invariant policies targeted at the cause (not just symptom) of the problem. Prominent among these should be reforms addressing principal-agent contract design and the implementation of financial benchmarks. Click here for full article Brad Jones, International Monetary Fund Hedge Fund Flows and Performance Streaks: How Investors Weigh Information We examine the relative weights hedge fund investors attach to past information in the fund selection process. The weighting scheme appears inconsistent with econometric forecasting models that predict fund returns, alphas or Sharpe ratios. In particular, investor flows are highly sensitive to performance streaks despite their limited predictive power regarding fund performance. Further, allocations based on forecast models out-of-sample predictions beat investor allocations by a significant margin, which suggests that the latter are suboptimal and reflect overreaction to certain types of information. Our findings do not support the notion that sophisticated investors have superior information or superior information processing abilities. Click here for full article Guillermo Baquero, European School of Management and Technology Marno Verbeek, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Duration of Poor Performance, Fund Flows and Risk-Shifting by Hedge Fund Managers A typical hedge fund manager receives greater compensation when the fund has a strong absolute or relative performance. Asymmetric performance fees and fund flow-performance relationship may create incentives for risk-shifting, estimated in our study by the change in fund return volatility in the middle of the year. However, hedge funds that cannot attract new funds or have had poor performance for a long period may face different incentives. The combination of these two observations confronts hedge fund managers with a complex strategic decision regarding the optimal level of their funds return volatility. While an increase in return volatility generally increases the expected payoff of the compensation contract, excessive volatility is not sustainable. This paper empirically examines the factors that affect hedge fund managers decisions to risk-shifting. We show that (1) if the fund has had prior poor performance, the magnitude of risk-shifting is larger (2) as the duration of poor performance increases, risk-shifting is reduced (3) if the fund is experiencing capital outflows, the magnitude of risk-shifting is smaller and (4) funds that have outflows and also use leverage or have short redemption notice periods display a smaller degree of risk-shifting. Click here for full article Ying Li, Asst. Professor of Business, Univ. of Washington Bothell A. Steven Holland, Professor of Business, Univ. of Washington Bothell Hossein B. Kazemi, Professor of Finance, Univ. of Massachusetts Amherst Best Ideas of Hedge Funds We provide new compelling evidence that hedge funds possess investment skill. Using the longest-in-literature unbiased sample of hedge funds, we show that large holdings of past winners earn 7 annual benchmark-adjusted return. This remarkable performance is consistent with the notion that large holdings represent managers best ideas. Our sample goes back to 1980 and does not miss non-surviving hedge funds, or those that do not voluntarily report to commercial databases. It consists of all investment managers that must report to the SEC, except those that we identify as managers other than hedge funds. While publicly available data is not sufficient to identify hedge funds directly, our reverse identification method achieves both high sensitivity and specificity. We also find weaker yet significant evidence of investment skill in standard indicators such as average fund performance and performance persistence. Click here for full article Sergey Maslennikovy, Ph. D. student and Parker Hund, undergraduate student both at Department of Finance, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin Chasing Winners: The Appeal and the Risk For the large majority of hedge fund investors, frequent and repeated manager turnover is neither a practical nor desirable approach to managing a hedge fund portfolio. However, experiments simulating such an approach can be useful in that they can illustrate potential long-term consequences of different selection strategies. In this paper, we present results of one such experiment that offer a strong caution against the practice of chasing winners, or hiring managers that have had the highest returns. The experiment results also suggest that alpha in this case, return not accounted for by beta to the broad equity market, including from manager skill consistently outperforms absolute return as a selection criterion. Amid a prolonged bull market, there may be a natural tendency for hedge fund investors to gravitate toward managers that have captured a significant share of the markets upside however, since such equity upside capture is statistically a relative rarity among hedge fund strategies, such a selection criterion may lead to adverse selection. Click here for full article Kristofer Kwait, Managing Director, Head of Hedge Fund Research and John Delano, Director Commonfund Hedge Fund Strategies Group Do Incentive Fees Signal Skill Evidence from the Hedge Fund Industry We examine whether fee structure acts as a reliable signal of hedge fund performance. Recent theoretical work suggests that, given the unique information asymmetries faced by hedge fund investors, managers will use performance-based incentive fees to signal skill. We test this hypothesis empirically and find little support for the notion that high incentive fee funds generate superior risk-adjusted returns during normal market conditions rather, increases in incentive fee level are accompanied by an increased proclivity to take on risk and increased leverage. Consequently, higher incentive fee funds suffer higher rates of attrition. Higher incentive fee funds do demonstrate lower market correlations and thus provide enhanced diversification benefits. As a result, high fee funds exhibited remarkable outperformance during the recent global financial crisis. Click here for full article Paul Lajbcygier, Department of Banking Finance, Monash University Joe Rich, Department of Accounting and Finance, Monash University Why Complementarity Matters for Stability 8212 Hong Kong SAR and Singapore as Asian Financial Centers There is much speculation regarding a race for dominance among financial centers in Asia, arising from the anticipated financial opening up of China. This frame of reference is, to an extent, a predilection that results from a traditional understanding of financial centers as possessing historical, geographic, and scale economy advantages. This paper, however, suggests that there is an alternative prism through which the evolution of financial centers in Asia needs to be viewed. It underscores the importance of complementarity rather than dominance to better serve regional and global financial stability. We posit that such complementarity is vital, through network analysis of the roles of Hong Kong SAR and Singapore as the current leading financial centers in the region. This analysis suggests that a competition for dominance can result in de-stabilizing levels of interconnectivity that render the global network as a whole more susceptible to rapid propagation of shocks. We then examine the regulatory and policy challenges that may be encountered in furthering such complementary coexistence. Click here for full article Minsuk Kim, Vanessa Le Lesl, Franziska Ohnsorge, and Srikant Seshadri International Monetary Fund (IMF) Do Alternative UCITS Deliver What They Promise A comparison of alternative UCITS and hedge funds We study the performance of alternative UCITS funds and account for potential survivorship biases in our sample in the best possible manner. Alternative UCITS funds offer similar raw returns but a lower volatility compared to offshore hedge funds. Single-index models show that alternative UCITS funds provide only marginal exposure to variations in hedge fund returns. Multifactor models indicate that the most important risk factors for both alternative UCITS funds and their matched hedge funds strategies are related to stock market risks, but alternative UCITS funds exhibit a lower exposure to these factors than hedge funds. Moreover, we find factor loadings on different risk factors, suggesting that alternative UCITS and hedge funds pursue different strategies. Finally, we assess the degree of the value added for an investor in terms of enhanced diversification benefits by implementing a spanning test and find that both groups are different asset classes with time-varying diversification properties. Click here for full article Michael Busack, Absolut Research GmbH Wolfgang Drobetz, School of Business, University of Hamburg Jan Tille, Absolut Research GmbH Evaluating and Predicting the Failure Probabilities of Hedge Funds Hedge funds have the most sophisticated risk management practices however, hedge funds also appear to have a short lifetime relative to other managed funds. In this study, we investigate the failure probabilities of hedge fundsparticularly the failures due to financial distress. We forecast the failure probabilities of hedge funds using both a proportional hazard model and a logistic model. By utilizing a signal detection model and a relative operating characteristic curve as the prediction accuracy metrics, we found that both of the models have predictive power in the out-of-sample test. The proportional hazard model, in particular, has stronger predictive power, on average. Click here for full article Hee Soo Lee, School of Business, Yonsei University Juan Yao, The University of Sydney Business School, The University of Sydney Sentiment and the Effectiveness of Technical Analysis: Evidence from the Hedge Fund Industry This paper presents a unique test of the effectiveness of technical analysis in different sentiment environments by focusing on its usage by the most sophisticated and astute investors, hedge fund managers. We document that during high-sentiment periods, hedge funds using technical analysis exhibit higher returns, lower risk, and superior market-timing ability than those non-users. The advantages for hedge funds of using technical analysis disappear in low-sentiment periods. These findings are consistent with the view that technical analysis performs relatively better in high-sentiment periods with larger mispricing, which cannot be fully exploited by arbitrage activities due to short-sale impediments. Click here for full article David M. Smith, State University of New York at Albany Na Wang, Hofstra University Ying Wang, State University of New York at Albany Edward J. Zychowicz, Hofstra University Hedge Fund Holdings and Stock Market Efficiency We examine the relation between changes in hedge fund stock holdings and measures of informational efficiency of equity prices derived from transactions data, and find that, on average, increased hedge fund ownership leads to significant improvements in the informational efficiency of equity prices. The contribution of hedge funds to price efficiency is greater than the contributions of other types of institutional investors, such as mutual funds or banks. However, stocks held by hedge funds experienced extreme declines in price efficiency during liquidity crises, most notably in the last quarter of 2008, and the declines were most severe in stocks held by hedge funds connected to Lehman Brothers and hedge funds using leverage. Click here for full article Charles Cao, Smeal College of Business, Penn State University Bing Liang, Isenberg School of Management, University of Massachusetts Andrew W. Lo, MIT Sloan School of Management Lubomir Petrasek, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System CTAs 8211 Which trend is your friend The occurrence of trends within financial markets is inconsistent with the assumptions of classical financial theory. Nevertheless, it can be empirically validated that market prices can be subject to trends. But - which trends should you measure Which trend is your friend Click here for full article Fabian Dori, Manuel Krieger, and Urs Schubiger 1741 Asset Management Ltd. In Search of Missing Risk Factors: Hedge Fund Return Replication with ETFs Properly considering all potential risk factors through tradable liquid portfolios in the context of a risk based factor model is paramount to quantifying the benefits of investing in hedge funds. We attempt to span the space of potential risk factors with exchange traded funds (ETFs). We develop a methodology of hedge fund return replication with ETFs based on cluster analysis and LASSO factor selection that overcomes multicollinearity among ETFs and the data mining bias. We find that the overall out-of-sample accuracy of hedge fund replication with ETFs increases with the number of ETFs available. This is consistent with our interpretation of ETF returns as proxies to a multitude of alternative risk factors that could be driving hedge fund returns. We further consider portfolios of cloneable and non-cloneable hedge funds, defined as top and bottom in-sample R2 matches. We find superior risk-adjusted performance for non-cloneable funds, while cloneable funds fail to deliver significantly positive risk-adjusted performance. We conclude that our methodology provides value in both identifying skilled managers of non-cloneable hedge funds, and also successfully replicating out-of-sample returns that are due to alternative risk exposures of cloneable hedge funds, thus providing a transparent and liquid alternative to investors who may find these return patterns attractive. Click here for full article Jun Duanmu, Yongjia Li, and Alexey Malakhov Sam M. Walton College of Business, University of Arkansas The Effect of Investment Constraints on Hedge Fund Investor Returns The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of frictions and real-world investment constraints on the returns that investors can earn from investing in hedge funds. We contribute to the existing literature by accounting for share restrictions, minimum diversification requirements and fund size restrictions that are commonly used by institutional investors. We show that the size-performance relationship is positive (negative) when past (future) performance is used. Evidence of performance persistence is reduced significantly when fund size and share restrictions such as notice, redemption and lockup period are incorporated into rebalancing rules. We test several hypotheses regarding the economic mechanism that underlies the size-performance relationship. We find empirical support for theoretical models based on decreasing returns to scale as well as managers responding optimally to fee incentives. The findings have significant implications for hedge fund investors since they caution against chasing performance in hedge funds and within the billion dollar club of hedge funds, in particular. Click here for full article Juha Joenvr, University of Oulu and Imperial College Business School Robert Kosowski, Imperial College Business School and Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance Pekka Tolonen, University of Oulu Equity Hedge Fund Performance, Cross8211Sectional Return Dispersion, and Active Share This study examines several aspects of active portfolio management by equity hedge funds between 1996-2017. Consistent with the idea that cross-sectional return dispersion is a proxy for the markets available alpha, our results show that equity hedge funds achieve their strongest performance during periods of elevated dispersion. The performance advantage is robust to numerous risk adjustments. Portfolio managers may use the current months dispersion to plan the extent to which the following months investment approach will be active or passive. We also estimate the active share for equity hedge funds and find an average of 53. We further document the average annual expense ratio for managing hedge funds active share to be about 7. This figure is remarkably close to active expense ratios reported previously for equity mutual funds, which may be interpreted as evidence of uniform pricing for active portfolio management services. Click here for full article David M. Smith, Department of Finance and Center for Institutional Investment Management, University at Albany Crystallization 8211 the Hidden Dimension of Hedge Funds Fee Structure We investigate the implications of variations in the frequency with which hedge funds update their high-water mark on fees paid by hedge fund investors. Using data on Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs), we perform simulations to analyse the effect. We find a statistically and economically significant effect of the crystallization frequency on total fee load. Funds total fee load increases significantly as the crystallization frequency increases. As such, our findings indicate that the total fee load depends not only on the management fee and incentive fee, but also on the crystallization frequency set by the manager. Click here for full article Gert Elaut, Ghent University, Belgium Michael Frmmel, Ghent University, Belgium John Sjdin, Ghent University, Belgium, and RPM Risk Portfolio Management AB, Sweden Governance Under the Gun: Spillover Effects of Hedge Fund Activism This paper empirically studies the spillover effects of hedge fund activism. Activism threat, defined as a heightened rate of recent activism in an industry, predicts a higher probability that a firm in that industry will be targeted. Using institutional trading in stocks outside of the industry as an instrument, we identify the effects of activism threat from those of product market competition and time-varying industry structure. The threat of being targeted has a disciplining effect on peer firms, which respond by reducing agency costs and improving performance along the same dimensions as actual targets. These changes lead to substantial positive abnormal returns and lower the ex-post probability of becoming a target, suggesting the presence of a partial feedback effect. Overall, our results provide new evidence that shareholder activism, as a monitoring mechanism, reaches beyond the firms being targeted. Click here for full article Nickolay Gantchev, Finance Area, Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Oleg Gredil, Kenan-Flagler Business School, Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Kenan-Flagler Business School, Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Evaluating Absolute Return Managers One traditional measure of investment performance, the Information Ratio (IR), is defined as the active return (alpha) divided by the tracking error (the standard deviation of the active return). Calculating an IR is straightforward when the benchmark for performance is a buy-and-hold standard like the SP 500. For absolute return managers, however, the typical benchmark we observe is zero meaning that any excess return is classified as alpha and deemed to represent the return from active management or skill. In this paper, we argue that this standard approach confuses beta returns and alpha returns. The former can be earned by following generic strategies that can be easily implemented and are often replicated by ETFs while the later are associated with more original or complex strategies that more genuinely reflect unique skills or expertise. We propose a new performance metric that strips out beta returns associated with investment style factors. This approach leads to a new statistic, the alpha ratio, which can dramatically impact the relative performance rankings of managers and provide a clearer signal of manager skill. Click here for full article Momtchil Pojarliev, Hathersage Capital Management LLC Richard M. Levich, New York University Stern School of Business, Finance Department CTAs: Shedding light on the black box In their paper they explore a number of the features they consider important when assessing Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs), from the perspective of an investor in the asset class as well as issues of a more technical nature which will inform further those considering making an allocation to the sector. Throughout the paper they have tried to visit topics which are pertinent to this quest, and in so doing, limit re-visiting themes which are already much discussed instead illustrating our assertions (where possible and appropriate) with technical data and examples of the techniques we have developed for finding, managing and monitoring managers in the space. We have covered a lot of ground: indeed this was the aim of their first paper on the sector and there exist many areas which may be the subject of dedicated papers in the future. Finally, they examine some traditionally held assertions with regards to CTAs and in turn assert that some hold true under analysis while others are likely not fully informed. Click here for full article Tommaso Sanzin, Partner, Risk Manager, Head of Quantitative Research Hermes BPK Partners Larry Kissko, Head of CTA, Macro RV Strategies Hermes BPK Partners How Do Hedge Fund 8216Stars8217 Create Value Evidence from Their Daily Trades I use transaction-level data to investigate the magnitude and source of hedge funds equity trading profits. Bootstrap simulations indicate that the trading profits of the top 10 of hedge funds cannot be explained by luck. Similarly, superior performance persists. Outperforming hedge funds tend to be short-term contrarians with small price impacts, and their profits are concentrated over short holding periods and in their more contrarian trades. Further, I find that performance persistence is significantly stronger for contrarian funds with small price impacts. My findings suggest that liquidity provision is an important channel through which outperforming hedge funds persistently create value. Click here for full article Russell Jame, Gatton College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky Did Long-Short Investors Destabilize Commodity Markets This paper contributes to the debate on the effects of the financialization of commodity futures markets by studying the conditional volatility of long-short commodity portfolios and their conditional correlation with traditional assets (stocks and bonds). Using several groups of trading strategies that hedge fund managers are known to implement, we show that long-short speculators do not cause changes in the volatilities of the portfolios they hold or changes in the conditional correlations between these portfolios and traditional assets. Thus calls for increased regulation of commodity money managers might at this stage be premature. Click here for full article Jolle Miffre, PhD, Professor of Finance, EDHEC Business School Chris Brooks, Professor of Finance and Director of Research, ICMA Centre, Reading Quantitative Trend Following Strategies and Equity Risk: From Diversifier to Hedge The goal of this paper is to analyze the equity risk hedging capabilities of CTA Trend Following (TF) strategies and to evaluate enhancements that would stabilize their hedging characteristics to equities. With real yields on US treasuries below zero, institutions are pushing the envelope to find new sources of return, Alpha and risk. More complex, but less liquid and less transparent, new investment conduits such as hedge funds have hidden the usually apparent equity market risk, as measured by volatility, by converting it in the form of tail risk and negative skew. Fixed Income has been extremely stable in the past 30 years and not many worry or care to hedge exposure to it yet. Equities, on the other side, have had some large cycles and drawdowns, which include some over 50. Although it is now in the form of tail risk, rather than old fashioned volatility, most investors would still like to hedge the residual equity risk that is now the core risk in almost every portfolio including hedge funds and fund of hedge funds. The DJCS HFI Dedicated Short Bias (Short Biased Index) has been extremely costly with a negative true Alpha of around -5.5 a year to the SP500. Timing the overall equity market on a discretionary or fundamental basis has not worked for most. Put option buying is extremely costly despite the low implied volatility of the equity markets and it only rewards sporadically due to the negative skew of equities. A profitable or at least cheaper hedge would be most welcome and there still seems to be some hope that TF can effectively hold this responsibility. We will offer some enhancements that will make the correlation of TF to equities significantly negative in order to stabilize this relationship. Despite strong performance during equity drawdowns, TF has been used (and sized) only as a diversifier in portfolios, not as a hedge. This could be due to: 1) A lack of model transparency and understanding, 2) High volatility that sometimes correlates to equities, and 3) Neutral rather than negative long term correlation to equities. In this paper, we will: 1) Analyze the ability of TF to improve a hedge fund portfolios risk adjusted returns and drawdowns, 2) Explore the increase in correlation of TF managers to equities and the reduction in their equity hedging characteristics over time, 3) Specifically analyze the impact of Fixed Income in TF portfolios and its role in TF hedging of equities, 4) Estimate the ability of TF ex-Fixed Income to hedge equity drawdowns across trading time frames and trading styles, 5) Explore the use of TF as a timing filter for equity indices, and 6) Enhance a diversified TF portfolio with covariance filtering to stabilize its ability to hedge equity risk. Click here for full article Nigol Koulajian, Quest Partners LLC Paul Czkwianianc, Quest Partners LLC Do Hedge Funds Provide Liquidity Evidence from Their Trades The paper provides significant evidence of limits of arbitrage in the hedge fund sector. Using unique data on institutional transactions, we show that the price impact of hedge fund trades increases when aggregate conditions deteriorate. The peak in trading impatience is reached during the financial crisis. The finding is consistent with arbitrageurs withdrawal from liquidity provision following a tightening in funding liquidity. Compared to other institutions in our data, hedge funds display the largest sensitivity of trading costs to aggregate conditions. We pin down this effect to a subset of hedge funds whose leverage, lack of share restrictions, asset illiquidity, and low reputational capital make them particularly exposed to funding constraints. These characteristics appear to negatively impact hedge funds trading performance when times get worse. Click here for full article Francesco Franzoni, Professor of Finance, University of Lugano Institute of Finance Alberto Plazzi, Assistant Professor, University of Lugano - Institute of Finance The Returns to Carry and Momentum Strategies We find that global time series carry strategies (across bonds, commodities, currencies, equities and metals) can be explained by a set of lagged macroeconomic variables. The payoffs to carry strategies disappear once futures returns are adjusted for their predictability based on these macroeconomic variables. On the other hand, momentum strategies are only weakly affected by lagged macroeconomic variables but are significantly related to measures of hedge fund capital flow. When studying these two findings together and over time we find that while momentum strategies were highly co-moving with carry strategies and therefore business cycle predictors between 1994 and 2002, when Hedge Fund AUM was low, correlation has since decreased. The decrease in correlation has coincided with significant increases in hedge fund AUM, and limits to arbitrage have become more relevant in explaining momentum returns. We embed these findings within a broad empirical investigation of time series carry and momentum strategies across 55 futures contracts spanning the asset classes bonds, currencies, commodities, equities and metals. Our results provide a possible avenue for identification strategies to disentangle the role of limited arbitrage effects on futures returns and systematic risks that are associated with time-varying expected returns in explaining momentum returns. Click here for full article Jan Danilo Ahmerkamp, Imperial College Business School James Grant, Imperial College Business School Crises, Liquidity Shocks, and Fire Sales at Hedge Funds We investigate hedge fund stock trading from 1998-2017 to test for fire sales. While funds with high capital outflows sell large amounts of stock during crises, these funds also buy stock, rather than using all the proceeds to fulfill redemptions. Further, funds with large outflows rarely sell the same stocks at the same time. For the relatively few stocks that are sold en masse, there is no evidence of price pressure, largely because hedge funds overwhelmingly choose to sell their most liquid, largest, and best-performing stocks. We provide new and compelling evidence that hedge funds neither engage in nor induce fire sales, since their well-diversified portfolios allow them to cherry-pick the most appropriate stocks to sell during crises. Click here for full article Nicole Boyson, Northeastern University Jean Helwege, University of South Carolina Jan Jindra, Ohio State University Drawdown-Based Stop-Outs and the Triple Penance Rule We develop a framework for informing the decision of stopping a portfolio manager or investment strategy once it has reached the drawdown or time under water limit associated with a certain confidence level. Under standard portfolio theory assumptions, we show that it takes three times longer to recover from the maximum drawdown than the time it took to produce it, with the same confidence level (triple penance rule). We provide a theoretical justification to why hedge funds typically set less strict stop-out rules to portfolio managers with higher Sharpe ratios, despite the fact that they should be expected to deliver superior performance. We generalize this framework to the case of first-order serially-correlated investment outcomes, and conclude that ignoring the effect of serial correlation leads to a gross underestimation of the downside potential of hedge fund strategies, by as much as 70. We also estimate that some hedge funds may be firing more than three times the number of skillful portfolio managers, compared to the number that they were willing to accept, as a result of evaluating their performance through traditional metrics, such as the Sharpe ratio. We believe that our closed-formula compact expression for the estimation of drawdown potential, without having to assume IID cashflows, will open new practical applications in risk management, portfolio optimization and capital allocation. The Python code included confirms the accuracy of our solution. Click here for full article David H. Bailey, Complex Systems Group Leader, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Marcos Lpez de Prado, Head of Global Quantitative Research, Tudor Investment Corporation and Research Affiliate, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory The Value of Funds of Hedge Funds: Evidence from their Holdings We examine the value of Funds-of-Hedge-Funds (FoFs) using a hand-collected database of the funds hedge fund holdings. This holdings level data allows us to examine the determinants of hedge fund selection by FoFs, as well the ability to gauge the FoFs skill at hiring and firing managers. We find that FoFs hire hedge funds that are more difficult for individual investors to access, all else equal. FoFs hire larger, younger hedge funds with more restrictive share liquidity and higher minimum investments. Contrary to the previous literature, we do not find that FoFs perform worse than their single manager peers. Rather, we find evidence that a primary source of FoF value comes via skillful monitoring of their underlying hedge fund investments after the hire date. Specifically, we find that hedge funds that are held by FoFs are less likely to fail. The hazard rate for hedge funds held by FoFs is 57 lower than comparable hedge funds. Further, funds fired by FoFs are more likely to underperform and subsequently fail more often indicating FoFs have skill in their firing decisions. Click here for full article Adam L. Aiken, Quinnipiac University Christopher P. Clifford, University of Kentucky Jesse Ellis, University of Alabama Trading Losses: A Little Perspective on a Large Problem Big losses by traders are back in the news. In September the trial of former Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) derivatives trader Kweku Adoboli opened in London with jury selection. Adoboli stands accused of four counts of fraud and false accounting in connection with losses of 2.3 billion on apparently unauthorized equity derivatives trades in 2017. The trial comes not long after JPMorgan Chases credit derivatives tradersincluding Bruno Iksil, known as the London Whale due to the size of his positions lost an estimated 7.5 billion (5.8 billion in realized losses in addition to 1.7 billion yet to come) on apparently authorized credit default swap trades. Since 1990, there have been 15 instances when traders lost at least 1 billion (in 2017 dollars). Trading losses of this size are uncommon but matter when they occur. Shareholders suffer losses, counterparties are exposed to potential settlement failure in over-the-counter markets, bank regulators face the prospect of individual bank insolvencies or even systemic problems in the financial markets, and the public is always on the hook when a bailout is deemed necessary. Click here for full article James R. Barth, Senior Finance Fellow, Milken Institute Donald McCarthy, Consultant, Econ One Research Exploring Uncharted Territories of the Hedge Fund Industry: Empirical Characteristics of Mega Hedge Fund Firms This paper investigates mega hedge fund management companies that manage over 50 of the industrys assets, incorporating previously unavailable data from those that do not report to commercial databases. We document similarities among mega firms that report performance to commercial databases compared to those that do not. We show that the largest divergences between the performance reporting and non-reporting can be traced to differential exposure to credit markets. Thus the performance of hard-to-observe mega firms can be inferred from observable data. This conclusion is robust to delisting bias and the presence of serially correlated returns. Click here for full article Daniel Edelman, Head of Quantitative RD, Alternative Investment Solutions William Fung, Visiting Research Professor, London Business School David A. Hsieh, Professor, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University Revisiting Kats Managed Futures and Hedge Funds: A Match Made in Heaven In November 2002, Cass Business School Professor Harry M. Kat, Ph. D. began to circulate a Working Paper entitled Managed Futures and Hedge Funds: A Match Made In Heaven. The Journal of Investment Management subsequently published the paper in the First Quarter of 2004. In the paper, Kat noted that while adding hedge fund exposure to traditional portfolios of stocks and bonds increased returns and reduced volatility, it also produced an undesired side effect - increased tail risk (lower skew and higher kurtosis). He went on to analyze the effects of adding managed futures to the traditional portfolios, and then of combining hedge funds and managed futures, and finally the effect of adding both hedge funds and managed futures to the traditional portfolios. He found that managed futures were better diversifiers than hedge funds that they reduced the portfolios volatility to a greater degree and more quickly than did hedge funds, and without the undesirable side effects. He concluded that the most desirable results were obtained by combining both managed futures and hedge funds with the traditional portfolios. Kats original period of study was June 1994-May 2001. In this paper, we revisit and update Kats original work. Using similar data for the period June 2001-December 2017, we find that his observations continue to hold true more than 10 years later. During the subsequent 10.5 years, a highly volatile period that included separate stock market drawdowns of 36 and 56, managed futures have continued to provide more effective and more valuable diversification for portfolios of stocks and bonds than have hedge funds. Click here for full article Thomas N. Rollinger, Director of New Strategies Development, Sunrise Capital Partners Segmenting Supply Chain Risk Using ECTRM Systems: Unifying Theory of Commodity Hedging and Arbitrage The complexity of managing physical and financial risk throughout the commodity production, processing and merchandising chain presents numerous challenges. To solve this problem commercials are increasingly turning to Energy and Commodity Transaction Risk Management (ECTRM) systems. Still, risk management functionality within these systems is reported as falling short of requirements. Our discussion, in response, provides an economic framework for developing commodity risk policy and evaluation tools. In doing so, we unify the theory of normal backwardation with theory of storage, macroeconomic general equilibrium with multiple equilibria and microeconomic agents, basis trading with arbitrage strategies, and the hedging response function with elasticinelastic supply-demand economics. After establishing axioms and rules of inference, we investigate the agribusiness supply chain to help illustrate application. Click here for full article Michael Frankfurter, Partner, IQ3 Solutions Group Send in the Clones Hedge Fund Replication Using Futures Contracts Replication products strive to offer investors some of the benefits of hedge funds while avoiding their high fees, illiquidity, and opacity. We test whether a replication algorithm can deliver the diversification and high Sharpe ratio that investors seek. Our procedure constructs monthly clone returns out-of-sample using fully collateralized futures positions held for one-month, with position sizes determined using rolling window regressions. Clone returns have high correlation with their hedge fund targets, indicating replication is possible. Clones also have high correlation with a buy-and-hold investment in stocks, however, and neither the targets nor their clones demonstrate successful time variation in factor loadings. Click here for full article Nicolas P. B. Bollen, Owen Graduate School of Management - Vanderbilt University Gregg S. Fisher, President and Chief Investment Officer, Gerstein Fisher The Life Cycle of Hedge Funds: Fund Flows, Size, Competition, and Performance This paper analyzes the life cycles of hedge funds. Using the Lipper TASS database it provides category and fund specific factors that affect the survival probability of hedge funds. The findings show that in general, investors chasing individual fund performance, thus increasing fund flows, decrease probabilities of hedge funds liquidating. However, if investors chase a category of hedge funds that has performed well (favorably positioned), then the probability of hedge funds liquidating in this category increases. We interpret this finding as a result of competition among hedge funds in a category. As competition increases, marginal funds are more likely to be liquidated than funds that deliver superior risk-adjusted returns. We also find that there is a concave relationship between performance and lagged assets under management. The implication of this study is that an optimal asset size can be obtained by balancing out the effects of past returns, fund flows, competition, market impact, and favorable category positioning that are modeled in the paper. Hedge funds in capacity constrained and illiquid categories are subject to high market impact, have limited investment opportunities, and are likely to exhibit an optimal size behavior. Click here for full article Mila Getmansky, Ph. D. Assistant Professor, Isenberg School of Management, University of Massachusetts Managed Futures and Volatility: Decoupling a Convex Relationship with Volatility Cycles 2017 was a period fraught with turbulence in financial markets. Managed Futures strategies, despite their common association with long volatility, did not fare as well as some might have expected amidst this turbulence. A closer look at volatility, what it means to be long or short volatility, and Managed Futures performance across different regimes in volatility can provide insights into the strategys complex or convex relationship with volatility. A closer look at the cycles of volatility demonstrates that Managed Futures is able to capture crisis alpha for investors over negative volatility cycles, while in certain turbulent periods they also face some of the same short volatility risks that plague many hedge fund strategies. Click here for full article Kathryn M. Kaminski, PhD. CIO and Founder, Alpha K Capital LLC Lessons from the MF Global Collapse In her paper, Ms. Till presents an organized series of events leading up to the downfall of MF Global and subsequently the eighth largest filing of bankruptcy in U. S. history. Click here for full article Hilary Till, Principal, Premia Risk Consultancy Contrarian Hedge Funds and Momentum Mutual Funds We study how hedge fund performance is related to the presence of mutual funds operating in the same asset class. We argue that hedge funds are able to exploit the constraints of the mutual funds related to both the high correlation between flows and value of investment and their tendency to cater to investors by invest in stocks that are hot. Hedge funds exploit these features of the mutual funds, especially the domestic ones. We show that the performance of the hedge funds is significantly higher when mutual fund market coverage is higher. This effect is mostly concentrated among domestic mutual funds and is stronger the higher investment horizon of the hedge funds. A high presence of the mutual fund industry helps to explain 28 of the yearly hedge fund performance. Hedge funds are more likely to be alpha in the presence of a high degree of mutual fund market coverage and their probability of survival is higher. Hedge funds employ contrarian strategies at the very moment in which mutual funds ride market expectations. The degree by which hedge funds react to changes in public information is directly related to the degree of mutual fund market coverage. Click here for full article Massimo Massa, Rothschild Chaired Professor of Banking, Professor of Finance at INSEAD Andrei Simonov, Associate Professor Finance, Eli Broad Graduate School of Mgmt. MSU and CEPR and Shan Yan, Eli Broad Graduate School of Mgmt. MSU Revisiting Stylized Facts About Hedge Funds - Insights from a Novel Aggregation of the Main Hedge Fund Databases This paper presents new stylized facts about hedge fund performance and data biases based on a novel database aggregation. Our aim is to improve the ability of researchers in this literature to compare results across different studies by highlighting differences between databases and their effect on previously documented results. Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we document economically important positive risk-adjusted performance of the average fund while differences in magnitude are due to differences in fund size and data biases, but not differences in fund risk exposures. However, this performance does not persist in any of databases when using value-weighted returns a finding which we show to be linked to fund size and more pronounced biases in certain databases. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, smaller funds and younger funds outperform while hedge funds with strict share restrictions are not associated with higher risk-adjusted returns. Overall we find that several stylized facts are sensitive to the choice of the database. To avoid biases, it is therefore important to use a high quality consolidated database such as the one used in this paper. Click here for full article Juha Joenvr, University of Oulu, Robert Kosowski, Imperial College Business School, Imperial College, and Pekka Tolonen, University of Oulu and GSF Regulated Alternative Funds: The New Conventional In what is beginning to seem like the distant past, a clear line had once separated traditional and alternative investment products. But as investors faced multiple market crises and rising volatility, fund managers responded with a range of innovative products designed to better manage volatility and offer alternatives to long-only investing in traditional markets. As investor segments and products converge, alternative strategies are increasingly being packaged within registered fund structures originally designed for retail buyers, but also used by institutions and other fund selectors. A growing number of alternative funds are being launched as UCITS (Undertaking for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities), a fund vehicle accepted for sale in countries throughout the European Union and many other nations. Alternatives also are becoming more prominent within U. S. mutual funds (registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or, in some cases, under the Securities Act of 1933). The growing popularity of these funds is clearly evident in strong asset flows, product proliferation, and a growing presence in Asian markets. One factor driving the popularity of alternative UCITS and mutual funds is the detailed requirements around risk measurement and management, liquidity, counterparty diversification, and limits on leverage. However, the increased use of derivatives and their associated counterparty and operational risks continue to concern investors and regulators alike. The regulatory environment remains in flux as new rules on hedge funds take shape in Europe, and as the framework around UCITS gets reviewed amidst the expansion of more complex products. Yet this too is encouraging further innovation. Meanwhile, new frontiers are emerging. Europe and the U. S. have led the way in the adoption of alternative strategies, but other markets are developing a taste for non-correlated funds. One of the biggest retail fund launches in Japan this year was an alternative managed futures strategy. Demand for alternatives is growing among sovereign wealth funds and national pension funds in Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Wealthy individual investors around the world are also expected to consider alternatives more seriously after their recent experiences with traditional asset classes. Although U. S. institutions and high net worth individuals (HNWIs) can access hedge funds and alternatives directly, they may see the benefits of sourcing such strategies through regulated structures, just as their European counterparts have done. Click here for full article contributed by SEI Global Services, Inc. - Investment Manager Services division Investor Behavior, Hedge Fund Returns and Strategies We quantify risks associated with investor behavior using several asset pricing models and hedge fund data. After finding that irrational sentiments play a role in hedge fund returns, our multi-beta CAPM estimations reveal that beta belonging to irrational component varies around .037 for risky hedge funds and .018 for relatively less risky ones. Investors can use this irrational beta to gauge the extent of irrational sentiments prevailing in markets and compare the values in turbulent periods with more tranquil periods to re-adjust their portfolios and use these betas as an early warning sign. It can also guide investors in avoiding those funds that display greater irrational behavior. Our approach offers investors a solid quantitative rather than subjective approach in assessing the oncoming of a financial downturn and in doing so better protect against unpredicted losses that may result from irrational trading. Click here for full article Andres Bello, University of Texas-Pan American, Gke Soydemir, California State University Stanislaus, and Jan Smolarski, University of Texas-Pan American A Review of the G20 Meeting on Agriculture: Addressing Price Volatility in the Food Markets Food price volatility has spiked to levels last seen in the 1970s. For low-income countries, food price hikes, such as have occurred recently, tend to significantly increase the incidence of intra-state conflicts, according to IMF research. Therefore, it was fitting and proper that the G20 meeting of agricultural ministers, which was hosted by France at the end of June, put food insecurity squarely at the top of the 2017 G20 agenda. The June G20 agricultural meeting resulted in an action plan that will be carried forward at the Cannes Summit of G20 leaders in November. The 2007-2008 food crisis, and the resumption of more recent food price spikes, clearly have a number of causes, which will require a great deal of political courage to address and ameliorate. That said, in reviewing over a century of commodity price volatility, there are episodes of low volatility and high volatility, which would indicate that this may be a pattern of recurrent phenomena. As a result, it may be wise to focus on how to manage price volatility rather than believe that this phenomenon can be eradicated, as noted by Dr. Pierre Jacquet of the Agence Franaise de Dveloppement. The World Bank, for example, has launched a program that will assist and encourage companies in developing countries to buy insurance in the derivative markets against sudden changes in food prices, according to the Financial Times. Notably, the action plan, agreed to by the G20 agricultural ministers in June, largely embraces marketbased solutions to the problems of food insecurity and food volatility, amongst its many action items. In contrast to the benign view of commodity derivatives trading, French president Nicolas Sarkozy stated at the opening of the June G20 agricultural meeting that the financialization of agriculture markets. is a contributory factor in price volatility and that this was a priority issue for regulators to address. Ultimately, whether commodity derivatives trading (and speculation) increases price volatility is an empirical question. Assuming that one has access to transparent marketparticipant, position, and price data, one can carry out empirical studies to confirm or challenge this assumption. In reviewing the evidence so far regarding the impact of commodity trading, speculation, and index investment on price volatility, this report finds that the evidence for the prosecution does not seem sufficiently compelling at this point. That said, given the disastrous performance of financial institutions in 2007 and especially, in 2008, it is fully appropriate to revisit ones assumptions regarding the economic usefulness of all manner of financial instruments, including commodity derivatives contracts. This papers conclusion is to agree with the World Bank president who has said, the answer to food price volatility is not to prosecute or block markets, but to use them better. And one sensible use of financial engineering is for hedging volatile food price risk with appropriate commodity derivatives contracts. Click here for full article Hilary Till, Research Associate, EDHEC-Risk Institute, Principal, Premia Capital Management, LLC Beware of Stranger Originated Life Insurance This issue summarizes two recent Delaware court decisions determining the validity of life insurance policies under a stranger originated life insurance program. These decisions are relevant to hedge funds and other investors that purchase life insurance policies for investment purposes. Click here for full article Christopher Machera, Hedge Funds Returns Hedge Fund Performance and Liquidity Risk This paper demonstrates that liquidity risk as measured by the covariation of fund returns with unexpected changes in aggregate liquidity is an important predictor of hedge fund performance. The results show that funds that significantly load on liquidity risk subsequently outperform low-loading funds by about 6.5 annually, on average, over the period 1994-2009, while negative performance is observed during liquidity crises. The returns are independent of share restriction, pointing to a possible imbalance between the liquidity a fund offers its investors and the liquidity of its underlying positions. Liquidity risk seems to account for a substantial part of hedge fund performance. The results suggest several practical implications for risk management and manager selection. Click here for full article Ronnie Sadka, Boston College, Carroll School of Management The Importance of Business Process Maturity and Automation in Running a Hedge Fund: Know Your Score and Get to the 8220Sweet Spot8221 Over the past two years, Merlin has published several white papers that are designed to highlight and help managers implement industry best practices - from shoring up their business model to identifying their target investors based on the development stage of their fund. In continuing with this theme, our latest white paper discusses the importance of business process automation within an asset management firm at all stages of development and how these organizations can measure their current processes versus investor expectations. It is critical that business process maturity and automation evolve over the life of a fund in a disciplined and forward-looking manner as they are key components to maintaining a scalable business. As a firm grows, processes that are maintained manually or with home-grown spreadsheets will stress and may break, adding business risk and overhead to a firms operations. This concept is especially important for fund managers because they cannot afford distractions and errors caused by broken or manual processes that affect the viability of the fund. Click here for full article This paper proposes a new methodology to evaluate the prevalence of skilled fund managers. We as-sume that each funds alpha is drawn from one of several distributions based on its skill level (e. g. good, neutral, or bad). For a sample of funds, the composite distribution of alpha is thus a mixture of the underlying distributions. We use the Expectation-Maximization algorithm to infer the proportion of funds of different skill levels and estimate the conditional probability each fund is of a skill type given estimated alpha. Applying our approach to hedge funds over 1994-2009, we find that about 50 of funds have positive skill. Funds identified by our approach as superior persistently deliver high out-of-sample alpha over the next three years. While investors chase past performance, inflows do not reduce fund performance in the near future. Click here for full article Yong Chen, Assistant Professor of Finance, Virginia Tech Michael Cliff, Vice President, Analysis Group Haibei Zhao, PhD student, Georgia State University Diversification in Funds of Hedge Funds: Is It Possible to Overdiversify Many institutions are attracted to diversified portfolios of hedge funds, referred to as Funds of Hedge Funds (FoHFs). In this paper we examine a new database that separates out for the first time the effects of diversification (the number of underlying hedge funds) from scale (the magnitude of assets under management). We find with others that the variance-reducing effects of diversification diminish once FoHFs hold more than 20 underlying hedge funds. This excess diversification actually increases their left-tail risk exposure once we account for return smoothing. Furthermore, the average FoHF in our sample is more exposed to left-tail risk than are nave 1N randomly chosen portfolios. This increase in tail risk is accompanied by lower returns, which we attribute to the cost of necessary due diligence that increases with the number of hedge funds. Click here for full article Stephen J. Brown, New York University Stern School of Business Greg N. Gregoriou, State University of New York (Plattsburgh) Razvan Pascalau, State University of New York (Plattsburgh) The Market Timing Skills of Hedge Funds During the Financial Crisis The performance of a market timer can be measured through the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model, provided the regression alpha is properly adjusted by using the cost of an option-based replicating portfolio, as shown by Hubner (2017). We adapt this approach to the case of multi-factor models with positive, negative or neutral betas. This new approach is applied on a sample of hedge funds whose managers are likely to exhibit market timing skills. We stick to funds that post weekly returns, and analyze three hedge fund strategies in particular: long-short equity, managed futures, and funds of hedge funds. We analyse a particular period during which the managers of these funds are likely to magnify their presumed skills, namely around the financial and banking crisis of 2008. Some funds adopt a positive convexity as a response to the US market index, while others have a concave sensitivity to the returns of an emerging market index. Thus, we identify positive, mixed and negative market timers. A number of signs indicate that only positive market timers manage to acquire options below their cost, and deliver economic significant performance, even in the midst of the financial crisis. Negative market timers, by contrast, behave as if they were forced to sell options without getting the associated premium. We interpret this behavior as a possible result of fire sales, leading them to liquidate positions under the pressure of repemption orders, and inducing negative performance adjusted for marketing timing. Click here for full article Over the past forty years or so, actively managed quantitative equity strategies have become a growing presence within the asset management industry, with numerous competing firms offering a relatively standardized set of products. The vast majority of managers in the benchmark-relative quantitative equity space, which has the largest pool of quant equity assets, relies on what this paper terms the generic paradigm: valuation and momentum alpha forecasts, highly standardized and often commercially available risk models, and mean-variance portfolio optimization tools. This paper argues that each element in this generic approach to quantitative equity management has become vulnerable to competitive pressure and changes in the nature of global equity trading. As a result, the performance of quant equity strategies in the benchmark-relative space has suffered over the past three years, and generic quant managers are likely to face considerable challenges in attracting additional assets going forward. Managers that eschew the generic approach by deploying more diversified sources of alpha, proprietary risk tools, and innovative approaches to dynamic portfolio optimization are likely to fare better, but to the extent they do, it will likely be on a far smaller scale in terms of aggregate assets under management. Click here for full article The investment community has heard and is following the siren call of Alternative Investments. Their seductive return properties and the mystique surrounding how they make money has tantalized investors resulting in exponential growth of assets under management. The key issue remains that dynamic strategies in Alternative Investments perform differently and are exposed to a different set of underlying risks than traditional investment vehicles. By taking a closer look into times when markets are stressed or in crisis (often called tail risk events), this investment primer will explain how some Alternative Investment strategies provide crisis alpha opportunities while others suffer substantial losses during times of market stress. Crisis alpha opportunities are profits which are gained by exploiting the persistent trends that occur across markets during crisis. By gaining a better understanding of what happens during crisis, the underlying risks in Alternative Investment strategies can be divided into three key groups: price risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk. By understanding and classifying Alternative Investments according to their underlying risks, performance metrics commonly used in this industry can be explained in simpler terms helping investors to use them more effectively as part of a larger investment portfolio strategy or philosophy. Click here for full article Using the hedge fund industry as our laboratory, we examine whether bank bailout programs initiated in seven countries during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis reduced contagion risk in the financial system. We test for the likely channel of achieving any such benefits. Reduced fund liquidation probabilities followed bailouts of financial firms offering prime brokerage, custodial and investment advisory services to hedge funds in the short term. However, bailouts did not lead to increased capital levels in bank-related hedge funds. Collectively, our evidence suggests that bailouts helped stem the propagation of contagion through information channels rather than directly through counterparty funding. Click here for full article Robert W. Faff, University of Queensland Jerry T. Parwada and Kian M. Tan, University of New South Wales The Business of Running a Hedge Fund - Best Practices for Getting to the 8216Green Zone8217 2017 was a transformative year for the hedge fund industry and served as a strong reminder that managing money is not the same as running a business. The significant number of small, mid-size and large fund closures already in 2017 provides continuing evidence of the material, multifaceted challenges facing operators of hedge fund businesses. Managers who understand the distinction between managing money and running a business and who execute both effectively are best positioned to maintain a sustainable and prosperous business - to achieve not only investment alpha, but also enterprise alpha. This paper examines the hedge fund business model and is based on our observations and numerous conversations with hedge fund managers, investors and industry experts. Our goal is to share the best practices we have witnessed among green zone hedge funds that are well positioned for sustainability across a variety of economic and market conditions. Click here for full article This paper introduces the portfolio construction technique of OverlayUnderlay Alternatives Blend of CTAs (overlay) and Hedge Funds (underlay). The well-established result, in both industry literature and practice, that adding alternatives to a traditional-only portfolio leads to superior risk-adjusted returns is re-established in this paper. Additionally, it is demonstrated that invoking an overlayunderlay of with CTAs and hedge funds-attainable due to the cash efficiency of futures-is better than investing in either hedge funds or CTAs alone. This finding helps to establish that a hedge funds versus CTAs attitude should be replaced by hedge funds and CTAs. Different nuances of how to blend hedge funds with CTAs are explored. Click here for full article Hedge funds are in a better position than mutual funds in timing systematic risk factors because they are less regulated and thus have more freedom to use leverage and short sales. To examine whether factor timing is a source of hedge fund alpha, this paper decomposes excess return generated by hedge funds during 1994 - 2008 into security selection, factor timing, and risk premium using the new measure of performance developed by Lo (2008). I find that security selection on average explains most of the excess return generated by hedge funds, and the contributions of factor timing and risk premium are trivial. In the U. S. equity market, hedge funds on average show negative timing ability especially in recent years that include the financial crisis period of 2007-08. Click here for full article In this paper we study the drawdown status of hedge funds as a hedge fund characteristic related to performance. A hedge funds drawdown status is the decile to which the fund belongs in the industrys drawdown distribution (at a given point in time). Economic reasoning suggests that both the current level and the past evolution of a funds drawdown status are informative of key fund aspects, including the managers talent, as well as fund investors assessment of the fund, and, hence, are predictive of future performance. The analysis delivers four completely new insights on hedge funds. First, the presence of insurance selling (shorting deep out-of-the-money puts) in the industry is large enough to make portfolios of low drawdown funds weak performers, in general, and bad performers in times of turmoil. Second, the market operates a Darwinian selection process according to which funds running large drawdowns for a prolonged period of time (survivers) are managed by truly talented traders who deliver outstanding future performance. Third, a completely new dimension of risk arises as a distinctive feature of hedge funds: risk conditional on survival is tantamount to outstanding performance. Fourth, drawdown status analysis raises serious concerns about the role played by other hedge fund characteristics In this paper, we examine the hypothesis that hedge fund managers obtain an informational advantage in securities trading through their connections with lobbyists. Using datasets on hedge fund long-equity holdings and lobbying expenses from 1999 to 2008, we show that hedge funds that are connected to lobbyists tend to trade more heavily in politically sensitive stocks than those that do not. We further show that connected hedge funds perform significantly better on their holdings of politically sensitive stocks. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that connected hedge funds, relative to non-connected ones, outperform by 1.6 to 2.5 percent per month in politically sensitive stocks, relative to non-political stocks. These results suggest that hedge fund managers exploit private information, which can be an important source of their superior performance. Our study provides evidence for the ongoing debate about regulatory reform governing informed trading based on private political information. Click here for full article Meng Gao, Risk Management Institute, National University of Singapore Jiekun Huang, Department of Finance, NUS Business School Are All Currency Managers Equal We present a post-sample study of currency fund managers showing that alpha hunters and especially alpha generators are more effective in providing diversification benefits for a global equity portfolio than currency managers who earn beta returns from popular style strategies or managers with high total returns regardless of their source. Our study is unusual in that we measure the alpha from currency investing using a simple factor model rather than based on total excess returns, that we use rankings of currency managers from an earlier published study and examine their performance truly out-of-sample, and finally that our data reflect actual trades and returns earned by these managers, so the data are not contaminated by the usual biases in hedge fund databases. Our results suggest that a factor model approach to analyzing currency fund returns, coupled with the revealed degree of alpha and beta persistence in our data, offer institutional investors with large equity exposure a useful tool for improving their performance. Click here for full article In spite of a somewhat disappointing performance throughout the crisis, and a series of high profile scandals, investors are showing interest in hedge funds. Still, funds of hedge funds keep on experiencing out-flows. Can this phenomenon be explained by the failure of funds of hedge funds managers to deliver on their promise to add value through active management, or is it symptomatic of a move toward greater disintermediation in the hedge fund industry Little attention has been paid so far to the added-value, and the sources of the added-value, of funds of hedge funds. The lack of transparency that is characteristic of the hedge funds arena and makes the performance attribution exercise particularly challenging is probably an explanation. The objective of this article is to fill in the gap. We introduce to this end a return-based attribution model allowing for a full decomposition of funds of hedge funds performance. The results of our empirical study suggest that funds of hedge funds are funds of funds like others. Strategic Allocation turns out to be a crucial step in the investment process, in that it not only adds value over the long-term, but most importantly, it brings resilience precisely when investors need it the most. Fund Picking, on the other hand, turns out to be a double-edged sword. Overall, funds of hedge funds appear to succeed in overcoming their double fee structure, and add value across market regimes, although to varying degrees and in different forms. Click here for full article Serge Darolles, Ph. D. Research Fellow, CREST and Deputy Head RD, Lyxor Asset Management Mathieu Vaissi, Ph. D. Research Associate, EDHEC-Risk Institute and Senior Portfolio Manager, Lyxor Asset Management Hedge Fund Leverage We investigate the leverage of hedge funds using both time-series and cross-sectional analysis. Hedge fund leverage is counter-cyclical to the leverage of listed financial intermediaries and decreases prior to the start of the financial crisis in mid-2007. Hedge fund leverage is lowest in early 2009 when the market leverage of investment banks is highest. Changes in hedge fund leverage tend to be more predictable by economy-wide factors than by fund-specific characteristics. In particular, decreases in funding costs and increases in market values both forecast increases in hedge fund leverage. Decreases in fund return volatilities also increase leverage. Click here for full article Andrew Angy, Columbia University and NBER Sergiy Gorovyyz, Columbia University Gregory B. van Inwegenx, Citi Private Bank Regular(ized) Hedge Fund Clones This article addresses the problem of portfolio construction in the context of efficient hedge fund investments replication. We propose a modification to the standard la Sharpe style analysis where we augment the objective function with a penalty proportional to the sum of the absolute values of the replicating asset weights, i. e. the norm of the asset weights vector. This penalty regularizes the optimization problem, with significant impacts on the stability of the resulting asset mix and the risk and return characteristics of the replicating portfolio. Our results suggest that the norm-constrained replicating portfolios exhibit significant correlations with their benchmarks, often higher than 0.9, have a fraction, i. e. about 12 to 23, of active positions relative to those determined through the standard method, and are obtained with turnover which is in some instances about 14 of that for the standard method. Moreover, the extreme risk of the replicating portfolios obtained through the regularization method is always lower than that exhibited by currently available commercial hedge fund investment replication products. Click here for full article Daniel Giamouridis, Dept. of Accounting Finance, Athens University of Economics and Business Sandra Paterlini, Center for Quantitative Risk Analysis, Dept. of Statistics, LMU, Munich, Germany Dedicated Short Bias Hedge Funds - Just a one trick pony During the recent period of significant market unrest in 2007 and 2008 dedicated short bias (DSB) hedge funds exhibited extremely strong results while many other hedge fund strategies suffered badly. This study, prompted by this recent episode, investigates the DSB hedge funds performance over an extended sample period, from January 1994 to December 2008. Performance evaluation is carried out both initially at the individual fund level and then on an equally weighted dedicated short bias hedge fund portfolio using three different factor model specifications and both linear and nonlinear estimation techniques. We conclude that DSB hedge funds are indeed more than a one trick pony. They are a significant source of diversification for investors and produce statistically significant levels of alpha. Our findings are robust to the specification of traditional and alternative risk factors, nonlinearity and the omission of the flattering credit crisis period. Click here for full article Ciara Connolly, Dept. of Accounting, Finance Information Systems Mark C. Hutchinson, Dept. of Accounting, Finance Information Systems and Centre for Investment Research University College Cork Replicating Hedge Fund Indices with Optimization Heuristics Hedge funds offer desirable risk-return profiles but we also find high management fees, lack of transparency and worse, very limited liquidity (they are often closed to new investors and disinvestment fees can be prohibitive). This creates an incentive to replicate the attractive features of hedge funds using liquid assets. We investigate this replication problem using monthly data of CS Tremont for the period of 1999 to 2009. Our model uses historical observations and combines tracking accuracy, excess return, and portfolio correlation with the index and the market. Performance is evaluated considering empirical distributions of excess return, final wealth and correlations of the portfolio with the index and the market. The distributions are compiled from a set of portfolio trajectories computed by a resampling procedure. The nonconvex optimization problem arising from our model specification is solved with a heuristic optimization technique. Our preliminary results are encouraging as we can track the indices accurately and enhance performance (e. g. have lower correlation with equity markets). Click here for full article Manfred Gilli, University of Geneva and The Swiss Finance Institute Enrico Schumann, Gerda Cabej and Jonela Lula University of Geneva Absolute Returns Revisited The term absolute returns has been battered as well as misused by business and politics alike. We aim to clarify. The term stands for an investment philosophy that stands in stark contrast to financial orthodoxy. And thats a good thing. Market heterogeneity with moderately leveraged financial institutions reduces systemic risk. Market homogeneity with excessively leveraged institutions doesnt. After challenging some axioms of financial orthodoxy, we introduce PPMPT (Post-post-modern portfolio theory) as an alternative to mean-variance optimization. Click here for full article This paper attempts to determine whether exchange-listed hedge funds experience longer lifetimes than non-listed funds, even after factors known to affect survival, such as size and performance, are considered. The Kaplan-Meier estimator is used to compare survival times of listed and non-listed funds. The Cox proportional hazards model is used to make the same comparison, but by controlling for additional factors. The accelerated failure time (AFT) regression model is used to estimate the median survival time of hedge funds, based on values of explanatory variables. Listed hedge funds tend to be larger and adopt more conservative investment strategies than non-listed funds. Listed funds tend to survive roughly two years longer on average than non-listed funds, and this difference in longevity is persistent even after controlling for factors known to affect survival. Finally, we find that the failure rate of listed funds is substantially lower than that of non-listed funds, but only during the first five years of life. Click here for full article Greg N. Gregoriou, SUNY College at Plattsburgh - School of Business and Economics Franois-Serge Lhabitant, Kedge Capital Fund Management amp EDHEC Business School Fabrice Douglas Rouah, McGill University - Faculty of Management Merlins Necessary Nine: How to Raise and Retain Institutional Capital This article is based on a presentation by Ron Suber at the Feb. 18th event Hedge Funds: Getting to the Next Level By Ron Suber -- Not long ago, pre-2008, hedge fund managers held relative power over investors. Because demand for their products was so high across a range of strategies, they controlled the terms, often with little transparency and very favorable gating provisions. Recent market events and a general scarcity of investors has shifted the power to the investor. While raising and retaining institutional capital has always been challenging, in todays environment hedge fund managers must be more diligent than ever in clearly defining and explaining their process, controls and their differentiation. Worries about performance are now often eclipsed by other concerns such as volatility, liquidity, attribution, transparency and, of course, fraud. The following checklist - we call it the Merlin Necessary Nine - is designed to help hedge fund managers understand and articulate their edge to institutional investors. Click here for full article In the last 20 years, the amount of assets managed by quantitative and qualitative hedge funds have grown dramatically. We examine the difference between quantitative and qualitative hedge funds in a variety of ways, including management differences and performance differences. We find that both quantitative and qualitative hedge funds have positive risk-adjusted returns. We also find that overall, quantitative hedge funds as a group have higher s than qualitative hedge funds. The outperformance might be as high as 72 bps per year when considering all risk factors. We also suggest that this additional performance may be due to better timing ability. Click here for full article Ludwig Chincarini, CFA, Ph. D. Assistant Professor Department of Economics, Pomona College Lies of Capital Lines In this paper we examine in detail the qualitative effects caused by the investors sensitivity to mark-to-market and price of liquidity. This distorts CAPM-like portfolio construction causing the Capital Line to become curved and eventually inverted. We show that in the world of strongly concave and non-monotonous Capital Lines, pushing up return targets results in increasing risk but not in increasing return. This is due to the decreasing and eventually negative marginal returns per unit of risk. By chasing returns and prompting investment managers to deliver unsustainable performance, the investment community damages its own chances through a greedy search for yield. Besides negatively skewing the risk-return characteristics, this also amplifies destabilizing pro-cyclical dynamics and increases the component of volatility, which is not accompanied by corresponding return. The latter has profound consequences for investment management and economic policy making. We examine the influence of non-linearity of the Capital Line on the cyclical volatility of capital market and short optionality negative gamma) profile, implicitly embedded in classical investment approach. We show how to mitigate this negative effect by including long volatility funds in the investment portfolio. We also discuss adverse selection bias among investment managers, created by the investors demand for high unsustainable returns. Since one can only hope that the behaviour of either capital allocators or investment managers will change, we argue that it is left up to regulators to take measures to limit the use of credit and leverage, and to control the self-enforcing mechanism of market destabilization. Click here for full article Kirill Ilinski, Fusion Asset Management Alexis Pokrovski, Laboratory of Quantum Networks, Institute for Physics, St-Petersburg State University Detecting Crowded Trades in Currency Funds The financial crises in 2008 highlights the importance of detecting crowded trades due to the risks they pose to the stability of the financial system and to the global economy. However, there is a perception that crowded trades are difficult to identify. To date, no single measure to capture the crowdedness of a trade or a trading style has developed. We propose a methodology to measure crowded trades and apply it to professional currency managers. Our results suggest that carry became a crowded trading strategy towards the end of Q1 2008, shortly before a massive liquidation of carry trades. The timing suggests a possible adverse relationship between our measure of style crowdedness and the future performance of the trading style. Crowdedness in the trend following and value strategies confirm this hypothesis. We apply our approach to currencies but the methodology is general and could be used to measure the popularity or crowdedness of any trade with an identifiable time series return. Our methodology may offer useful insights regarding the popularity of certain trades - in currencies, gold, or other assets - among hedge funds. Further research in this area might be very relevant for investors, managers and regulators. Click here for full article Because many facets of the global oil markets have not been sufficiently transparent, it is unclear how much of the oil-price rally that peaked in July 2008 can be put down to speculation. This uncertainty has led to concerns that there was actually excessive speculation in the oil derivatives markets. In an effort to make the oil markets more transparent, the U. S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission has recently launched the Disaggregated Commitments of Traders report. This report includes three years of enhanced market-participant data for twenty-two commodity futures contracts. This report makes it possible to examine whether, over the last three years, speculative position-taking in the exchange-traded oil derivatives markets has been excessive relative to commercial hedging needs. We use a traditional metric for evaluating speculative position-taking and find that this position-taking does not appear to be excessive over the past three years when compared to the scale of commercial hedging at the time. Click here for full article The original Superstars versus teamwork (Nov. 8, 2007) was the first in a sequence of research pieces that have persuaded us that the best way to build portfolios of CTAs is to look for low correlation and place your bets there. Correlations appeared to be predictable, especially for portfolios, while Sharpe ratios did not. We found that choosing managers to maximize the portfolios Sharpe ratio yielded better results than did choosing managers based on their individual Sharpe ratios, and the difference was statistically significant. The teamwork portfolios in that research were constructed, however, using conventional mean variance analysis that was based on estimated means, volatilities and correlations. And, when we applied it to the construction of a teamwork index, we found out, quite by accident, that it was unusually sensitive to minor changes in the eligible set. Too sensitive, for that matter, which led us back to the question of just how one should approach the selection of managers for a teamwork portfolio. The flaw, we found, was not in giving past correlations a role in shaping our teamwork portfolios, but in allowing past returns to have any effect at all. As you will see on page 3 (Exhibit 3), past correlations for large enough portfolios of CTAs can be highly predictable while past returns and, by extension, past Sharpe ratios are not. In this new look at that research, we changed two things. First, we formed teamwork portfolios using three different rules. Second, we allowed ourselves to construct new portfolios each year without regard to the costs of dropping and adding managers. The three teamwork rules were these. One used the conventional meanvariance approach to maximize the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio. The other two used only correlations and gave no weight at all to past returns. The first of these, which is illustrated in Exhibit 1, simply calculated the probability that a CTA would have been in a low-average correlation portfolio and chose those with the highest probabilities of inclusion. The second ranked CTAs using each CTAs average return correlation with all others CTAs in the eligible set and chose those with the lowest average correlations. The superstar portfolios were formed by identifying those CTAs who had, over the previous three years, produced the highest individual Sharpe ratios. In a nutshell, what we found is this. First, the teamwork portfolios gave us an edge over the superstar portfolios. While the superstar portfolios delivered the highest Sharpe ratio in two of the eight years, they came in dead last the other six years. In contrast, the correlation-only teamwork portfolios came in first or second in five of the eight years, and came in last only once. Second, the correlation-only approaches gave us two benefits over the conventional meanvariance approach. For one thing, they are more robust. The removal of one or more managers from the eligible set does not materially affect the probability that the remaining low correlation CTAs will end up in the low correlation portfolio. For another, they are more economical and use the eligible CTA set far more sparingly. While the meanvariance portfolios performed almost as well as the correlation-only portfolios, they used 21 of the 42 CTAs over the eight years, while the correlation-only portfolios used only 14. Thus, the meanvariance approach would have dropped and added 11 CTAs, the correlation-only rules would have dropped and added only four. Given the high costs of dropping and adding CTAs, this kind of stability in ones choice of CTAs can be worth a great deal. In the remainder of this note, we review this reworking of our research and conclude with a discussion of how we have applied what weve learned to the construction and management of the AlternativeEdge Teamwork Index. In particular, we take a more complete look at which return statistics are persistent or predictable (volatilities and correlations) and which are not (means and Sharpe ratios) explore two empirical approaches to constructing low correlation portfolios explain why we volatility weight the CTAs in the AlternativeEdge indices. Click here for full article We believe the distinction between emerging markets and developed markets is no longer useful. The differences that justified the segregation of emerging and developed markets have disappeared or are in the process of disappearing. Emerging markets, because of their characteristics, should matter a great deal to investors today. Investors handicap themselves by limiting how much they invest in emerging markets. The term emerging markets is obsolete. The end of emerging markets has arrived, as the distinction between emerging markets and developed markets has run the course of its usefulness to investors. Distinctions are disappearing between emerging and developed markets. Emerging markets represent half of the worlds economy they are large and liquid with volatility similar to that of developed markets and their corporate governance and government policies are no worse than, and in some cases superior to, those of developed markets. There is one measure by which there is still a distinction between emerging markets and developed markets: Growth. We believe that, for the foreseeable future, this differentiation in growth will remain, leading to more attractive investment opportunities in emerging markets than in developed markets. For this reason, investors should focus more on emerging markets than developed markets. Click here for full article I study novel data from a confidential website where a select group of fundamentals-based hedge fund managers privately share investment ideas. These value investors are not easily defined: they exploit traditional tangible asset valuation discrepancies such as buying high book-to-market stocks, but spend more time analyzing intrinsic value, growth measures, and special situation investments. Evidence suggests that the managers long recommendations earn economic and statistically significant long-term abnormal returns. Oddly enough, these managers share their profitable ideas with other skilled investors. This evidence is puzzling in a world where there is an efficient market for fund managers and asset prices. Click here for full article Based on the style analysis pioneered in Sharpe, W. F. (1992). Asset Allocation: Management Style and Performance Measurement, Journal of Portfolio Management, 7-19. I define a procedure to examine the consistency of hedge fund indexes across providers. The results of my investigation suggest that the competing indexes of the different providers are homogeneous. However, I also find two cases for which one provider differently allocates the funds between styles compared to its peers. Click here for full article Portfolio optimisation for a Fund of Hedge Funds (FoHF) has to address the asymmetric, non-Gaussian nature of the underlying returns distributions. Furthermore, the objective functions and constraints are not necessarily convex or even smooth. Therefore traditional portfolio optimisation methods such as mean-variance optimisation are not appropriate for such problems and global search optimisation algorithms could serve better to address such problems. Also, in implementing such an approach the goal is to incorporate information as to the future expected outcomes to determine the optimised portfolio rather than optimise a portfolio on historic performance. In this paper, we consider the suitability of global search optimisation algorithms applied to FoHF portfolios, and using one of these algorithms to construct an optimal portfolio of investable hedge fund indices given forecast views of the future and our confidence in such views. Click here for full article B. Minsky, International Asset Management Ltd. M. Obradovic, School of Mathematical Physical Sciences, Sussex Univ. Q. Tang, School of Mathematical Physical Sciences, Sussex Univ. R. Thapar, International Asset Management Ltd. What is the Optimal Number of Managers in a Fund of Hedge Funds This paper investigates the level and the determinants of the optimal number of hedge fund managers in a Fund of Hedge Funds (FOFs). The paper also analyzes the impact that this level has on the performance and the volatility of returns of the typical FOF. Several important findings emerge. First, we find that the number of underlying hedge funds (HFs) included into a FOF has a negative and significant impact on the volatility of returns but less of an impact on the actual returns. However, if we properly classify the FOFs into several larger categories of interest, we find evidence that the FOFs having between 6 and 10 hedge fund managers perform the best. On average this group of FOFs has assets under management of around 200 million. Second, further evidence shows that there is a positive relationship between the size of the FOF portfolio and the lifetime of the fund. Third, several factors that influence the number of HF managers into a FOF include, but are not limited to the amount of leverage, the redemption frequency, the size of the fund, the total number of assets managed by the FOF manager, whether the fund issues a K-1 schedule for tax purposes, the currency in which the fund trades, the geographical focus, and the strategy pursued. Click here for full article Greg N. Gregoriou, Professor of Finance, State University of New York Razvan Pascalau, Assistant Professor of Economics, State University of New York Investor Irrationality and Closed-End Hedge Funds This study questions the rationality of people investing in HFs. I use a sample of London listed closed-end hedge funds to evaluate two criteria that imply irrational behavior. I nd that the rationality of investors can not be rejected for the majority of time. However, the results also imply that investors react irrationally when facing the worsening economic conditions in the second half of 2008. Click here for full article Oliver Dietiker, University of Basel Skill, Luck and the Multi-Product Firm: Evidence from Hedge Funds We propose that higher skilled firms diversify in equilibrium even though managers exploit idiosyncratic performance shocks to time diversification moves. We formalize this intuition in a mistakefree equilibrium and test our predictions using a large panel dataset on the hedge fund industry 1977- 2006. The results show that returns fall following new fund launches, but are 13 basis points per month higher in diversified firms compared to a matched control sample of focused firms. Consistent with the theory, the evidence suggests that both idiosyncratic performance shocks and systematic differences in skill influence diversification decisions. Click here for full article Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr. University of California, Berkeley Evan Rawley, University of Pennsylvania Crowded Chickens Farm Fewer Eggs - Capacity Constraints in the Hedge Fund Industry Revisited We revisit the question of capacity constraints in the hedge fund industry by looking at over 2,000 individual funds operating within ten different strategy segments over the years 1994 to 2006. By first looking at fund specific determinants of alpha returns, we demonstrate that the negative effect of inflows on performance is dominated by a concave size effect and thus nonlinear. Secondly, we investigate how competitive dynamics within a strategy segment influence alpha returns. The finding of a concave relationship between the total size of a segment and individual fund performance supports the notion of limiting capacity constraints on strategy level. While fund specific determinants only apply to funds that generated alpha in the past, strategy segment effects apply to all funds. Click here for full article Oliver Weidenmller and Marno Verbeek Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University The Good, the Bad or the Expensive Which Mutual Fund Managers Join Hedge Funds Does the mutual fund industry lose its best managers to hedge funds We find that a mutual fund manager with superior past performance is more likely to start managing an in-house hedge fund while continuing to manage mutual funds. However, a mutual fund manager with poor past performance is more likely to leave the mutual fund industry to manage a hedge fund. Thus, mutual funds appear to use in-house hedge funds to retain the best-performing managers in the face of competition from hedge funds. In addition, the managers of mutual funds with greater expenses are more likely to enter the hedge fund industry. The magnitude of such expenses is negatively related to subsequent performance in the hedge fund industry. Hence, hedge funds do not acquire superior performance for their investors by hiring these expensive managers. Click here for full article Prachi Deuskar, University of Illinois at Urbana Joshua M. Pollet, Goizueta Business School, Emory University Z. Jay Wang, University of Illinois at Urbana Lu Zheng, Paul Merage School of Business, University of California Irvine Performance Bias from Strategic Asset Allocation: The Case of Funds of Hedge Funds Evaluating the performance of portfolio managers has received wide attention in the finance literature. The common practice is to divide performance, which is attributable to active management, into two main components, security selection and market timing. However, the Brinson et al. studies and the controversial debate on the relative importance of asset allocation and security selection reveal that the strategic asset allocation has a significant impact on the performance of an actively managed portfolio. Nevertheless, up to now neither an empirical study has taken that portfolio decisions into account in the performance evaluation nor has anyone previously discussed a possible performance bias which could arise from the strategic asset allocation decisions. Beside its direct influence on the performance of funds of hedge funds, the strategic asset allocation induces a performance bias similar to the timing bias, which results from actively changing the beta of the portfolio of hedge funds by the portfolio manager. Unfortunately, normally the historical portfolio holdings of funds of hedge funds are not available due to their low transparency. In order to estimate the strategic asset allocation of each fund of hedge funds we use Sharpes 1988, 1992 returns-based style analysis (RBSA), which requires only the monthly performance. By comparing the selectivity and timing performance of 2638 funds of hedge funds, 2095 live funds and 543 dead funds, estimated with Jensens 1968 model and the timing model of Treynor and Mazuy 1966 using fund specific benchmark portfolios - which reflect the funds strategic asset allocations - against the selectivity and timing performance estimates generated with traditional hedge fund and fund of hedge funds indices, we document a performance bias which is clearly induced by the strategic asset allocation decision. This bias causes an overestimation of the true selectivity and timing performance of funds of hedge funds. In order to avoid these biases, both academics and practitioners should evaluate the performance of funds of hedge funds against benchmark portfolios which reflect the fund specific strategic asset allocation. Over the period from 1994 - 2006, we find that funds of hedge funds exhibit a negative monthly selectivity performance of -0.1648 and a monthly timing performance of -0.0263. Click here for full article Dr. Oliver A. Schwindler, Department of Finance, Bamberg University Lintner Revisited: The Benefits of Managed Futures 25 Years Later In this paper we attempt to update Professor Lintners work by demonstrating that the beneficial correlative properties of managed futures presented in his research persist today. Click here for full article Ryan Abrams, AlphaMetrix Alternative Investment Advisors, LLC Ranjan Bhaduri, AlphaMetrix Alternative Investment Advisors, LLC Elizabeth Flores, CME Group Selectivity and Timing Performance of Funds of Hedge Funds: A Time-Varying Approach This paper empirically examines the time variation of the selectivity and timing performance of funds of hedge funds by employing rolling versions of the performance regression models of Jensen (1968) and Treynor and Mazuy (1966). The analysis is based on a sample of 1,207 funds of hedge funds during January 1994 until December 2006. We propose for the first time a cross-sectional regression method similar to those used by Fama and McBeth (1973) for the analysis of the determinants of the performance of funds of hedge funds. Moreover, we use fund specific style benchmarks, which reflect the performance of the individual strategic asset allocation decision of each fund. Our results show that positive selectivity performance has faded away over the sample period and has become negative in recent years while the timing performance erratically fluctuates around zero. The cross-sectional regression reveals that the importance of the selectivity and timing seems to rotate over time, as both variables show considerable variation over time and different magnitudes in the cross-section. Summing up, we present profound and robust evidence that selectivity performance can be regarded as a good discriminating factor for superior funds of hedge funds. Click here for full article Dr. Marco Rummer, Saiumld Business School, Oxford University Dr. Oliver A. Schwindler, Department of Finance, Bamberg University Recovering Delisting Returns of Hedge Funds Numerous hedge funds stop reporting to commercial databases each year. An issue for hedgefund performance estimation is: what delisting return to attribute to such funds This would be particularly problematic if delisting returns are typically very different from continuing funds returns. In this paper, we use estimated portfolio holdings for funds-of-funds with reported returns to back out maximum likelihood estimates for hedge-fund delisting returns. The estimated mean delisting return for all exiting funds is small, although statistically significantly different from the average observed returns for all reporting hedge funds. These findings are robust to relaxing several underlying assumptions. Click here for full article James E. Hodder, Professor - Finance, University of Wisconsin-Madison Dr. Jens Jackwerth, Head Dept of Economics, University of Konstanz Olga Kolokolova, Research Asst. University of Konstanz The Impact of Hedge Fund Family Membership on Performance and Market Share We study the impact that hedge fund family membership has on performance and market share. Hedge funds from small fund families outperform those from large families by a statistically significant 4.4 per year on a risk-adjusted basis. We investigate the possible causes for this outperformance, and find that regardless of family size, fund families that focus on their core competencies have core competency funds with superior performance, while the familys non-core competency funds underperform. We next examine the determinants of hedge fund family market share. A familys market share is positively related to the number and diversity of funds offered, and is also positively related to past fund performance. Finally, we examine the determinants of fund family market share at the fund stylestrategy level. Families that focus on their core competencies attract positive and significant market share to these core-competency funds. Hence, by starting new funds only in their familys core competencies, fund managers can enjoy increased market share while their investors enjoy good performance. Click here for full article The paper assesses the extent to which the Group of Seven (G7) has been successful in its management of major currencies since the 1970s. Using an event-study approach, the paper finds evidence that the G7 has been overall effective in moving the US dollar, yen and euro in the intended direction at horizons of up to three months after G7 meetings, but not at longer horizons. While the success of the G7 is partly dependent on the market environment, it is also to a significant degree endogenous to the policy process itself. The findings indicate that the reputation and credibility of the G7, as well as its ability to form and communicate a consensus among individual G7 members, are important determinants for the G7s ability to manage major currencies. The paper concludes by analyzing the factors that help the G7 build reputation and consensus, and by discussing the implications for global economic governance. Click here for full article This paper is the first to use quantile regression to analyze the impact of experience and size of funds of hedge funds (FHFs) on performance. In comparison to OLS regression, quantile regression provides a more detailed picture of the influence of size and experience on FHF return behaviour. Hence, it allows us to study the relevance of these factors for various return and risk levels instead of average return and risk, as is the case with OLS regression. Because FHF size and age (as a proxy for experience) are available in a panel setting, we can perform estimations in an unbalanced stacked panel framework. This study analyzes time series and descriptive variables of 649 FHFs drawn from the Lipper TASS Hedge Fund database for the time period January 1996 to August 2007. Our empirical results suggest that experience and size have a negative effect on performance, with a positive curvature at the higher quantiles. At the lower quantiles, however, size has a positive effect with a negative curvature. Both factors show no significant effect at the median. Click here for full article We make use of a new database on daily currency fund manager returns over a threeyear period, 2005-08. This higher frequency data allows us to estimate both alpha measures of performance and beta style factors on a yearly basis, which in turn allows us to test for persistence. We find no evidence to support alpha persistence a managers alpha in one year is not significantly related to his alpha in the prior year. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence for style persistence funds that rely on carry, trend or value trading or with a longshort bias toward currency volatility are likely to maintain that style in the following year. In addition, we are able to examine the performance of managers that survive through the entire sample period, versus those that drop out. We find significant differences in both the investment styles of living versus deceased funds, as well as their realized alpha performance measures. We conjecture that both style differences and ineffective market timing, rather than market conditions, have impacted performance outcomes and induced some managers to close their funds. Click here for full article Momtchil Pojarliev, Hermes Investment Management Limited Richard M. Levich, New York Universitys Leonard N. Stern School of Business The Rising Costs of Low U. S. Interest Rates The Federal Open Market Committees (FOMC) decision to drastically reduce interest rates over the past year may be viewed positively in hindsight because it prevented a collapse of the U. S. credit markets. But it is more likely that this decision will be remembered for the toll it exacted on the U. S. economy and global markets. After tightening monetary policy for two years, from June 2004 to June 2006, the decision by the FOMC in the autumn of last year to reverse course seems to have provided some short-term relief to U. S. financial institutions and credit markets. But it also has significantly raised the long-term costs and challenges of restoring price stability in the consumer goods and financial markets. Click here for full article This paper provides a discussion about some recent issues related to the transfer of credit risk (CRT) from the perspective of global liquidity. The CRT market is enormously growing and exhibits major structural shifts in terms of buyers and sellers of protection. I try to address these issues from an options perspective by suggesting that liquidity providing can be understood, in economic terms, as selling put options. The overall conclusion of the paper is that it is not the extent of CRT per se, as often claimed, which causes liquidity related systemic risk, but rather the potential coordination failures of the behavior market participants in adverse market environments. In this context, I critically address the role of investments banks in providing liquidity to hedge funds, and finally, the (limited) access of global banks to central bank liquidity through cross-border collateral trading. Since coordination failures, seen as the major issue of a potential liquidity crisis, is to a large extent a matter of market structure, regulatory actions to improve liquidity should focus on the architecture of the financial system in the first place, not so much on the behavior of individual agents. Market stabilization should therefore be understood as a process of establishing informative markets and adequate infrastructure. Click here for full article We study the effect of financial crises on hedge fund risk. Using a regime-switching beta model, we separate systematic and idiosyncratic components of hedge fund exposure. The systematic exposure to various risk factors is conditional on market volatility conditions. We find that in the high-volatility regime (when the market is rolling-down and is likely to be in a crisis state) most strategies are negatively and significantly exposed to the Large-Small and Credit Spread risk factors. This suggests that liquidity risk and credit risk are potentially common factors for different hedge fund strategies in the down-state of the market, when volatility is high and returns are very low. We further explore the possibility that all hedge fund strategies exhibit a high volatility regime of the idiosyncratic risk, which could be attributed to contagion among hedge fund strategies. In our sample this event happened only during the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis of 1998. Other crises including the recent subprime mortgage crisis affected hedge funds only through systematic risk factors, and did not cause contagion among hedge funds. Click here for full article Monica Billio, University of Venice - Department of Economics Mila Getmansky, University of Massachusetts at Amherst Loriana Pelizzon, University of Venice - Department of Economics A Portrait of Hedge Fund Investors: Flows, Performance and Smart Money We explore the flow-performance interrelation of hedge funds by separating the investment and divestment decisions of investors. We report three main results. First, we find a weak inflow-performance relation at quarterly horizons together with a very steep outflow-performance relation. At annual horizons, these patterns revert. We attribute this differential response time of inflows and outflows to the combined effect of liquidity restrictions, high searching costs and active investors monitoring. Second, consistent with the theory that performance persistence is more pronounced where money flows are the least responsive, we find remarkable differences in persistence levels across horizons for the subsets of funds experiencing inflows and outflows. Third, we show that investors limited response capacity precludes them from investing into the subsequent good performers. Conversely, investors appear to be fast and successful in de-allocating from the subsequent poor performers. Click here for full article Studies dealing with the classification of CTAs have not effectively examined the distinction between the time frame these managers trade and the strategies they employ. Nor have such studies examined the information that rigorous due diligence adds to the process of classifying CTA s. This paper utilizes a set of CTA managers screened from the binary option CTA (Managed Futures) Data Feeder database. Returns of these managers are analyzed using variables in this database as well as information collected in an extensive due diligence review. The results suggest that time frame and strategy are distinct factors in the classification of CTA managers. Furthermore, with ratings derived from the due diligence review, research quality is identified as a separate factor affecting CTA returns. Click here for full article We investigate an index of returns on professionally managed currency funds and a subset of returns from 34 individual currency fund managers. Over the period 1990-2006, excess returns earned by currency fund managers have averaged 25 basis points per month. We examine the relationship of these returns to four factors representing returns based on carry trading, trend-following, value trading and currency volatility. These four factors explain a substantial portion of the variability in index returns in the entire period and in sub-periods. We perform similar regressions for the 34 individual funds, and find many funds where returns are significantly related to these four factors. Our approach impacts the definition of alpha returns from currency speculation, modifying it from the excess return earned by the fund, to only that portion of the excess returns not explained by the four factors. While the impact on measured alpha is substantial, we find that some currency fund managers continued to generate alpha returns in the most recent sample period. Click here for full article This paper investigates potential sources of return to speculators in the commodity futures market. Initially, we focus on the classic arbitrage model based on the theories of Keynes (1930), Kaldor (1939), Hicks (1939, 1946), Working (1948) and Brennan (1958). Next our study examines the simplified arbitrage model which references the term structure of the futures price curve and provides rationale for a structural risk premium known as the roll return. We then introduce our theory of roll yield permutations which is derived from integrating the futures price curve with the expected future spot price variable. Last, we investigate Spurgins (2000) hedging response model from which asymmetric hedging response functions transfer risk premia to speculators. Our research indicates that these models have inherent shortcomings in being able to pinpoint a definitive source of structural risk premium within the complexity of the commodity futures markets. We hypothesize that the classic arbitrage pricing theory contains circular logic, and as a consequence, its natural state is disequilibrium, not equilibrium. We extend this hypothesis to suggest that the term structure of the futures price curve, while indicative of a potential roll return benefit, in fact implies a complex series of roll yield permutations. Similarly, the hedging response function elicits a behavioral risk management mechanisms, and therefore, corroborates social reflexivity. Such models are inter-related and each reflects certain qualities and dynamics within the overall futures market paradigm. With respect to managed futures, it is an observable materialization of behavioral finance, where risk, return, leverage and skill operate un-tethered from the anchor of an accurate representation of beta. In other words, it defies rational expectations equilibrium, the efficient market hypothesis and allied models - the CAPM, arbitrage pricing theory or otherwise - to single-handedly isolate a persistent source of return without that source eventually slipping away. Click here for full article Davide Accomazzo, Adjunct Professor of Finance, Pepperdine University Michael Frankfurter, Managed Account Research, Inc. Principals, Cervino Capital Management, LLC What Happened to the Quants In August 2007 During the week of August 6, 2007, a number of quantitative longshort equity hedge funds experienced unprecedented losses. Based on TASS hedge-fund data and simulations of a specific longshort equity strategy, we hypothesize that the losses were initiated by the rapid unwind of one or more sizable quantitative equity market-neutral portfolios. Given the speed and price impact with which this occurred, it was likely the result of a forced liquidation by a multi-strategy fund or proprietary-trading desk, possibly due to a margin call or a risk reduction. These initial losses then put pressure on a broader set of longshort and long-only equity portfolios, causing further losses by triggering stoploss and de-leveraging policies. A significant rebound of these strategies occurred on August 10th, which is also consistent with the unwind hypothesis. This dislocation was apparently caused by forces outside the longshort equity sector in a completely unrelated set of markets and instruments suggesting that systemic risk in the hedge-fund industry may have increased in recent years. Click here for full article Natural-resource managers make or lose their bread-and-butter by structuring active bets in the commodity markets in a variety of ways. Active managers may try to call the market direction correctly make relative-value bets in the derivatives markets take on basis risk invest in natural-resources equities, particularly in emerging markets or they may trade physical commodities. Active natural-resource managers need to be clearly differentiated from Commodity Trading Advisors (CTAs) and index funds. CTAs (or systematic trend followers) exploit trends in the financial and commodity markets. Indexed commodity funds, in turn, offer the investor pure commodity exposure. The case for institutional investors to include both passive commodities portfolio exposure as well as active commodities management has been made by a variety of industry observers. Until now, however, the subset of active natural-resource managers has not seen the growth in assets that the commodity index funds have seen. Clearly, active natural-resource investing is not nearly as well understood by institutional investors. As such, an institutional investor considering an investment with a naturalresources manager needs to understand the trading strategies, risks, and potential returns in this investment category. This article will focus on the due-diligence process as it applies to investment strategies commonly used by active natural-resource managers. Click here for full article Since the publication of our first paper on hedge fund replication in 2005, our FundCreator methodology has met with many positive reactions. There have also been some negative responses though. Until now we have not responded to the criticism launched against FundCreator, other than the occasional remark when asked for comments. However, with a number of high profile conferences on the subject coming up this year and early next year and investors clearly becoming confused as a result of the amount of disinformation that is being circulated, in this short paper we will address the 10 most common points of criticism. We will argue that most of these are largely unjustified and fairly trivial at best and no reason whatsoever to doubt the capability of FundCreator to deliver exactly what it promises: returns with predefined statistical properties. Here we go. Click here for full article We examine whether hedge funds are more likely to experience extremely poor returns when equity, fixed income, and currency markets or other hedge funds have extremely poor performance than would be predicted by correlations of hedge fund returns with returns on these markets or with returns of other hedge funds (contagion). First, we consider whether extreme movements in these markets are contagious to Arbitrage, Directional, and Event Driven hedge fund indices. Second, we investigate whether extreme adverse returns in one hedge fund index are contagious to other hedge fund indices. To conduct these examinations, we estimate Poisson regressions using both monthly and daily returns on hedge fund style indices. We find no systematic evidence of contagion from equity, fixed income, and currency markets to hedge fund indices, although the Arbitrage index exhibits evidence of contagion from the equity and currency markets for monthly data. In contrast, we find systematic evidence of contagion across hedge fund styles for both monthly and daily data. Our results provide a new perspective on the systemic risks of hedge funds and suggest that diversification across hedge funds may not help as much as correlations would imply in reducing the probability of very poor returns. Click here for full article Nicole M Boyson, Northeastern University Christof W. Stahel, George Mason University Ren M. Stulz, Ohio State University A Subprimer on Risk Early in 2007, there were concerns about two issues that could wind up causing significant havoc. One was the potential unwind of the yen carry trade, which we covered in our last issue. The other was the weakness in subprime mortgages in the US. At the risk of further cursing the market, it is fair to say that the yen carry trade scenario has not come about as yet. But clearly, the subprime issue has come to a head, and by now has impacted markets directly linked to subprime, such as securitized products and the equity of mortgage lenders, and others where the link is at best indirect, such as corporate credit, leveraged buyouts, and global equities. A postmortem analysis of these market events is premature, since the situation is still quite fluid. A comprehensive analysis of subprime mortgages, the catalyst of our current excitement, is beyond the scope of our efforts here. Still, it is not a market we can ignore, and so we offer some thoughts here on what is particular about subprime, and what we might be able to learn after this storm has blown over. Click here for full article When I recently co-edited the book, Intelligent Commodity Investing (Risk Books, 2007), a risk-management professional asked me if the title of the book is an oxymoron. This question was posed soon after the Amaranth debacle so perhaps the question is an appropriate one. This article will argue that one can indeed intelligently invest in the commodity markets and will briefly touch on three approaches, which in turn are drawn from the Intelligent Commodity Investing book. The first two sections of this article will discuss two historically profitable approaches that take into consideration the largely mean-reverting properties of commodity prices. The final section of the article will argue that we are in the midst of a rare trend shift in prices for some commodity markets and will provide some ideas on how to benefit from this shift. Click here for full article Dubbed the Trade of the Decade by at least one website, it is difficult to imagine a single trading strategy getting more popular attention than the carry trade has over the last eighteen months. Headlines in early 2006 included Japans Boom May Explode Yen-Carry Trade and Yen Carry Trade to Unwind-Market Crash Alert. Fears rose again in early 2007: in What keeps bankers awake at night the Economist made the carry trade first on its list. But the fears seem to have subsided, with the Economist acknowledging more recently that the carry trade may have gone Out With a Whimper. Click here for full article In this article, we provide the busy reader with a survey of articles that were written over the past four years on hedge funds. Specifically, we review the economic basis for hedge fund returns and then discuss some of the logical consequences of these observations. Next, we summarize the general statistical properties of hedge fund strategies. We then examine what the appropriate performance measurement and risk management techniques are for these investments. And lastly, we briefly cover ways that investors can consider incorporating hedge funds within their overall portfolios. Click here for full article Never has an industry so extensively studied by experts produced such a surplus of myths, misunderstandings, and half-truths. Many of these myths could easily be clarified with a call or two to knowledgeable industry professionals. Too often, a seemingly logical statement that sounds-good-when-you-say-it-fast becomes accepted conventional wisdom despite the reams of evidence weighted against it. Although many of these experts are well-intentioned, they may not be sufficiently well-informed. The solution lies in enhanced collaboration between academia, industry, and the press. Click here for full article The interest in commodity trading advisers (CTAs) and hedge funds trading purely currency has increased significantly in recent times this has both been with respect to the number of participants involved and the money-under-management allocated to the sector, Middleton (2006). Performance has suffered over the past couple of years and this has led many to question how sustainable this popularity in currency will be. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the downturn in performance experienced by currency programmes over the past couple of years. Active currency indices are used, together with transparent proxies for style, to highlight the importance of assessing performance over as long a period as possible prior to making investment decisions. The paper puts forward some possible explanations for the recent difficulties investigates whether the investors appetite for currency as an asset class still remains and concludes with thoughts on the ways in which participants may have to change in order to adapt to the new environment. Click here for full article In this paper we use the hedge fund return replication technique recently introduced in Kat and Palaro (2005) to evaluate the net-of-fee performance of 875 funds of hedge funds and 2073 individual hedge funds, up to an including November 2006. Comparing fund returns with the returns on dynamic futures trading strategies with the same risk and dependence characteristics, we find that no more than 18.6 of the funds of funds and 22.5 of the individual hedge funds in our sample convincingly beat the benchmark. In other words, the majority of hedge funds have not provided their investors with returns, which they could not have generated themselves by mechanically trading a diversified basket of liquid futures contracts. Over time, we observe a substantial deterioration in overall hedge fund performance. In addition, we find a tendency for the performance of successful funds to deteriorate over time. This supports the hypothesis that increased assets under management tend to endanger future performance. Click here for full article One of the more notable trends in the hedge fund industry over the past few years is the migration toward more stringent liquidity terms. That is, managers are requiring lock ups of one year or longer and are also lengthening notice periods for redemptions. Numerous reasons exist for this shift including potential SEC registration that may be skirted by employing a lock up of two years or more, a trend toward lesser-liquid underlying investments in an attempt to generate favorable returns and, for lack of a better term, manager greed. The SEC regulation rationale appears moot for the time being given that the mandatory registration requirement has been indefinitely tabled (see Goldstein, et al v. SEC, 2006). The most legitimate argument appears to be the utilization of more strict liquidity terms in order to better match fund assets and liabilities as managers migrate toward lesser-liquid underlying investments. Manager greed on the other hand continues to exemplify a straight forward supply and demand issue: the highest quality managers with the best performance are likely to be more in demand and will best be in a position to dictate lock up requirements. Notwithstanding the aforementioned arguments, the question remains as to what longterm value is being added by managers employing more inflexible liquidity terms. In this study we revisit, albeit with a different set of data, the observations of Liang (1999) pertaining to fund lock ups and performance. We then delve further into the data on a sub-strategy basis to determine the extent of value added and to discuss the necessity of lock ups given the nature of the underlying securities employed within each sub-strategy. Click here for full article One of the most powerful tensions in the world of money management is in the pull between assets that perform well on their own and portfolios that perform well. Even the most casual students of finance know about the importance of diversification. But as soon as any one asset turns in a bad performance, the temptation to dump that asset and replace it with something that performed better is nearly irresistible. What we found in this research is that team players outperformed superstars. We found that the difference was statistically significant. We found that in most cases replacing underperforming managers with someone who would have been better did little or nothing to improve overall portfolio performance. We did find, though, that firing team players for poor individual performance and replacing them with managers with higher Sharpe ratios seriously degraded the performance of the portfolio. Click here for full article We examine how Amaranth, a respected, diversified multi-strategy hedge fund, could have lost 65 of its 9.2 billion assets in a little over a week. To do so, we take the publicly reported information on the funds Natural Gas positions as well as its recent gains and losses to infer the sizing of the funds energy strategies. We find that as of the end of August, the funds likely daily volatility due to energy trading was about 2. The funds losses on 91506 were likely a 9-standard-devation event. We discuss how the funds strategies were economically defensible in providing liquidity to physical Natural Gas producers and merchants, but find that like Long Term Capital Management, the magnitude of Amaranths energy position-taking was inappropriate relative to its capital base. Click here for full article Although commodity markets have been around for centuries, investors interest in them has always been quite limited. Over the last few years, however, this has changed completely. Commodities have very quickly become very popular and investment in commodities is growing at an unprecedented rate. It is estimated that over the past few years (institutional) investors have poured 75 billion into commodities and according to a recent institutional investor survey by binary options Capital, many institutions expect to significantly increase their commodity exposure further over the next three years1. After initially taking a somewhat reserved view on the commodity investment boom, the supply side is rolling out a whole range of commodity-linked products funds, ETFs, trackers, and all kinds of structured products. Given investors appetite for and the very healthy profit margins earned on these products, the end of the boom may not be in sight yet. Click here for full article New research by CISDM and the binary option Group examines the early reporting habits of hedge funds and CTAs. In the article, Early Reporting Effects on Hedge Fund and CTA Returns, published in the Journal of Alternative Investments, Fall 2006 issue, it is shown that hedge funds and to a lesser extent CTAs who delay reporting returns often report lower performance than those who report early. Hedge fund and CTA indices published by the binary option Group are used to demonstrate the differences between early estimates and final numbers. Each month, binary options provides an early estimate (usually within the first week of the month) of the previous months returns by strategy based on reporting managers. Typically within weeks following the early estimate, binary options provides a final estimate for the previous months hedge fund andor CTA index returns. Note that hedge fund and CTA fundmanager returns are reported in the month following the actual month of performance. This provides enough time for firms to properly calculate returns using various administrative reporting services and report them (if desired) to several of the existing hedge fund databases. The binary option group is one of several firms or organizations currently reporting hedge fund and CTA returns on the industry. Other major hedge fund and CTA index reporting organizations include CISDM and HFR. While some overlap exists among databases managed by various firms and organizations, past research (Jones, 2005) has shown that each database differs as to reporting managers (approximately 50). Click here for full article In this paper we study the multivariate return properties of a large variety of commodity futures. We find that between commodity groupings (such as metals, energy, etc.) correlations are very low and mostly insignificant whereas within groups they tend to be much stronger. In addition, commodity futures are roughly uncorrelated with stocks and bonds. Still, correlations may vary somewhat over the different phases of the business cycle, suggesting that not all commodities make equally good diversifiers at all times. Copula-based tests do not indicate any deviant behaviour in the tails of the joint return distribution of commodity futures and stocks or bonds. Contrary to equities and bonds, we show that commodity futures returns are positively correlated with unexpected inflation (i. e. 25 on average with CPI inflation as opposed to 30 for equities and 50 for bonds). There are significant differences between the various commodities, however, with energy, metals, cattle, and sugar offering the best hedging potential. Altogether, assuming that the observed regularities will persist, our results confirm that a well-balanced commodity futures portfolio could offer a worthwhile diversification service to the typical traditional investment portfolio. Click here for full article In this chapter, we introduce readers to commodity (natural resource) futures programs. We begin the chapter by describing the present investment landscape as one where return compression in a number of popular hedge fund strategies has led absolute-return investors to investigate other promising return sources. This includes the highly volatile natural-resource markets, which Lammey (2004) describes as a paradise for speculators. The second section of the chapter discusses how (real) spot commodity prices have been in a long-term secular decline, which has meant that in the past, most arguments for investing in commodities have had to rely on one of the two following rationales. An investment in a commodity futures program has had to (1) capture cyclical opportunities, or (2) provide an inherent risk premium that has only been available in certain futures markets. This latter concept is admittedly esoteric and will be explained later in this chapter. In the chapters third section we will argue that current commodity investment programs, which are designed to either capture cyclical opportunities or monetize risk premia, are still valid in the current environment. But we will further note that one can also make a plausible case for investing in commodities based on increases in spot commodity prices. The 1990s were marked by a series of unusually favorable supply shocks, which may not be the case going forward, as ONeill of Goldman Sachs et al. (2004) have warned. In the concluding section of the article, we will outline the risk management requirements for a commodity investment program, given that absolute-return investors require that hedge funds control downside risk rather than just capture the premium of the asset class, as Ineichen of UBS (2003) has explained. Click here for full article Optimizing fund growth maximizes fund value. We argue that growth in fund size results from managerial skill. To test this argument, we estimate a model that links fund growth to performance characteristics. We use the model to isolate significant performance characteristics, and then confirm that the model has predictive power out-of-sample. This predictive ability suggests that a manger can employ strategies to optimize his funds size and hence maximize overall fund value, thus demonstrating skill. In November, we discussed risk modeling of credit spreads. We raised two broad questions. First, we asked which market should we look to for information. And when credit is traded in more than one market, should we choose the one with the greatest liquidity, or the one that most closely matches our position Second, we asked what made a time series useful as a risk factor, and whether we could choose among a variety of definitions of spread to obtain the best properties for forecasting purposes. A third question we could have asked, but did not, was how we should model the volatility once we had obtained a useful time series. We picked up that question in our December note. In this note, we ask the first two questions again, but for futures contracts rather than credit spreads. As we will discuss, there are modeling choices we have applied for a long time which, while serving us well broadly, are in fact questionable in specific cases. Moreover, it is never a bad thing to return to models that have been around a while, and revisit the thinking that led us to those choices in the past. We examine the role of backwardation in the performance of passive long positions in soybeans, corn and wheat futures over the period, 1950 to 2004. We find that over this period, backwardation has been highly predictive of the return of a passive long futures position when measured over long investment horizons. The share of return variance explained by backwardation rises from 24 at a one-year horizon to 64 using five-year time periods. A historical examination of soybean production and trading suggests that the profitability of a passive long soybean position during the early part of our sample may have resulted from inadequate inventories and storage facilities at the time. These conditions created the conditions for demand-driven price spikes. Further, the thin margins of soybean processors likely increased hedging demand. The implications for commodity investing are considered. Click here for full article In this paper we study the univariate return properties of a large variety of commodity futures. Our analysis shows that the volatility of commodity futures is comparable to that of US large cap stocks. Yet, with the exception of energy, a consistently positive risk premium is lacking in commodity futures. We also find that for many commodities, futures returns and volatility can vary considerably over different phases of the business cycle, under different monetary conditions as well as with the shape of the futures curve. Skewness in commodity futures returns is largely insignificant, whereas kurtosis is significantly positive and comparable to that of US large cap stocks. In almost all commodities we find significant degrees of autocorrelation, which affects the properties of longer horizon returns. Click here for full article In this paper we use the hedge fund return replication technique recently introduced by Kat and Palaro (2005) to evaluate the net-of-fee performance of 1917 individual hedge funds. Comparing fund returns with the returns on dynamic futures trading strategies with the same risk and dependence characteristics, we find that no more than 17.7 of the hedge funds in our sample beat the benchmark. In other words, the majority of hedge funds have not provided their investors with returns, which they could not have generated themselves by mechanically trading SP 500, T-bond and Eurodollar futures. Over time, we observe a substantial deterioration in overall hedge fund performance. In addition, we find a tendency for the performance of successful funds to deteriorate over time. This supports the hypothesis that increased assets under management endanger future performance. Click here for full article January 5, 2006 - NEW YORK - Strategic Financial Solutions, LLC, (SFS) creator of the worlds leading asset allocation and investment analysis software, the PerTrac Desktop Analytical Platform, is pleased to present the aggregate results of the 2005 SFS Hedge Fund Database Study, an annual report that aims to shed additional light on the hedge fund industry. Click here for full article The risk-adjusted returns since inception of most hedge fund indices have been enhanced by a favorable environment and could be susceptible to a decrease in market risk appetite. However, this vulnerability is not uniform managed futures strategies have proven more robust than other hedge fund strategies, yielding positive returns under both risk-seeking and risk-averse conditions. Risk-averse periods tend to cluster and therefore the current state of market risk appetite provides information about the future state of market risk appetite. These effects in combination mean that it is possible to enhance portfolio performance by combining a measure of risk aversion with allocations to the managed futures space. Click here for full article In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by developing a fundamental framework to project future market volatility. We then apply it to current conditions, expecting in 2006 a rebound in market volatility from depressed levels, but with high volatility delayed to 2007-08. We draw implication for asset returns, active returns, and for what policy markets should be looking out for. We come up with some expected results, but also with quite a few surprises (at least to us). Among these are that leverage by investors tends to lag, rather than lead market volatility that corporate leverage and macroeconomic volatility are more causally related to market volatility that hedge funds seem very reluctant to raise leverage, in contrast to banks and that active investors tend to do poorly when volatility rises unexpectedly. Click here for full article The Sharpe ratio is a statistic which aims to sum up the desirability of a risky investment strategy or instrument by dividing the average period return in excess of the risk-free rate by the standard deviation of the return generating process. Devised in 1966 as a measure of performance for mutual funds, it undoubtedly has some value as a measure of strategy quality, but it also has several crucial limitations (see Sharpe 1994 for a recent restatement and review of its principles). Furthermore, its widespread and often indiscriminate adoption as a quality measure is leading to distortion of proper investment priorities, as investment firms manipulate strategies and data to maximise it. Click here for full article Over 1,000 representatives from 650 firms completed the 2005 Deutsche Bank Alternative Investment Survey. These 650 investors represent 645 billion dollars in direct hedge fund assets, which we estimate is nearly two-thirds of all assets in the hedge fund industry. We asked each respondent to categorize themselves as a fund of funds, bank, corporation, consultant, insurance company, pension, endowment, foundation, family office or high net worth individual. We received responses from all these investor types, with a particularly strong showing from pensions, endowments and foundations, comprising 18 of respondents. Family offices and high net worth individuals are also well represented, at 15. Funds of funds represent the largest group, with 43 of all responses. We polled investors from all over the world, with roughly half from the United States and more than a third from Europe. Click here for full article Two studies, by Watson Wyatt and UBS (both from March 2005), give a pessimistic view of the hedge fund industrys capacity to generate long-term returns, due to its increasing size. Unfortunately, these studies focus almost exclusively on alpha. In the present paper, we show the importance of considering not only the exposure to the market (the traditional beta), but also the other exposures (the alternative betas) to cover all the sources of hedge fund returns. To do so, we examine the real extent to which the variability and level of hedge fund returns are affected by (static) betas, dynamic betas (i. e. factor timing), and pure alpha (i. e. security selection). Click here for full article Over the last 10 years hedge funds have become very popular with high net worth investors and are currently well on their way to acquire a significant allocation from many institutional investors as well. The growing popularity of hedge funds and the availability of various hedge fund databases have spawned several hundreds of academic research papers on various aspects of the hedge fund industry and especially the risk-return performance of hedge funds and fund of funds. Many of these papers apply methods, like standard mean-variance and Sharpe ratio analysis for example, which are ill-suited for the analysis of hedge funds returns and have, as a result, produced incorrect conclusions. Fortunately, some studies have taken a more sophisticated approach and have made it clear that hedge fund returns are not really superior to the returns on traditional asset classes, but primarily just different. With hedge fund performance getting worse every year, the hedge fund industry has come to more or less the same conclusion. Unlike in the early days, hedge funds are no longer sold on the promise of superior performance, but more and more on the back of a diversification argument: due to their low correlation with stocks and bonds, hedge funds can significantly reduce the risk (as measured by the standard deviation) of a traditional investment portfolio without giving up expected return. Once we accept that hedge fund returns are not superior, but just different, the obvious next question is: is it possible to generate hedge fund-like returns ourselves by mechanically trading stocks and bonds (either in the cash or futures markets) Although hedge fund managers typically put a lot of effort into generating their returns, maybe it is possible to generate very similar returns in a much more mechanical way and with a lot less effort. If it is, we may be able to do without expensive hedge fund managers and all the hassle, including the due diligence, the lack of liquidity, the lack of transparency, the lack of capacity, and the fear for style drift, which comes with investing in hedge funds. There might well be more than one road leading to Rome. Based on earlier work into hedge fund return replication by Amin and Kat (2003), we have done a lot of research in this area, which has lead to the development of a 3 general procedure that allows us to design simple trading strategies in stock index, bond, currency and interest rate futures that generate returns with statistical properties that are very similar to those of hedge funds, or any other type of managed fund for that matter. In what follows, we briefly describe this procedure as well as provide some examples of the procedures amazing results. Click here for full article U. S. stock market from 1986 through 2002. While the falling knives we identified did post a relatively high bankruptcy rate over the three-year period following their initial drop, they also outperformed the SP 500 by wide margins. We followed up our study of U. S.-based falling knives by extending our falling knife analysis to markets outside the United States - and we concluded that non-U. S. knives also tended to outdistance their benchmarks. Whats new in this paper First, we study both U. S. and non-U. S. falling knives over a synchronized time period: 1980 through the end of 2003. As a result, our analysis now includes many falling knives that were generated in 2000, when the generally high valuation levels of the late 1990s began to wind down amid the collapse of the technology stock bubble. We also take an in-depth look at falling knives over time, by sector, and - for non-U. S. knives - on a country-by-country basis. In addition, we test market capitalization and enterprise-value-to-sales ratios as possible predictors of falling knife performance. Click here for full article Demographics, climate change, debt problems, deficit worries: the list of potential life changing events goes on. Yet there is one other decision that could overwhelm all these. If Asia - from Japan to China - formally begins to use the US dollar as their standard of value it will change the outlook for asset prices for decades to come. The idea is not fantasy. Chinas latest infusion of cash into State banks suggests that floating the RMB may not be as high on the political agenda as some hope. Moreover, the long-term Yen outlook looks far from assured. A simple pan-Asian dollar fix would drive Asian asset prices sky-high. And its happened before: Japan fixed to the US dollar in 1949 at Y360 and Hong Kong fixed in 1983 at HK7.80. Both markets subsequently enjoyed sharp increases in asset prices. Click here for full article Hedge funds have become increasingly popular among institutional investors due to their potential for generating positive returns in any market environment. The recent growth in the number, style, and complexity of these investments has increased the importance of the fund-offunds service provider. More recently, investable hedge fund indices have emerged to represent a quasi-passive low-cost beta approach to hedge fund investing. On the other hand, fund-of-funds are being relied upon to provide manager selection, due diligence, asset allocation, and riskmonitoring advice to institutional investors who are resource-constrained they are viewed as an active alpha-producing investment when compared with rules-based hedge fund indices. In this paper, we outline the theoretical and practical challenges of applying an investable index-based approach to an actively managed hedge fund industry, and seek to identify the potential value that fund-of-funds may provide. Click here for full article In February 2004, Everest Capital authored a White Paper titled The Continuing Case for Emerging Markets highlighting our positive outlook for emerging markets equities. We revisit our thesis below, and reiterate our favorable view for the performance of the asset class. Click here for full article In this article, we describe the reasons traditional performance evaluation approaches do not work-for traditional investments as well as hedge funds. However, unlike previous articles that have simply documented the problems, we offer a solution: Namely, performance evaluation in general, and hedge fund performance evaluation in particular, should be viewed as a hypothesis test where we assess the validity of the hypothesis Performance is good. To accept or reject this hypothesis, the textbooks say you should construct all of the possible outcomes and see where the actual performance result falls. If the observed performance is toward the top of all of the possibilities, the hypothesis is correct, and performance is good. Otherwise, it is not. In other words, the hypothesis test gives us a chance to determine if a manager truly has the skill to outperform a group of monkeys randomly playing the same game. Click here for full article The two most remarkable features in financial markets in recent years have been the plunge in stock market volatility and the bull market in credits. Together they have helped to sustain high valuation levels across world equity markets. Yet the two features are closely linked: their common factor being monetary policy, or more accurately monetary stability. In short, low currency market volatility has led to low stock market volatility, which, in turn, has fuelled the appetite for credit. We argue in this report that the world economy is operating two monetary standards. One looks rock steady the other appears close to change. The bottom line is that financial markets may be nearer to the fault line than most investors believe. Volatility could jump and credits blow out. Click here for full article Hedge funds do not easily fit into the current way institutions go about investing. Based on a survey of recent academic and practitioner research, this article reviews six competing frameworks for how to incorporate hedge funds in institutional portfolios. Each framework has very different implications for institutional asset allocation, manager selection, and benchmarking. Click here for full article Investable Hedge Fund Indices (IHFIs) have grown in numbers since the first meaningful introduction of these during 2003. While making their presence wide spread through a number of main providers, investors have been left with the task of considering whether or not IHFIs achieve in practice a better if not outright alternative to established Hedge Funds of Funds (HFOFs ). What the assessments provided by this report show is that IHFIs are not very different to HFOFs and in many ways HFOFs remain a more viable alternative. Large dispersions are shown to exist for the same types of Hedge Fund Strategies amongst the different IHFI providers. The subscription and redemption costs, notice periods and annual fees make the actual performance which investors can expect to realise from Buy and Hold investing, substantially less than that reported for the underlying indices on which the IHFIs are based. In summary, many practical challenges remain open with investing in IHFIs and will require considerable time and resources to shift the vote towards IHFIs away from HFOFs if at all. Click here for full article Longshort equity hedge funds have historically outperformed traditional long equity exposure with lower risk. This is a result of a demonstrated capability by longshort managers to generate alpha via stock selection, rotation in and out of cash and timely shifts in market exposures (e. g. large vs. small capitalization, sector, geography, etc). As a consequence, longshort managers have tended to generate a highly favorable characteristic: a higher correlation to equity markets in rising markets and lower correlation in falling markets (sometimes referred to as an asymmetrical riskreturn profile). Over the past decade, assets under management by longshort equity hedge funds have grown more than 20 annually. This expansion was the most rapid of any hedge fund strategy and longshort managers have displaced global macro funds to claim the largest share of industry assets. Although a portion of this growth in longshort assets was attributable to market appreciation, the demonstrated ability of the managers themselves was also a key factor stimulating inflows. In my view, the optimum portfolio allocation should include adequate doses of unconstrained longshort managers in lieu of passive or active long equity exposure. Indeed, if one relies solely on the historical performance record, longshort managers would entirely displace traditional long-only managers. This view holds up even when longshort manager returns are liberally adjusted downward to reflect possible survivor bias. And while there is no guarantee that longshort manager performance will hold up in the future, it would take a severe deterioration in manager capabilities to justify no allocation, in my opinion. There is no one preeminent asset allocation scheme for delineating the role of longshort hedge funds in portfolios-it depends on an investors current positions and portfolio management structure. Approaches include allocating to an aggregate longshort category and populating the space with generalist managers that invest broadly. Alternatively, one can distinguish between geographic markets (developed, emerging, etc) or invest in styles (valuegrowth) as part of the overall equity allocation. In this article, I make the case for incorporating the alpha-generating capabilities and the implicit beta exposure of longshort managers explicitly in the asset allocation process. The first section reviews the evolution of longshort hedge funds. The performance characteristics of the longshort managers are then reviewed in the second section. The third section describes the basic determinants of longshort manager returns. This is followed by an analysis of what allocations to longshort managers might make sense. The final section discusses the attributes of various longshort managers who specialize in sectors. The key conclusion is that longshort managers have a demonstrated ability to outperform on a risk-adjusted basis compared to most long-only vehicles. I believe substantial allocations to these managers are appropriate regardless of whether one views them as a substitute for active equity managers or as a stand-alone hedge fund strategy. Click here for full article Anjilvel et al 2001 emphasize the alpha advantage of hedge fund managers. They write, Our research has shown that a significant proportion of the total return to hedge funds in the past has been alpha, in contrast with a small negative total alpha for mutual funds . They hypothesize, One possible explanation for an alpha advantage. is that. the active managers can forecast expected returns better than others. This means a significant ability to exploit market inefficiencies to outperform their benchmarks, presumably by virtue of skill, knowledge, and insight. This view of hedge fund management has a direct impact on the potential capacity of the hedge fund industry. To figure out the capacity of the hedge fund industry, we start by quoting from Cochrane 1999: . the average investor must hold the market so portfolio decisions must be driven by differences between an investor and the average investor. If hedge funds are exploiting market inefficiencies, this means that other investors are supplying those inefficiencies. This means that, unfortunately, we cant all profit from exploiting inefficiencies. Therefore, there is a natural cap on the potential size of the hedge fund industry, assuming that hedge funds are indeed exploiting inefficiencies rather than taking in risk premiums. Click here for full article We construct an equally-weighted index of commodity futures monthly returns over the period between July of 1959 and December of 2004 in order to study simple properties of commodity futures as an asset class. Fully-collateralized commodity futures have historically offered the same return and Sharpe ratio as equities. While the risk premium on commodity futures is essentially the same as equities, commodity futures returns are negatively correlated with equity returns and bond returns. The negative correlation between commodity futures and the other asset classes is due, in significant part, to different behavior over the business cycle. In addition, commodity futures are positively correlated with inflation, unexpected inflation, and changes in expected inflation. Click here for full article This paper incorporates investor preferences for return distributions higher moments into a Polynomial Goal Programming (PGP) optimisation model. This allows us to solve for multiple competing hedge fund allocation objectives within a mean-variance-skewness-kurtosis framework. Our empirical analysis underlines the existence of significant differences in the return behaviour of different hedge fund strategies. Irrespective of investor preferences, the PGP optimal portfolios contain hardly any allocation to longshort equity, distressed securities, and emerging markets funds. Equity market neutral and global macro funds on the other hand tend to receive very high allocations, primarily due to their low co-variance, high co-skewness and low co-kurtosis properties. More specifically, equity market neutral funds act as volatility and kurtosis reducers, while global macro funds act as portfolio skewness enhancers. In PGP optimal portfolios of stocks, bonds, and hedge funds, where equity exposure tends to be traded off for hedge fund exposure, we observe a similar preference for equity market neutral and global macro funds. Click here for full article Illiquidity is a common feature of alternative investments, but the diversity of hedge fund investments - including OTC derivatives - present special challenges. Hilary Till of Premia Capital Management reviews developments in quantitative techniques for evaluating the effect on performance. Click here for full article OneChicago, LLC has asked Gardner Carton Douglas LLP to summarize the regulatory implications for funds and their advisors of investing or trading in security futures products (SFPs). SFPs are unique in that they are both securities and futures. Funds and investment managers must understand how the use of SFPs may affect their existing registrations andor exemptions or trigger the need for new registrations or exemptions. To navigate the analysis, we have created separate links for each type of fund or advisor. To view a summary of the regulatory implications of using SFPs, click on to the link that corresponds to the situation that is relevant to you. Of course, if more than one situation is relevant to you, you should review each relevant link. The accompanying regulatory analysis is not intended to be exhaustive. It does not include an analysis of the implications of using SFPs under the Securities Act of 1933 or Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Further, this analysis is not legal advice, which may often turn on specific facts. Readers should seek specific legal advice from qualified counsel before acting with regard to the subjects mentioned here. Click here for full article Some investors who are unfamiliar with managed futures are nervous about the volatility of the asset class. Unbeknownst to them, they may be missing an opportunity to reduce the overall risk of loss in their investment portfolios. Historically, diversified investment portfolios perform better and are less volatile when they include managed futures investments. Considering that returns from managed futures tend to be highly volatile, these assertions are counterintuitive. A clearer understanding of how this happens is obtained by studying the nature of managed futures returns and their correlation to stocks and bonds, especially during times of stress for financial markets. Click here for full article The paper tests the performance of 2894 hedge funds in a time period that encompasses unambiguously bullish and bearish trends whose pivot is commonly set at March 2000. Our database proves to be fairly trustable with respect to the most important biases in hedge fund studies, despite the high attrition rate of funds observed in the down market. We apply an original ten-factor composite performance model that achieves very significance levels. The analysis of performance indicates that most hedge funds significantly out-performed the market during the whole test period, mostly thanks to the bullish sub-period. In contrast, no significant under-performance of individual hedge fund strategies is observed when markets headed south. The analysis of persistence yields very similar results, with most of the predictability being found among middle performers during the bullish period. However, the Market Neutral strategy represents a remarkable exception, as abnormal performance is sustained throughtout and significant persistence can be found between the 20 and 69 best performers in this category, probably thanks to an extreme adaptability and a very active investment behavior. Click here for full article Emerging markets have not yet fully made their way back onto investors radar screens. Those who have not looked at the asset class since the turmoil of the late 1990s may be surprised by what they find a mere five years later. Largely unnoticed, emerging markets have outperformed developed markets over the past one-, three - and five-year periods. Investment inflows into the asset class finally showed renewed signs of life in late 2003, following net outflows over the previous five years. This lack of investor interest was in stark contrast to the acceleration of foreign direct investment (FDI) during the same period. Click here for full article The paper highlights the inadequacies of the traditional RAPMs (Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures) and proposes AIRAP (Alternative Investments Risk Adjusted Performance), based on Expected Utility theory, as a RAPM better suited to Alternative Investments. AIRAP is the implied certain return that a risk-averse investor would trade off for holding risky assets. AIRAP captures the full distribution, penalizes for volatility and leverage, is customizable by risk aversion, works with negative mean returns, eschews moment estimation or convergence requirements and can dovetail with stressed scenarios or regime-switching models. A modified Sharpe Ratio is proposed. The results are contrasted with Sharpe, Treynor and Jensen rankings to show significant divergence. Evidence of non-normality and the tradeoff between mean-variance merits vis--vis high moment risks is noted. The dependence of optimal leverage on risk aversion and track record is noted. The results have implications for manager selection and fund of hedge funds portfolio construction. Click here for full article Milind Sharma, Merrill Lynch A Detailed Analysis of the Construction Methods and Management Principles of Hedge Fund Indices - Are All Hedge Fund Indices Created Equal His analysis highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the various hedge fund indices available in the market. Click here for full article Marc Goodman, Kenneth Shewer and Richard Horwitz make the case that the style-based tailwinds that equity hedge funds have enjoyed over the past few years will shift, and could become dangerous headwinds for the unaware investor. Click here for full article Marc Goodman, Kenneth Shewer and Richard Horwitz explore whether hedge funds and fund of funds provide risk-efficient diversification, and how institutional investors can best allocate assets to achieve a superior riskreturn relationship. Click here for full article Hedge Funds are seen as an alternative asset class, but what does this really mean We argue in this report that the long-run returns from hedge funds should differ little from other financial assets. However, their risk characteristics are significantly different, particularly when differentiated by their investment style. It is this characteristic that distinguishes them from conventional assets. Hedge funds are not higher risk and they are not necessarily lower risk: they simply have a different risk profile. As such they should be part of every asset allocation. Click here for full article There are two ways to make money in financial markets. Beta - One way to make money in financial markets is to take on a systematic risk for which the market compensates you. This type of risk is known as beta. For instance, equities have a higher expected return than cash over time for the simple reason that they are a more risky investment than cash. The same is true of long duration bonds versus cash, corporate bonds versus treasuries, mortgages versus treasuries, emerging market debt versus developed market debt, etc. At any given point in time, risky financial assets may be expensive or cheap, but over time, they should return more than less risky assets. Betas are easy to capture (i. e. nave investment strategies can capture betas). Over significant periods of time, betas have positive returns. However, they have low return to risk ratios (we estimate that, over long time-frames, betas have annual Sharpe ratios ranging from 0.2 to 0.3), and for the most part, they are correlated to one another (in part because risk itself is inherent in each of them). Alpha - The other way to make money in financial markets is by taking it away from other market participants. This is known as alpha. Alpha is zero-sum. For every buyer, there is a seller, and so for every alpha trade, there is both a winner and a loser. Examples of alpha strategies include market-timing and active security selection. Only investors who are smarter than the market will be able to reliably provide alpha. Click here for full article The recovery seen in the Japanese market over the last couple of months begs the question, is this the start of a new secular bull market or a cyclical uplift in the extraordinary oversold position we saw at the end of the fiscal year We do not have the definitive answer. Fortunately as a hedge fund of funds, we do not need to time our entry into the market but to be positioned to protect funds regardless of market direction and to make money where we can. We are, however, in a position to reflect on some of the prevalent views amongst our own managers and make some observations of our own. Click here for full article As the speculative bubble of 98-99 gave way to the bear market of 00-01, pension sponsors found that traditional diversification methods have not hedged as much of the market decline as hoped - providing little absolute return protection. In particular, pension surpluses have been shrinking to the point where many organizations will be faced with a need to contribute additional funds to their pension plans just as their earnings are falling due to the economic slow-down. Therefore, its not surprising that investors are increasingly drawn to a new strategy thats relatively unaffected by the markets and the economic environment: market neutral investing. With strong positive returns and low levels of volatility, market neutral strategies are making their way into the asset allocation plans of a growing number of institutional and other qualified investors. Incorporating investment techniques that, in isolation, have historically been considered risky, investors are discovering that certain market neutral strategies are, in fact, less risky than traditional equity investments. Click here for full article I extend the classical market timing model of Merton (1981) to the case of multiple risk factors and show that the equilibrium value of a market timers forecasting ability can be written more generally as a weighted-sum of Arrow-Debreu-type contingent claim prices. Following these results I develop a class of return-based parametric tests to evaluate the ability of a portfolio manager to time multiple markets. I apply these tests to evaluate the performance of fund of funds hedge fund managers. I show that, both individually and on aggregate, fund of funds managers do not exhibit timing ability with respect to a variety of hedge fund styles. However, I argue that this result is due to frictions created by the hedge funds into which these vehicles invest. Click here for full article This paper attempts to evaluate the out-of-sample performance of an improved estimator of the covariance structure of hedge fund index returns, focusing on its use for optimal portfolio selection. Using data from CSFB-Tremont hedge fund indices, we find that ex-post volatility of minimum variance portfolios generated using implicit factor based estimation techniques is between 1.5 and 6 times lower than that of a value-weighted benchmark, such differences being both economically and statistically significant. This strongly indicates that optimal inclusion of hedge funds in an investor portfolio can potentially generate a dramatic decrease in the portfolio volatility on an out-of-sample basis. Differences in mean returns, on the other hand, are not statistically significant, suggesting that the improvement in terms of risk control does not necessarily come at the cost of lower expected returns. Click here for full article That hedge funds have started to gain widespread acceptance while remaining a somewhat mysterious asset class enhances the need for better measurement and benchmarking of their performance. One serious problem is that existing hedge fund indices provide a somewhat confusing picture of the investment universe. In this paper, we present detailed evidence of strong heterogeneity in the information conveyed by competing indices. We also attempt to provide remedies to the problem and suggest various methodologies designed to help build a pure style index, or index of the indices, for a given style. Finally, we present evidence of the ability of pure style indices to improve benchmarking of hedge fund returns. Our results can be extended to traditional investment styles such as growthvalue, small caplarge cap. Click here for full article A key measure of track record quality and strategy riskiness in the managed futures industry is drawdown, which measures the decline in net asset value from the historic high point. In this discussion we want to look at its strengths and weaknesses as a summary statistic, and examine some of its frequently overlooked features. Click here for full article The growth in demand for hedge funds since 1995 has been significant. During this period, the assets invested in hedge funds grew from an estimated 100 billion to over 500 billion. Ultimately, the sustainability of this growth depends upon the relative and absolute investment performance ofthe hedge fund industry. Hedge funds provide sophisticated investors with access to virtually every investable asset class combined with the expertise needed to manage these complex investments. These investors receive positive returns, enhanced diversification when combined with stocks and bonds, low volatility, and protection against significant drawdowns..This paper discusses systematic trend following, a hedge fund style that has a 20 year track record of producing positive annual returns with low to negative correlation to most other asset classes and hedge fund strategies. Exhibit I compares the ZCMMAR Trend Following Index versus the SP 500 and the Lehman Treasury Bond Index since 1983. Click here for full article Hilary Till continues in the spirit of her August 2002 Quantitative Finance feature on measuring risk-adjusted returns in alternative investments. Click here for full article In this paper we study the possible role of managed futures in portfolios of stocks, bonds and hedge funds. We find that allocating to managed futures allow investors to achieve a very substantial degree of overall risk reduction at limited costs. Apart from their lower expected return, managed futures appear to be more effective diversifiers than hedge funds. Adding managed futures to a portfolio of stocks and bonds will reduce that portfolios standard deviation more and quicker than hedge funds will, and without the undesirable side-effects on skewness and kurtosis. Overall portfolio standard deviation can be reduced further by combining both hedge funds and managed futures with stocks and bonds. As long as at least 45-50 of the alternatives allocation is allocated to managed futures, this again will not have any negative sideeffects on skewness and kurtosis. Click here for full article There are many benefits to investing in hedge funds, particularly when using a diversified multi-strategy approach. Over the recent years, multi-strategy funds of hedge funds have flourished and are now the favorite investment vehicles of institutional investors to discover the world of alternative investments. More recently, funds of hedge funds that specialize within an investment style have also emerged. Both types of funds put forward their ability to diversify risks by spreading them over several managers. However, diversifying a hedge fund portfolio also raises a number of issues, such as the optimal number of hedge funds to really benefit from diversification, and the influence of diversification on the various statistics of the return distribution (e. g. expected return, skewness, kurtosis, correlation with traditional asset classes, value at risk and other tail statistics). In this paper, using a large database of hedge funds over the 1990-2001 period, we study the impact of diversification on naively constructed (randomly chosen and equally weighted) hedge fund portfolios. We also provide some insight into style diversification benefits, as well as the inter-temporal evolution of diversification effects on hedge funds. Click here for full article Franccedilois-Serge Lhabitant and Michelle Learned Thunderbird, the American Graduate School of International Management Managed Futures: A Real Alternative Managed Futures investments performed well during the global liquidity crisis of August 1998. In contrast to other alternative investment strategies, the performance of Managed Futures was good in that year and had once more demonstrated their diversification potential. More assets did subsequently flow into Managed Futures, but 1999 did turn out to be one of the worst performing years for the industry. Since then, the performance as well as the acceptance of Managed Futures has improved. As the global stock markets are declining, an increasing number of investors is getting attracted to the strategy. The following article will take a closer look at this asset class. Click here for full article The popular perception is that hedge funds follow a reasonably well defined market-neutral investment style. While this long - short investment strategy may have characterized the first hedge funds, today hedge funds are a reasonably heterogeneous group. They are better defined in terms of their freedom from the constraints imposed by the Investment Company Act of 1940, than they are by the particular style of investment. We study the monthly return history of hedge funds over the period 1989 through to January 2000 and find that there are in fact a number of distinct styles of management. We find that differences in investment style contribute about 20 percent of the cross sectional variability in hedge fund performance. This result is consistent across the years of our sample and is robust to the way in which we determine investment style. We conclude that appropriate style analysis and style management are crucial to success for investors looking to invest in this market. Click here for full article We study the diversification effects from introducing hedge funds into a traditional portfolio of stocks and bonds. Our results make it clear that in terms of skewness and kurtosis equity and hedge funds do not combine very well. Although the inclusion of hedge funds may significantly improve a portfolios mean-variance characteristics, it can also be expected to lead to significantly lower skewness as well as higher kurtosis. This means that the case for hedge funds includes a definite trade-off between profit and loss potential. Our results also emphasize that to have at least some impact on the overall portfolio, investors will have to make an allocation to hedge funds which by far exceeds the typical 1-5 that many institutions are currently considering. Click here for full article This column will discuss the state of the art in applying returns-based analyses to hedge funds. It will pay particular attention to those hedge fund strategies where the use of derivatives and dynamic trading strategies can lead to highly assymetric outcomes. Click here for full article Hedge funds and other actively managed strategies contain two fundamental sources of risk: 1) Systematic risk - the risk associated with exposure to market-wide influences such as the broad equity or fixed-income market, and 2) Active risk - the risk associated with the performance of active managers relative to their market benchmarks. The conventional asset allocation approach employed by most plan sponsors and consultants fails to integrate these two sources of risk. This can lead to the formation of inefficient portfolios. In this article we propose a risk allocation framework that focuses on risk exposures instead of asset class exposures. Click here for full article Brett H. Wander and Dennis M. Bein Analytic Investors Private Placement Life Insurance The New Alternative in Insurance Within this report, we attempt to illustrate a simple bridge between hedge fund and insurance language and products, attempting to uncover the edge that exists in combining these fundamental vehicles of traditional and alternative investment worlds. Click here for full article Brad Cole and Christine Kailus Cole Partners Alternative Asset Strategies: Early Performance in Hedge Fund Managers This paper investigates the effects of age on hedge fund performance. In particular, we seek to ascertain whether hedge funds perform better during the early stages of their development. Existing studies seem to lack practicality and conclusiveness, with some studies failing to address adequately the issues of survivor and market biases. Survivor bias results from the tendency of hedge funds with poor performance to drop from available databases, causing industry performance returns to appear better than they are in reality. Market bias suggests that the recent success of many hedge funds results from strong general market performance and not necessarily from hedge fund managers skills. Unfortunately, the lack of complete and consistent data makes addressing these biases difficult. As hedge funds disappear from databases, survivor bias becomes embedded in available data. In addition, since most hedge fund databases only have significant information for the past five to ten years (coincident with one of the strongest U. S. equity market periods) market bias would also seem to be inherent in the data. In order to attempt to address these issues, this study has compiled information from various sources, including deceased funds, to create a more comprehensive database of available hedge fund information. Additionally, hedge fund returns were calculated according to age rather than vintage so that not all early returns come from the same market period. Where appropriate, subsets of this database were used. In all cases, individual hedge fund return data and not hedge fund style or hedge fund index data was used.1 Based upon this data, our conclusion is that despite the biases found in the data, investors may gain enhanced returns by investing in young hedge funds if proper due diligence is completed. Hedge funds under three years of age tend to perform better than do older hedge funds without necessarily adding to the volatility of returns. Click here for full article Given the tremendous rise in hedge fund assets, one of the most common queries we receive from clients today is: Have hedge funds grown to the point where they are no longer the market tail but the entire dog And if hedge funds have become the market dog, does the dog now have fleas That is has the proliferation of hedge funds created yet one more bubble that needs to be popped before the market can resume even a vague semblance of normal behavior Click here for full article Innovative financial engineers in alternative investments are knitting a web of complex interdependencies, yet no one has a masterplan. Click here for full article In a previous article Hillary Till touched upon the difficulty of using standard measures to evaluate certain hedge fund strategies. Here, after reviewing these difficulties, she discusses state-of-the-art solutions. Click here for full article Randy Warsager examines the treasures and the pitfalls awaiting those who make the transition from traditional to hedge fund manager. Click here for full article Selling managed futures to institutional investors is like trying to get the National Bowling Championships on primetime network TV. While the networks are making unprecedented allocations of primetime to sports coverage, bowling gets a continually smaller slice. In fact, Ive heard of one venture capitalist who is buying up all the bowling alleys in the country in order to launch a new craze, Ballroom Hurdle Dancing. Really, it is easy to pick on managed futures. In fact, the only reasons more people are not kicking managed futures is because they are too busy gagging on their distressed debt, high tech and value equity investments. The binary option Systematic Traders index which some consider to be the core CTA index was -3.63 for 1999 and is -1.70 through September 2000. But is managed futures a strategy that is just out of favor or are the wheels falling off the cart Through a series of interviews with database providers, investors, distributors and managers, we estimate a net outflow of assets due to poor performance and redemptions somewhere between of between 35 to 50 over the last eighteen months. We also feel the number of players has been trimmed by about 30. Our source for these numbers was not purely scientific, but as a 20-year participant in the futures industry, we have had to do some digging - enough to make us believe that this group is truly at a crossroads. Herein, we cut through the carnival of marketing jargon to find the real drivers running CTA-land. Click here for full article Brad Cole, President, Cole Partners Managing Investor Drawdowns Through a Risk Control Plan: A New Model for Evaluating Manager Performance Tushar Chande, President LongView Capital Management, L. L.C. The Benefits of a Long Volatility Investment Approach in a Multi-Fund Portfolio Alan R. Kaufman Chief Investment Officer, Trilogy Capital Management Group, L. L.C. Risk Management: A Practical Approach to Managing a Portfolio of Hedge Funds for a Large Insurance Company Norman Chait, CFA, AIG Global Investment Corporation
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